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Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL



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WORLDWIDE REPORT

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SOVIET JOURNAL ON 'DESTABILIZING' EFFECTS OF SDI

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 86 (signed to press 12 Aug 86) pp 37-48

[Article by A. Kozyrev: "Space and Universal Danger"]

[Text] Creatively applying Lenin's legacy to the conditions of the present day, the 27th CPSU Congress provided answers to the most burning issues confronting mankind on the threshold of the 21st century. One such issue is the conquest and use of outer space. The rapid development of science and technology and modern production techniques in spheres connected with space have made it possible in the extremely short time since the start of the space era, which was inaugurated by the Soviet Union's launch of the world's first artificial Earth satellite in 1957 and the first man in near-Earth space in 1961, to score tremendous successes in the conquest of space. Currently the world's highly developed powers, which have accumulated certain space potential, face a qualitatively new stage--the broad-scale conquest and use of space on the basis of the saturation of near-Earth orbits with space vehicles and man's permanent presence there. The question of what the opportunities which are opening up will be used for and what goals advanced space technology will serve arises under these conditions.

The events of our day strikingly illustrate the existence of two paths by which it is possible to move forward in space. It is sufficient to say that two Soviet manned stations are operating in orbit, one of which, the "Mir," is of the new generation. Its six docking ports afford an opportunity for assembling in orbit with the aid of specialized modules multipurpose national economic science-production complexes. The recent meeting of five spacecraft of various countries, including two Soviet, with Halley's Comet was convincing testimony to the tremendous potential of modern science and technology and proof of the possibility of fruitful international cooperation in the peaceful exploration of outer space even in the present complex atmosphere. And together with this the United States was conducting a number of tests of the ASAT aircraft-fired missile antisatellite complex against a target in space. As a result a space vehicle, a peaceful satellite, which was destined to be the first casualty of the militarist "star wars" program, was destroyed.

In space, as on Earth, mankind is faced with a choice: either an arms race poisoning the world political climate and ultimately threatening nuclear catastrophe or the curbing thereof, transition to a reduction in and elimination of weapons of mass annihilation, a lowering of the levels of states' military potentials to the bounds of a reasonable sufficiency and, primarily on this basis, reliable international security. The 15 January 1986 statement of M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, the CPSU Central Committee Political Report to the 27th party congress and the decisions of the congress and the CPSU Central Committee June (1986) Plenum contain a scientifically substantiated concept of the creation of an all-embracing system of international security. They essentially represent a blend of the new political thinking and philosophy of the formation of a secure world in the nuclear-space era with a platform of specific action.

Signposting the arterial path toward a secure world via the limitation and narrowing of the sphere of military preparations, the CPSU Program stipulates that "outer space be excluded from this sphere completely lest it become an arena of military rivalry and source of death and destruction. The exploration and conquest of space must be undertaken only for peaceful purposes and for the development of science and production in accordance with the requirements of all peoples. The USSR supports collective efforts in the solution of this problem and will participate actively in such international cooperation."

It is obvious that it is a question of two aspects of a single global task: halting the preparation for "star wars" and preventing the spread of the arms race to space and at the same time counterposing to this as the sole intelligent alternative the peaceful conquest of outer space by the joint efforts of all states. Solution of each of the said questions would be of great significance for the creation of an all-embracing system of international security. As the documents of the 27th CPSU Congress point out, the prevention of an arms race in space would be a principle of such a system in the military sphere, and the unification of efforts in the exploration and peaceful use of space, in the economic sphere.

I

The problem of space is moving increasingly to the center of the ideological-political confrontation unfolding at present between the two approaches to the questions of war and peace and the two concepts of security. One concept, which finds its concentrated expression in Washington's "strategic defense initiative" or, more precisely, the "star wars" program, essentially represents an extraordinarily dangerous attempt to approach a solution of problems of the modern world from the old standpoints of militarism and selfish imperialist interests. Despite all its seeming novelty, it amounts merely to the latest attempt by U.S. ruling circles to achieve "absolute security" and essentially a position of strength for themselves, having placed all others in a position of "absolute danger". What it has not been possible for decades to achieve with increasingly new twists of the nuclear arms race spiral it is intended obtaining by way of the use of the latest space technology.

The purpose of the American plan officially expounded in Washington is well known: creating thanks to the use of the latest S&T achievements broad-based multilayer ABM defenses by way of the deployment in space of the latest weapons systems. Ultimately the intention, according to the U.S. President himself, is to make nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete". Although he speaks of nuclear arms in general, it is obviously a question merely of "neutralizing" the Soviet Union's defense potential.

The United States' acceleration together with the "star wars" program of the creation of updated nuclear first strike-potential primarily testifies to this. Its most important components are to be the MX and ground-based Midgetman intercontinental missiles, the submarine-based Trident ICBM's and the intermediate-range missiles deployed on the territory of a number of West European states and also intended for the highly accurate destruction of strategic targets on the territory of the Soviet Union. Arms systems employing Stealth technology providing for concealment of the approach to target and surprise attack and air- and sea-based long-range cruise missiles with the same properties are being created.

The vague utterances of the head of the U.S. Administration concerning a readiness "in due course" to share the "wonder technology" with other countries, including the USSR, also have a hypocritical ring. The present-day reality is Washington's literally maniacal aspiration to prevent any technological cooperation with the Soviet Union whatever on the pretext of "preventing information leaks," which could have if only potential strategic significance. The same pretext was also used for the refusal to continue the Soviet-American cooperation which had begun to show in the 1970's in a number of spheres of the peaceful conquest of outer space.

According to the conclusions of Soviet and the majority of foreign scientists, the creation of a broad-based U.S. ABM system with space echelons, which would provide reliable protection for American territory and, even more, the territory of its allies in West Europe or in other parts of the world, is technically impossible. But the very advancement in the military program of such a goal as a priority and the deployment of a broad front of work on its achievement will lead to an undermining of international security and the disruption of strategic stability.

This is brought about by a whole number of circumstances. First of all, in line with the development, creation and deployment of this weapon or the other of ABM struggle there could arise in the military strategists--the initiators of the plans for "limited" or "protracted" nuclear wars--the illusion of acquisition of the capacity for delivering a first, "disarming" nuclear strike in the hope of impunity. The ABM system, albeit one limited in its possibilities, would be entrusted in this case with the mission of "finishing off" the enemy's retaliatory strike weapons which had survived.

Further, as the majority of serious specialists in the strategy sphere acknowledge, deployment of the ABM systems envisaged by the "star wars" program would force the other side to engage in the appropriate measures for the purpose of ensuring preservation of the strategic balance by way of a buildup of its retaliatory nuclear strike potential. Even U.S. Defense

Secretary C. Weinberger plainly acknowledged in a report to President R. Reagan that in the event of the Soviet Union embarking on the path of deployment of broad-based ABM systems, this would require of the United States "an increase in the quantity of our offensive forces and their capacity for overcoming Soviet defenses."*

Under the conditions of the nuclear confrontation even space-based defense systems cannot be regarded other than as an addition to the offensive strategic potential. "The side which created a defense first," the well-known American commentator T. Wicker aptly observed, "would obtain, albeit temporary, nonetheless an advantage when it came to implementing offensive operations, just as the warrior of old with sword and shield had advantages when attacking an enemy without a shield."**

Finally, in the guise of "defensive" arms the Pentagon is creating attack space-based arms, which could have the capacity for destroying a wide spectrum of targets. Military specialists and scientists the world over agree that the basic system developed for destroying missiles will also be employed for launching attacks against satellites. An analysis of the developments under way in the United States permits the conclusion that antisatellite weapons are being created in the guise of "research".

The administration is pursuing a policy of the continued testing and subsequently the deployment of the ASAT antisatellite system. The latter essentially represents the second generation of such weapons if it is considered that the first-generation arms intended for combating satellites were tested and deployed by the Pentagon back at the start of the 1960's.*** A threat to security and stability is created by the fact that with an attack against satellites, primarily those intended for early warning of a missile attack, an aggressor could count on "deaf-ning" and "blinding" his victim in order to increase the efficiency of a surprise "disarming" nuclear strike.

As they are developed and perfected attack space-based arms will inevitably acquire the capacity for destroying targets in the atmosphere--aircraft and cruise missiles--and subsequently on Earth. The space "shield" will thereby become a space sword supplementing the nuclear sword. In the opinion of well-known U.S. physicists and government experts, it will be easier to use the laser weapons being developed within the framework of President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative for burning an enemy's cities than for protecting the United States against missiles. According to their conclusions, the firestorms over vast expanses of the Earth caused by such weapons could lead to an ecological catastrophe similar to a "nuclear winter". In other words, it is essentially a question of the creation of fundamentally new weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, the discoveries made in the development of attack space-based weapons will be employed in new types of conventional arms for the army, air force and navy also.

* THE NEW YORK TIMES, 25 November 1985.

** Ibidem.

*** In connection with the racket kicked up in the West concerning the Soviet "satellite threat" it is appropriate to point out that the Soviet Union, which was forced to adopt retaliatory measures in response to the enumerated U.S. actions, began its testing of antisatellite weapons considerably later, and it was suspended in 1983 in connection with the unilateral moratorium announced by the USSR and has not been conducted since.

The undermining of security and destabilization of the strategic situation are inevitable also in the event of broad-based ABM systems being created and deployed by both sides. Owing to the differences in the amounts of S&T process stock and economic and production potentials, it is inevitable that the deployment of such systems would be accompanied by acute rivalry increasing suspicion and stimulating an arms race in all directions. But even under the hypothetical conditions of the sides' absolutely synchronous deployment of all-embracing ABM systems strategic stability would be undermined inasmuch as, given a space "shield," the attacking side would have the advantage. This is explained primarily by the fact that the creation of 100-percent reliable ABM defense is practically inconceivable, and, consequently, in the event of a massive missile launch, the attacking side could count with a great deal of confidence on at least some of the nuclear warheads reaching their targets. In addition, space-based ABM systems would be highly vulnerable, scientists and specialists generally acknowledge, and would in themselves be a tempting target for a first strike.

An analysis of the destabilizing strategic consequences of the creation of attack space-based arms in accordance with the "star wars" program convincingly confirms the fundamental conclusion of the 27th CPSU Congress that winning an arms race, like a nuclear war itself, is no longer possible under modern conditions. The nature of present-day weapons leaves no state a hope of defending itself only by military-technical means, even by the creation of defenses in space. But continuation of the arms race, its extension to space even more, will accelerate the already high rate of stockpiling and upgrading of nuclear weapons. Whereas today's level of the balance of the opposing sides' nuclear potentials ensures for them equal danger, in the event of weapons reaching space, this equal danger would grow even more and could attain limits where even parity ceases to be a factor of military-political restraint.

Finally, it is in the example of space-based arms that the proposition concerning the fact that the appearance of new systems of weapons of mass annihilation is constantly reducing the time and narrowing the possibility for the adoption in the event of crises of political decisions on war and peace is confirmed particularly convincingly. Truly, space-based weapons of global and practically instantaneous action will, like no other weapons, depend on extraordinarily complex computer systems. Considering that no more than 200-300 seconds, as the "star wars" plan envisages, are to elapse from the appearance of missiles in the atmosphere to their destruction--and that in this time it is necessary to detect, recognize and allocate among interceptors, sight and destroy these missiles--it has to be concluded that automated systems and computers will make the decision on the start of a war.

The situation in the world could assume a nature where it would no longer depend on the intelligence or will of politicians but would be in the grip of technology and military-technocratic logic. Besides--which was shown once again by the Challenger and Titan catastrophes--even the most reliable machinery which has undergone multiple testing and checking is subject to malfunctions. The result of one such in the event of the deployment of space-based arms could perfectly well be nuclear catastrophe. In connection with

the Challenger tragedy the American science fiction writer A. Asimov called attention to the following aspect of the problem also: "...Star wars will require far more intricate computers, which we do not yet possess. We will only be able to test them under real war conditions. And what if they do not work? Then not seven persons but all mankind will perish." It may be added to this that such catastrophes themselves could well be the detonator of a military confrontation in the atmosphere of increased fear and suspicion which would reign under the conditions of the saturation of space with attack weapons.

The destabilizing effect of the "star wars" program would be reflected not only in the military-strategic but also political and international law spheres. By its very focus it is irreconcilably contrary to the indefinite Soviet-American ABM Treaty. The program sets the goal of precisely what this treaty prohibits--the creation, testing and deployment of the systems and components of a broad-based ABM defense of the country's territory, space-based included. Sooner or later the undermining also of such fundamental multilateral agreements on arms limitation and the strengthening of international security as the Treaty Banning Tests of Nuclear Weapons in the Atmosphere, Outer Space and Under Water (1963) and the Treaty Governing the Principles of States' Activity in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Heavenly Bodies (1967), which bans the deployment in space of nuclear and other weapons of mass annihilation, would be inevitable.

Thus in implementing the "star wars" program its initiators are consciously moving toward disrupting the negotiations which are under way and canceling out existing arms limitation agreements.

The assessment of the destabilizing consequences of attempts to create a broad-based defense does not change depending on whether such attempts are made only by the United States or jointly with its allies, in respect of West Europe included. Striving for the attachment of the S&T potential of its West European partners to realization of its own militarist program and to simultaneously respond, as it were, to their legitimate suspicions concerning the fact that it is precisely on European territory that the Pentagon could carry out its plans for waging a "limited" nuclear war, taking cover behind the space "shield," the United States recently advanced the proposition according to which means of the ABM defense not only of the United States but the West European states also are being developed within the SDI framework.

The "European Defense Initiative" (EDI) project is also being pushed persistently by militarist circles of the FRG endeavoring thus to become familiar with the latest military technology and thereby compensate, as it were, for their lack of nuclear weapons. In the event of its creation a West European ABM system would be used in combination with the existing offensive nuclear arms of NATO in Europe and could not be regarded other than as a direct addition to the nuclear arsenals deployed on the continent--in the form of an "antimissile umbrella" over the Pershing 2 missiles and ground-based cruise missiles, which the United States is continuing to deploy in West Europe.

In associating themselves with the SDI or taking the path of the realization of the EDI West European countries are objectively becoming participants in the reckless military plans of the United States in space and assuming a share of the responsibility for the grim consequences for the balance of forces and strategic stability and security in Europe and the world as a whole. The security of these states themselves would be seriously undermined first of all. To speak of the FRC, it is obviously a question of its flagrant violation of the commitments intended to ensure that the threat of war never again emanate from German soil.

The conclusion suggests itself with all irrefutability from what has been said that in the event of realization of the "star wars" program in the next few years the whole world could find itself in a situation of an absolutely unchecked arms race, strategic chaos, the most dangerous undermining of stability, general uncertainty and the increased risk of nuclear catastrophe connected with this; there will be no talk of any "star wars" "rescue" mission.

In the nuclear-space era security can be achieved only for all--and not by military-technical but political means, on the paths of prevention of an outlet into space for weapons and of nuclear disarmament. "An arms race in space," UN experts concluded, "could increase the threat of nuclear war. It will also lead to a further growth of the already huge military spending and the even greater diversion of resources essential for economic and social development. In addition, an arms race in space would have negative consequences for the use of outer space for peaceful purposes."*

II

The fraudulence of the attempts to pass off the "star wars" program as some panacea against the nuclear threat was shown as convincingly as could be by the concept of a nuclear-free world advanced by the Soviet Union. The statement to mankind of 15 January 1986 proposed the sole possible and, what is most important, safe way toward the removal of the nuclear threat--a specific plan in a historically short timeframe of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons before the year 2000. In these same 15 years, which the supporters of "star wars" propose wasting on a new ruinous stage of a space-based arms race allegedly capable of reducing the risk of nuclear war, the Soviet Union calls for the implementation of tangible measures to free the planet for all time from the nuclear sword of Damocles hanging over it. And the possibility of the appearance of weapons in space is a serious obstacle to this. For nuclear disarmament to become a reality it is essential to reach an accord on a renunciation of attack space-based arms: at the first stage by the Soviet Union and the United States, at the second, on a multilateral basis with the obligatory participation of the leading industrial powers.

Having advanced as the central direction of Soviet foreign policy the creation of a nuclear-free world, the 27th CPSU Congress set the task: "...Before it

* "Study of the Security Concept," UN Doc A/40/553, 26 August 1985, p 34.

is too late, finding a practicable solution which WOULD AFFORD GUARANTEES AGAINST THE TRANSFER OF THE ARMS RACE TO SPACE. The 'star wars' program cannot be permitted to be used both as a stimulus to a further arms race and as an impediment in the way toward radical disarmament."

The most intelligent thing, of course, would be a radical ban on the creation, testing and deployment of assault space-based arms given the most effective verification, including the opening up of the corresponding laboratories. In other words, the use of force in space and from space in respect of Earth and also from Earth in respect of space-based targets would be banned. In accordance with this, no weapons of any kind--conventional, nuclear, laser, beam or any other--intended for ABM defense, antisatellite struggle or for hitting targets on Earth or in the atmosphere would be put into space and deployed there, whether on manned or unmanned systems.

Inasmuch as such a radical decision on renunciation of the entire class of strike space-based arms is encountering bitter resistance on the part of the United States, which is referring, inter alia, to the "difficulty" of the formulation of a precise definition of such arms, the Soviet Union declares itself ready to also move forward on the path of partial measures leading to the ultimate goal. One such is an unconditional ban on antisatellite weapons. The subject of a possible accord was ascertained to a considerable extent back at the 1978 Soviet-American negotiations on antisatellite systems. These negotiations, incidentally, began on the initiative of the American side, which had probably realized what was implied by "antisatellite systems". True, the negotiations were broken off through the fault of Washington also, which obviously feared the possibility of real accords being achieved, which had begun to come into view in the course of the exchange of opinions. The Soviet Union proposes a ban on the testing, creation and deployment of new antisatellite systems and the elimination of such systems which the sides already have.

It is a question here precisely of assault weapons capable of destroying space-based targets. The communications, navigation and missile-attack warning satellites which the USSR and the United States have at the present time are not weapons in the proper meaning of this word: they do not create a threat of direct attack in space or from space. In addition, these systems contribute to the maintenance of strategic stability, depriving, inter alia, an enemy of the possibility of launching a surprise disarming nuclear strike. A ban on antisatellite weapons should therefore be combined with provision for the security or, in other words, immunity of such military satellites, as, equally, of course, the orbital craft of an exclusively peaceful purpose.

Guided by these considerations and endeavoring to increase to the maximum the effectiveness of the principle of the nonuse of force in space, the Soviet Union proposed at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament the formulation of an international agreement on the immunity of artificial Earth satellites. Account was also taken of the fact here that a number of states, France, in particular, has for several years expressed concern for satellite security and put forward in this form or the other the idea of their guaranteed immunity. The solution of this question would also correspond

to the will of the world community unambiguously expressed in the resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly 40th Session on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and calling on all states for the strict observance in their space activity of the fundamental principle of renunciation of the use or threat of force. As is known, 151 states voted for the resolution, and only the United States together with the Grenadan puppet regime failed to support it. Obviously, realization of the Soviet proposal would be of considerable significance for the securing of the conditions conducive to the operation in near-Earth orbits of peaceful space-based worker-craft.

From the viewpoint of the prevention of the spread of the arms race to space and its elimination in the nuclear sphere on Earth a priority nature is attached to a halt on a mutual basis to all nuclear explosions. This would correspond also to the task of strict compliance with the existing arms limitation accords related to space.

Under present conditions strategic stability may be secured only given unswerving compliance with the Soviet-American ABM Treaty. The Soviet Union has offered repeatedly to solemnly declare together with the United States adherence to the treaty. Its preservation and strengthening are a most important prerequisite of the achievement of a secure and lasting peace and a limitation of and radical reduction in nuclear arms. The USSR expresses a readiness to move forward in all directions and to use to the maximum effect the existing mechanism of negotiations being conducted both on a bilateral basis between the USSR and the United States and on a multilateral basis, primarily at the Conference on Disarmament.

The interim version of an agreement proposed by the Soviet Union at the negotiations between the USSR and the United States on nuclear and space-based arms envisages together with appreciable reductions in strategic offensive arms an accord on nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty for at least 15 years and confining work in the SDI sphere to the level of laboratory research, that is, the threshold which the United States has in fact already approached.

In proposing a mutual renunciation of attack space-based arms the USSR is by no means posing the question of a ban on fundamental research, in the sphere of lasers included. But if the research goes beyond the framework of fundamental and is goal-seeking and sets itself directly the task of the creation of weapons, that is, is a part of the process of the development of means of waging war, it should undoubtedly be banned. If a commitment on the noncreation of assault space-based arms were to be adopted, it could be monitored easily. If a side took it into its head to violate it, this would become known for mockups, test models and so forth would appear.

Extra-laboratory testing would be inevitable also. Furthermore, the corresponding laboratories could be opened up for monitoring purposes. Thus were a ban to be imposed on assault space-based arms, the question of research would be solved of its own accord. As a whole, it is obvious that there are no objective barriers en route to the prevention of an arms race in space. Only the political will, a realistic evaluation of the current world situation and an aspiration to security not in word but in deed are needed.

III

As M.S. Gorbachev's 15 January 1986 statement emphasizes, it is necessary to move into the third millenium not with the "star wars" program but with large-scale plans for the peaceful conquest of space by the powers of all mankind. The practical elaboration and implementation of such plans is a most important way of ensuring progress throughout our planet and the formation of a dependable system of security for all. The letter from N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, to the UN secretary general in June 1986 revealed the content of a phased program of joint practical action for the peaceful conquest of space, which is submitted for the international community's examination. The stages of its implementation would be organically combined with stages of nuclear disarmament. Both these processes would complement and stimulate one another. Each of them would contribute appreciably to an improvement in the international climate, a lessening of suspicion and mistrust in relations between states and suffusion of the process of the relaxation of international tension with specific content. Both a substantial proportion of the resources freed as nuclear arsenals are eliminated and the resources which the "star wars" program threatens to swallow up could be channeled into the tasks of the peaceful conquest of space by the efforts of all mankind and in the interests of all states.

Man's breakthrough into space and mastery of the energy of the atom emphasize the interdependence and, to a considerable extent, the wholeness of the modern world. But today states and peoples perceive it mainly in the form of the common threat to them emanating from nuclear weapons and the danger of the spread of the arms race to space. The large-scale development of international peaceful cooperation in space would contribute to the cohesion of the peoples on a qualitatively new, constructive basis. In jointly channeling resources and material and intellectual possibilities into the implementation of measures to use and conquer outer space states would master in practice the science of living in peace and cooperation in the interests of a solution of the global problems of mankind and in the interests of Planet Earth. Cooperation in space would serve as a bridge to a strengthening of trust and mutual understanding on Earth also.

Serious economic considerations speak in favor of such cooperation also. Even if it is allowed that the "star wars" program would initially lend impetus to scientific development, the price would be the creation of truly suicidal arms. The peaceful conquest of space opens a fundamentally different--direct and worthwhile--route to an acceleration of progress in science and production. As just the first steps of the United States pertaining to the association of its allies with the development of strike space-based arms show, it is a question of one further lever with which the transatlantic monopolies wish to crush their competitor-partners. West European industry is being assigned the role merely of subcontractor for individual jobs. The Americans are also endeavoring to pump to the maximum the erudition of West European scientists in the fields where the latter have scored certain successes. At the same time the U.S. monopolies are reserving the key sectors and decisive directions for themselves. As a result West Europe's dependence in the technology sphere will grow.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, the cooperation which it offers in the conquest of space, which is open and accessible to all without any discrimination, would afford the peoples tangible benefits. It would permit each country to reveal its possibilities and load industry and scientific potential. As J. Manno, an American specialist in the space field, observes, programs of the peaceful use of outer space, including those implemented by states jointly, could afford unprecedented scope for the development of science and production and, in particular, fully load the corresponding capacity of the United States and produce not fewer but even greater profits for American business.*

In proposing extensive international cooperation the Soviet Union is prepared to develop it with all states and on a bilateral basis. Of course, this applies fully to the United States also. Many American scientists and also a number of business representatives consider the two countries' interaction in the space sphere highly promising and mutually profitable. This was also reflected in a report of the American UN Assistance Association prepared with regard for the opinions of broad circles of the U.S. public, which observes that the Soviet and American programs for the conquest of space are largely mutually complementary. The United States possesses the best equipment and technology in the field of automation and data processing which could be of interest to the USSR; at the same time the Americans could benefit from the tremendous experience accumulated by Soviet cosmonautics of man's prolonged stay in space, automatic dockings and approaches 'n orbit and the creation of landing craft for expeditions to other planets.**

In advocating cooperation in space the Soviet Union is essentially proposing the rational management of the resources of terrestrial civilization. It is inexpedient to scatter and duplicate states' efforts in the conquest of space. Their prudent use of the basis of coordination and unification would produce a multiplication effect and make practicable what is simply beyond the powers of one, even a most developed, country. A convincing example of this was the experiment pertaining to the exploration of Venus and Halley's Comet. It is known that Soviet interplanetary stations helped adjust the direction of the flight of the West European Giotto spacecraft following them. Practice has proven also that the larger the scale of efforts in the peaceful conquest of space, the more tangible their terrestrial results both for the developed and the developing countries and the broader the access to their results for states without their own space potential.

The Soviet Union is not in advancing its program claiming the possession of absolute truth, truth "of last resort". It poses the question of the joint development of large-scale projects for the conquest of space at all stages, beginning with determination of the world's peoples' needs for the use of space technology with regard for the current possibilities and prospects of the elaboration of specific plans for the development of space facilities in the interests of all mankind. It is to the accomplishment of this task that the first, organizational, stage of the program of a duration of 5 years should be devoted. The main directions and principles of qualitatively new broad-based international cooperation in the peaceful conquest of space would be determined.

* See J. Manno, "Arming the Heavens," New York, 1984.

** See "Developing the Final Frontier," New York, 1985, p 55.

The results of such work could be finally agreed and confirmed at an international conference or special session of the UN General Assembly on space issues specially convened for this no later than 1990. The forum would approve an action program for the 1990's with horizons of the following 10-15 years. A World Space Organization would be instituted at the same time, which would undertake the coordination of efforts in this enterprise of a universal scale. Specialized programs for the realization of specific cooperation projects would be implemented under the aegis of the organization.

The Soviet program also outlines such most important directions of cooperation in the peaceful use of space as communications and navigation, remote exploration of the Earth in the interests of states' economic development, study and preservation of man's environment, weather forecasting and the notification of natural disasters, the industrialization of outer space, including the use of new energy sources and the creation of new materials and technologies. The experiments conducted on Soviet orbital stations, particularly on the "Mir" station, have already brought mankind close to the possibility of the organization of experimental production under the conditions of high vacuum and weightlessness.

Of course, it is also essential to continue the efforts to explore outer space and conduct fundamental scientific studies in the space field. The Soviet program points in the direction of consolidation of the positive experience gained, in particular, in the study of Halley's Comet and progress in the exploration of space and celestial bodies by geophysical methods and with automatic interplanetary stations.

The second stage, which would encompass the first half of the 1990's, would be the stage of material preparation for the implementation of future projects. Its essence would consist of the development and creation of space technology and, as it becomes ready, transition to the use thereof. Understandably, priority projects would be implemented first. The possibilities of their speediest recoupment of costs and the use of accumulated experience and also profit for the accomplishment of subsequent missions could also be taken into consideration here, obviously.

The full-scale realization of the Soviet program is to occur at the third stage. Prior to the year 2000 all areas of cooperation would assume mature, materially satisfied forms. It is planned consistently launching the corresponding space vehicles and organizing the functioning of the necessary ground-based systems, and the specialized programs would begin to produce practical results.

The Soviet Union proceeds from the fact that at all stages the plans for international cooperation should embody the best achievements of world technical thought. It is essential to make such plans models of the equal and truly mutually profitable cooperation of all states. The USSR also takes into consideration the special interests and problems of the developing states. It poses the question, in accordance with the principles of realism and fairness, of the main resources being allocated by the space powers and other economically developed states and of the developing countries participating in the cooperation on preferential terms. The least developed countries, on the other hand, could derive much on the basis of gratis assistance also.

From the first days of the space era the USSR has regarded its achievements in space as a contribution to the general progress of civilization and has generously shared them with other peoples. Now also it declares its readiness to extensively exchange its successes in the conquest of space. It is prepared to help states, on a mutually profitable basis, of course, in the solution of such a most important problem as putting peaceful vehicles into space orbits. The reliability and efficiency of Soviet carrier rockets enjoy world recognition.

As the program proposed by the Soviet Union is implemented, the activity of the World Space Organization, which would become a true center directing man's assault on space, would begin to gather speed also. The Soviet program would mark the start of terrestrial civilization's path into space. Its implementation would lead to the creation of the organizational and material structure for a whole number of major projects connected with the joint creation of space vehicles, including science-production orbital stations and platforms and interplanetary manned craft for the transition in the first decades of the 21st century to the practical development and use of the Moon, including the creation there of a base for flights to other planets.

In a word, the USSR is proposing a realistic and specific plan and at the same time one of unprecedented scale for the use of circumterrestrial space by the joint efforts and in the interests of all peoples of the Earth. As it is implemented, the practicable prerequisites for the conversion as of the start of the third millennium even of terrestrial civilization into an interplanetary civilization would be created.

The Soviet "star peace" program is one of the peaceful conquest of space. It is the sole intelligent alternative to the insane "star wars" plans and truly worthy response of terrestrial civilization to the challenge of the space era. The approach to the problem of space proposed by the Soviet Union corresponds to the vital interests of all peoples and the interests of social progress and is an organic part of the historic mission of the creation of an all-embracing system of international security.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SOVIET JOURNAL ON EUREKA'S SIGNIFICANCE, RELATION TO SDI

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 86 (signed to press 12 Aug 86) pp 93-100

[Article by Yu. Yudanov: "EUREKA--Problems of the Creation of the West European Technology Community"]

[Text] A new technology community has arisen in West Europe. Its focus and future are being actively discussed in scientific, business and government circles. The name EUREKA is the result of an abbreviation of the English name European Research Coordinating Agency, but the fact that it evokes an association with the famous exclamation of the ancient Greek scientist is by no means accidental. "Archimedes' discoveries would seem child's play compared with what it is intended setting in motion with EUREKA," the well-informed West German weekly DIE ZEIT wrote. "Of course, it could prove merely a fine label on an empty bottle... but it could also initiate West Europe's technological renaissance."¹ EUREKA represents an attempt to unite the technological efforts of 19 West European countries in the development and realization of specific projects in the newest sectors of industry.

Main Stages of Formation

The initiative for the creation of EUREKA belongs to the French Government (April 1985). In a comparatively short period a whole series of measures attesting outward signs of the organization's successful activity has been conducted within the framework of this West European program. The first three conferences at the level of foreign ministers and those in charge of scientific research have been held (July 1985 in Paris, November 1985 in Hanover, June-July 1986 in London). The first 10 joint West European technology projects (totaling DM1.3-1.5 billion) were approved in Hanover.

The London conference confirmed a further 62 joint projects and discussed the main forms and methods of financing the program. The euphoria of the initial stages of the formation of EUREKA is over, "it is now a question of the assimilation of new sources of financing of the joint projects," the journal WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE wrote.²

EUREKA's organizational structure has gradually been determined. Conferences of ministers of the member-countries, in which the chairman of the European Communities Commission (ECC) participates, are its coordinating body. The regularity of the meetings has not been stipulated but in practice they are convened every 6 months. The host country presides at the meeting. A special "high representatives" group of the participating countries' leading officials has been set up. Its tasks include the preparation of government conferences and the choice of projects which could be deemed expedient within the EUREKA framework. And, finally, a secretariat was formed at the Hanover meeting for supporting contacts between the partners and participation in the preparation of conferences of ministers and "high representative" meetings. The secretariat does not have the right of decision-making, and its budget constitutes approximately DM2 million a year.

The appearance of the West European EUREKA program is usually connected with the new stage of the development of the international political and economic contradictions of capitalism. A principal reason for the emergence of the program was the intensified quest in West Europe for its own ways of solving security problems. It was stepped up particularly under the conditions of the deployment of the American intermediate-range missiles on the territory of the region and assumed vital significance in connection with the unfolding of the American plans for the militarization of space. For a long time there were few who paid any attention to the calls for the creation of a technology community in West Europe, and it was only when debate concerning participation in the SDI program had heated up that the possibility of a return to this idea under a more acceptable label appeared, the well-known conservative paper FRANKFURTHER ALLGEMEINE wrote (4 September 1985).

The second reason is of an economic nature and is connected with the new phase of development of the S&T revolution, the basis of which is the extensive use of microelectronic and biological technology. It is believed that it is in precisely these spheres that the old continent's technological lag has shown through particularly clearly. EUREKA is intended to lend impetus to the growth of the newest sectors in West Europe.

Two questions arise upon an analysis of the said factors. The first: what is the extent of the civil focus of EUREKA? Official circles invariably emphasize that it is the West European civil answer to the American SDI project.³ However, the prevailing opinion is that it is extraordinarily difficult in this sphere to make a precise delineation since research and design developments in the sphere of the latest technology could be used both for civil and for military purposes.

"The military need not distress itself unduly over the EUREKA project," the weekly DIE ZEIT writes ironically. "Practice shows that the spinoff of civil research for military purposes is always higher than the side effect of military-technical developments for the civilian sectors."⁴ Many specialists believe that the projects which have already been approved in the sphere of laser technology, optical electronics and high-speed computers are of military significance. It is in this sphere that West European firms possess certain unique technological knowhow, and the United States is interested in using it in the SDI program.⁵

Is EUREKA an alternative to SDI or its West European supplement? The FRG press is inclined to believe the latter. "The results of the Hanover conference clearly showed that there has been a rapprochement of the American and West European technology programs. The projects proposed by the FRG are almost identical to the SDI program, although the idea of the peaceful nature of EUREKA is being instilled persistently," the weekly WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE wrote.⁶ The leaders of the Federal German Industry Union also discern the intersection of the two programs and their definite community.

It should not be forgotten that the French EUREKA project pursued a dual goal. The civil version, which was intended to increase the competitiveness of West European industry in the technologically progressive sectors, represented merely part of the program. The goal of strengthening military potential by way of an improvement of cooperation in arms production was set simultaneously. All the French projects, already approved at the Hanover conference, may be used for military purposes also. This has caused certain difficulties in the mutual relations of the partners in the new community. The FRG ruling coalition has been embarrassed precisely by this aspect of EUREKA, which could lead to a certain isolation of the West European military-industrial complex. Bonn consented to the further development of the program only after it had concluded an official agreement on FRG participation in the SDI (Britain's position was similar).

The second question which needs to be clarified is the degree of West Europe's technological backwardness. This problem, which has recently become a fashionable sociopolitical topic, is in reality not as straightforward as the local press and even investigative studies at times portray it. A recent OECD analysis, for example, says that if there is no change in the trends which have come to light in technological development, West Europe will become a supplier of technically less complex products. A similar assessment is also made by a Japanese long-term scenario of mankind's technological future.

The supporters of the "Europessimism" concept underpin their position with statistical data on the sharp deceleration of the region's economic development: by 1986 the increase in GNP in the United States and Japan amounted to approximately 13 percent compared with 1982, in West Europe, to 6 percent. The problem of employment has intensified. Whereas in the United States approximately 15 million new jobs have been created in the last decade, and 5 million in Japan, in the Community the number thereof has declined by 1.5 million. Finally, a constant decline in West Europe's relative significance in the world production and exports of technologically complex and the latest products is occurring. Thus given a share of the total value of world exports in excess of one-third, the region's relative significance in world exports of modern electronic-information technology constitutes approximately 10 percent.

However, for an analysis of West Europe's technological backwardness it is advisable to preliminarily separate out the industrial sectors constituting the basis of S&T progress. For example, according to an estimate contained in the special OECD study, six main sectoral directions of S&T development

have been determined currently: electronics, computers, telecommunications systems, new construction materials, new product treatment techniques (lasers) and biotechnology.⁷ But such an approach is contentious.

The viewpoint of A. (Blyum), an associate of the (Battele) Institute, which is well known in the country (as published), would appear to be of interest in this connection. He believes that the technological level of production cannot be judged only in terms of a narrow group of selected sectors. S&T progress extends to a considerable proportion of modern production (up to three-fourths of the total product cost) and includes at least all the leading (currently and in the future) sectors of the economy--electronics and electrical engineering, chemical industry and biotechnology, transport and general machine building, aerospace industry and so forth. If definition of the concept of modern S&T progress is approached on this basis, it is hardly possible, the author believes, to cogently corroborate the "Europessimism" concept.

Many specialists believe that West Europe is not as helpless technologically as the Americans like to emphasize. It was observed at a 2-day symposium of top managers of West European industry (approximately 200 representatives) held in mid-May 1986 in Barcelona that the legend of "Euroclerosis" is without due foundation and that, on the contrary, it is possible to speak with assurance about a new phase of "Euro-optimism".⁸

The essence of the arguments concerning the comparability of the general technological level of development of the three main centers of imperialism is basically as follows. In the past decade the United States and Japan have made pronounced progress in microelectronics and biotechnology. It is in these sectors that a certain lag of the West European region has been revealed. The idea had taken shape in the 1970's in West Europe that there was no need for the creation of its own microprocessors and that it was more expedient to concentrate efforts on the "intelligent use of finished microelectronics in conventional products". An abrupt turnabout occurred in the mid-1980's, and leading firms (Siemens, Philips and others) have set about actively eliminating the lag that has come to light, paying special attention to software. Considerable successes in the competitive struggle with American and Japanese producers have already been achieved in this sphere.

The strongest aspect of West European industry is considered product quality based on the high qualifications of the industrial personnel. The recently deceased FRG "computer king" H. Nixdorf observed during our conversation at a symposium in Bonn that West European engineering personnel were more educated and better prepared for independent activity. He believed that were the personnel's participation in the solution of production-finance and creative problems to be secured, the efficiency of firms' activity would rise appreciably. This is confirmed by the practice of the Nixdorf electronics company itself.

West European industry's successes in the realization of a number of technically intricate projects testify to its high technological level. The most successful example of resistance to American hegemony in the sphere of

advanced technology is considered realization of the Airbus project. The consortium of four West European firms was formed in 1970 to create a counterweight to the American Boeing's almost monopoly position in passenger aircraft production. By the mid-1980's the consortium's share of the world market constituted 10 percent and will in the very near future, it is expected, grow to 25 percent.

In the opinion of many experts, considerable scientific and technical-industrial potential of West Europe is not being realized fully owing to the economic discreteness of the region and growing "technical nationalism". "There are now hardly any Europeans who doubt that transnational cooperation in the new technology sphere will help achieve greater efficiency," the weekly DIE ZEIT observes.⁹

The EUREKA program is taking technological cooperation beyond the confines of the European Community. Many observers believe that this manifests an endeavor to escape from the "inveterate bureaucratism" in the activity of the ECC, which leads to a delay of many years in the realization of the majority of projects. In addition, as distinct from joint projects of the Community, the EUREKA program affords each state an opportunity to make a decision on participation in specific projects and the scale of their financing, proceeding from its own interests.

It was no accident that EUREKA evoked the dislike of some top EC managers, who hastened to christen it the "joint risk community," an "insufficiently considered and hasty undertaking" and even a "technological departure from a West European society of solidarity". They assert that the appearance of EUREKA is pointless inasmuch as the EC Council of Ministers had already adopted a technology development program in July 1985.

Of course, relations between EUREKA and this technology program are quite complicated. Attempts are being made to achieve their integration on the basis of a kind of division of labor. The Community is to concentrate efforts on the formulation of common technological standards, the creation of conditions for a "single West European market" (before 1992) and the realization of a number of infrastructural projects in the transport and telecommunications sphere and so forth. EUREKA, on the other hand, is designed to assist merely the projects in the newest sectors of industry, which have a clear commercial prospect.

Specific Projects and Two Approaches

The EUREKA conference in Hanover was conducted as a significant Western-style international undertaking. Security forces completely blocked off the location of the meeting (the international fair grounds), and helicopters hovered overhead. Journalists had to undergo a triple inspection. The ministers of 18 West European countries had gathered to discuss organizational questions and approve the first joint projects.

The debate was conducted behind closed doors, but the journalists were constantly familiarized with the delegations' written statements on the problem under discussion. Passions grew heated over the creation of a special coordinating body. The countries with major transnational monopolies

(Britain, the FRG and others) defended the idea of a "projects exchange," in which there was to be an exchange of opinions between the future partners in S&T cooperation. Other participants in the meeting advocated the creation of a secretariat consisting of official representatives of all the states participating in EUREKA. The small countries supported this proposal, hoping with the help of the coordinating body to lessen the domination of the TNC in the preparation and realization of the projects. The decision to create a secretariat was made ultimately.

The specific projects were discussed in a highly charged atmosphere. Initially there were not more than half a dozen of them, but by the end of the meeting the documents observed that an accord had been reached on the first 10 joint projects. They vary in terms of economic-technological importance, amount of financial outlays and realization timeframes. Projects were approved, in the main, in respect of which the path of technological solution, financing and marketing had already come to light. Two proposed by the FRG evoked the greatest interest: a single European computer communications system and Eurotrack--a system for combating harmful discharges during the operation of transport.

The first is aimed at the creation not only of the foundation for a permanent exchange of information but also at a certain unification of S&T standards in the region. Seven countries expressed a desire to participate in its realization (the FRG, France, Austria, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden and Finland), and 10 countries (Britain, Italy, Belgium, Norway, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Luxembourg, Ireland and Turkey) displayed an interest in the project.

The project for the creation of a single system of computer communications is based on a 4-year period. Two of the biggest research center associations in the FRG (the Max Planck Gesellschaft and Fraunhofer Gesellschaft), approximately 40 universities and higher engineering schools and 15 industrial firms intend participating therein. According to a local press report, the financial contribution of the federal Ministry of Research and Technology will amount to approximately DM50 million. Eurotrack, which is based on an 8-year period, has collected five partners, and as many countries displayed an interest in this project (the FRG's possible financial contribution is DM150 million).

The Third West German project, Eurolaser, was the basis of a consortium of four major West European countries (the FRG, Britain, France and Italy), and interest therein was displayed by a further six states (Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain and Greece). Specialists believe that a certain lag on the part of West Europe has shown through in this sector. Inasmuch as there is no common West European engineering standard, it is mainly small and mid-sized firms which are engaged in production. The project is valued at DM400 million (the FRG's possible contribution is approximately DM100-150 million).

The French projects for EUREKA which won approval were joined by just one partner each: a Norwegian firm in the compact vector calculator project (interest on the part of Italy), a Portuguese firm in a project for textile

industry (interest on the part of Spain and Turkey) and a West German firm in the creation of equipment for converting sunlight into energy. In addition, French companies will work on the creation of membrane filters for water purification in conjunction with a Danish firm (interest on the part of the Netherlands) and industrial robots based on opto-electronics with an Italian firm (interest on the part of Switzerland). France intends allocating approximately Fr1 billion (approximately DM300 million) to finance the projects.¹⁰

The search for partners for cooperation continued after the Hanover meeting also. A Franco-West German consortium for the use of ceramics in the production of diesel motors was approved at the London conference (it was already functioning, but the participants wished to secure the EUREKA stamp). A multilateral project (firms of five countries) pertaining to the joint assimilation of the production of computers with a new software system was confirmed also. It is also proposed allocating for its realization DM100 million from government resources.

A basic point of contradictions was clearly ascertained at the time of elaboration of the program and preparation for approval of the first specific projects--the scale of government participation. The essence of the problem is that the government is prepared, proceeding from considerations of profitability, to hand over solution of the main questions of technological cooperation to individual firms, but then the end results of cooperation may not coincide with the national plans of S&T progress.

The supporters of the "market mechanism" assert that the initiative in exploratory, so-called "pilot" projects should come from the firms themselves orienting the product toward specific consumers and ensuring the profitability of the innovations. The government, on the other hand, should be involved merely to create a general favorable climate and also in cases where the cost of a project exceeds the firms's financial possibilities and realization of the project is attended by great risk.

Another form of government participation--a system of preferential taxation when realizing individual programs--was also proposed at an international conference on problems of financing EUREKA (September-October 1985, London). However, A. Herhausen, a leader of the Deutsche Bank, believes, the main role should be assigned the participation of the major private banks in the financing of specific projects with commercial prospects. He considers essential the creation of a kind of "data bank" for EUREKA, where representatives of firms and credit institutions could discuss the options of such financing.¹¹

(K. Broykhkhauzen), leading economic commentator of the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, opposed the direct connection of government resources with realization of EUREKA projects. In his estimation the EC countries are already investing approximately DM5 billion a year for research purposes, mainly in fundamental studies and big prestige projects, frequently of an infrastructural nature.¹² Realization of the EUREKA agreements should be based on the "market mechanisms".

The concept of reliance primarily on the microlevel is defended predominantly by the FRG and Great Britain. It was no accident that the governments of these countries opposed the creation of a regulating body within the EUREKA framework. The distinct evolution of the FRG's position catches the attention. Whereas at the time of preparation of the Hanover meeting there was extensive discussion of the scale of the government's financial participation in a number of projects proposed by the West German side, subsequently its position changed. Finance Minister G. Stoltenberg declared in the Bundestag that there was at the present time no possibility of allocating special financial resources for EUREKA. Only negligible appropriations--DM40 million--from the current funds of the Ministry of Research and Technology had been approved.

The other approach is recognition of the need for macroeconomic regulation of S&T progress. This concept is supported by France and also many small countries lacking their own transnational industrial corporations. The need for the financial participation of the state in the EUREKA projects is substantiated by the fact that essentially government programs of technological development operate in the other centers of rivalry. It is a question of the military research program in the United States (NASA) and the Japanese system of the industrial cooperation of firms and the state in research (the programs of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry).

The supporters of this approach refer to the examples of really efficient West European technological cooperation given government financial support (the Airbus project) and the irrational dispersal of resources at the microlevel. The existence of the two approaches to the solution of EUREKA problems is exerting a certain influence on the nature and rate of realization of its projects. In the sphere of financing the first approach is predominant, in organizational matters success has accompanied representatives of the second direction.

There is one further factor which will constantly delay realization of the EUREKA projects. The West European governments, primarily of Great Britain and the FRG, which have signed official agreements on participation in the SDI, are manifestly giving preference to technological cooperation with the transatlantic partner.

West European business circles' attitude toward the EUREKA program varies. They support, as a rule, the idea of the need for increased S&T cooperation within the confines of the region, but on a scale and in forms corresponding to their strategy. The European Industrialists Roundtable employers' organization, which incorporates the leaders of 22 major companies (including the West German Siemens, the Anglo-Dutch Philips, the French Renault, the Italian FIAT, the Swiss Ciba-Geigy, the Swedish Volvo and others), fully supports in its statement the EUREKA program as "creating the necessary impetus for West Europe's accelerated technological development."

The "mobile model of economic cooperation" adopted at the conference in Hanover earned the employers' particular approval. It incorporates a number of most important features which, this organization believes, will enable firms to adapt the EUREKA projects more flexibly to their entrepreneurial strategy.

Individual projects are to be prepared on the basis of intensive cooperation between firms, credit institutions and potential consumers of the finished product, discussion with the partners concerned of the forms of cooperation and management, ascertainment of the possibilities of in-house financing of the project and an appeal to the capital market or to government resources. Furthermore, within the framework of this model it is essential to determine the forms of assistance on the part of the government and the Community, study the possibilities of obtaining government orders or financial support in particularly promising projects and limit government control of the correspondence of individual projects to the EUREKA principles.

The leading firms of West Europe's electronics industry (Siemens, Philips, General Electric, Thomson-Brandt and others) have confirmed a desire to study the possibilities of realization of a number of projects within the EUREKA framework. The importance of joint work was emphasized in connection with the need for the "strategic tooling of electronics," which depends very heavily on American and Japanese producers (particularly in the microprocessor sphere), computer chips with large storage capacity and so forth.¹³

As the Federal German Industry Union believes, West German firms must necessarily participate in specific EUREKA projects. But, its leaders believe, without a large common West European market it is difficult to hope for something fundamentally new in the development of West European integration. The leadership of another FRG employers' organization--the Trade and Industry Congress, which previously occupied a highly skeptical position in respect of EUREKA--recently assessed it as an "important means of international cooperation". In addition, O. Wolf von Amerongen, president of the association, expressed the thought that the unification of West European technical standards could be accomplished more efficiently by the firms themselves in specific joint projects.¹⁴

In the estimation of the journal WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE (6 December 1985) the majority of West European companies welcomes the appearance of the EUREKA program or, in any event, has a more positive attitude toward it than toward the American SDI project. But the central question for many firms remains that of the forms and scale of government financing of individual projects. When it became known that the FRG Government had allocated the EUREKA program only the small sum of DM40 million, "a cool sobering-up period following initial euphoria" set in, as WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE wrote, for many of the firms preparing to line up at the "Bonn trough".

The attitude of the FRG's scientific circles toward the EUREKA program is more definite and precise than among business people. The overwhelming majority of leaders of research centers and universities believes that participation in joint West European research and industrial developments is far more expeditious than association with the SDI. Highly indicative in this respect was the statement of Prof H. Staab, president of the Max Planck Gesellschaft association (it incorporates approximately 60 fundamental research institutes employing over 10,000 research associates). EUREKA, in his opinion, would contribute to a lessening of the technology gap between West Europe and the other industrial centers, and for this reason it would be advisable for the FRG's research forces to take part. The question of

association with the SDI should be left open.¹⁵ The conference of deans of the country's higher educational institutions also advocated participation in EUREKA, noting that the project "will lend long-term impetus to the West European countries' economic development."¹⁶

Battles have broken out in connection with EUREKA on organizational, financial and economic-technological issues. The West European technology community which is being created is attracting the particular attention of FRG social forces. They are endeavoring to determine the place of this organization in the system of international relations and European security.

Position of Social Forces

Discussion of the EUREKA program in the Bundestag, often in the presence of representatives of the public and the press, is usually accompanied by stormy debate. The problem is preliminarily studied by special commissions and committees and only after this is it submitted to the general session. The proposal of the Bundestag Research and Technology Committee (of 18 May 1986) concerning FRG participation in EUREKA was approved by all parties with the exception of the Greens. Representatives of the Greens declared that realization of the program could not produce positive changes in the direction of the development of more environmentally acceptable technology. Besides, they believe, EUREKA's "purely technological" approach could lead to its use for military purposes.

The attitude of the ruling bourgeois parties toward the EUREKA program reflects their common foreign policy strategy. In agreeing to support this program and hold the Hanover meeting the Bonn coalition attempted to smooth over the unfavorable impression which it had made on the West European public by its blind following of the lead of American policy. After the signing of the official accord concerning the country's participation in the SDI program, FRG ruling circles resolved to demonstrate support for West European interests. This generally corresponds to the strategic line of monopoly capital. Bonn's task was merely to ensure that the priority of SDI not be doubted in the least and that the possible "anti-American" or "purely West European" aspects of the program of technological cooperation which was being drawn up be reduced to a minimum. For the purpose of increasing the priority nature of the American military program everything possible was done to remove aerospace projects from EUREKA. Many observers gained the impression that the EUREKA program has become a smokescreen behind which Bonn officials are attempting to conceal their dependence on U.S. policy.

It was not fortuitous, therefore, that shortly after the Hanover meeting a process of a dismantling of the accords began and an endeavor to downplay the significance of this program began to show. The official press began to write about the fact that EUREKA is a "trifle" and "knick-knack" and that it cannot be of appreciable significance for the technological fate of the FRG and West Europe as a whole. In particular, K.-H. (Naryes) (member of the CDU), the country's representative in the Community, defined EUREKA as a "title without content".¹⁷ Blocking financial support for the program, the ruling coalition is endeavoring to shift the center of gravity of its development to the microlevel.

The attitude toward EUREKA within the ruling coalition varies. In the FDP there is a highly influential group which considers the program most

important impetus for an acceleration of the West European region's technological development. This viewpoint is shared, for example, by Foreign Minister H.-D. Genscher, who is speaking actively in defense of EUREKA. At the same time the official accord on the FRG's association with the American SDI program was signed by the head of the FDP, M. Bangemann, minister of economics.

The most active supporter of EUREKA in CDU ranks is H. Riesenhuber, minister of research and technology. The press describes him as a most impressive figure of the coalition government and liked by the S&T intelligentsia. According to an estimate of this ministry, approximately DM1 billion annually will be needed from state resources for realization of the EUREKA projects up to 1990.¹⁸

The Christian Democratic government of the Land of Lower Saxony attempted to use the EUREKA program in the domestic political struggle. Not long before elections to the Landtag, which were of national significance, E. Albrecht, prime minister of this Land, proposed making a principal project of Eureka the joint development of the technology for the industrial production of energy from alternative sources in order by the year 2000 to have ensured a decisive departure from traditional energy sources.

During the debate in the Bundestag SPD representatives observed that the government coalition was pursuing a "flanking maneuver" policy in respect of EUREKA, using it as a cover for participation in the SDI. This is reflected in the adaptation of the subject focus of EUREKA to the American program and the cutback in government financing of specific projects. The social democrats are insisting on massive financing of the state's participation in the realization of individual projects. The basic proposition of the ruling coalition that EUREKA could develop even without government financing is aimed at blocking the West European technology community. According to the estimation of J. (Fozen), social democratic representative on the Bundestag Research and Technology Committee, the FRG's annual contribution to the development of the EUREKA projects should amount to approximately DM700 million.¹⁹

Furthermore, the SPD is demanding the creation of a special official program under the EUREKA motto, in which it is essential to determine the main subject areas and distinguish the most important projects. Their realization prior to the end of the millennium should ensure West Europe's technological independence and put an end to the "brain drain" to the United States.²⁰ In the social democrats' opinion it is essential to speed up the creation of an international body capable of analyzing the main EUREKA projects, studying the possibilities of their financing and determining the attitude toward them of the main social groups. Organizationally EUREKA should be tied in more closely with the European Community system. The SPD demands that the government regard this program as the West European civil alternative to the American SDI military program and abandon participation in the preparation of "star wars".²¹

The most important specific projects to be realized in EUREKA the social democrats consider joint developments, primarily in the sphere of transport-communications systems: uniform high-speed transport (Transrapid), the single telecommunications and space system (the Hermes Project) and also the Photovoltaic Project, which will permit the direct conversion of sunlight into electric power.

EUREKA, the social democrats believe, as a possible model of a West European technology community, should contribute to the region's further unification. West Europe, E. Bahr, a prominent social democratic figure and disarmament expert, declared, should be based not on military power but on the tremendous economic potential, knowhow of its research workers and engineers and the high labor efficiency of the industrial personnel. West Europe's strength lies in peaceful competition.²² He believes that EUREKA could contribute to a stimulation of the process of the relaxation of international tension in the Helsinki spirit.

The blocking of the allocation of government funds, refusal to compile a long-term program of research and industrial development and, finally, coolness in the establishment of contacts between EUREKA and the Community testify, the SPD believes, to the ruling coalition's pursuit of an entirely definite policy. It is the direct result of following the American policy of confrontation and does not correspond to the West Europeans' interests.

As a public opinion poll showed, the country's participation in EUREKA is supported by more than half the inhabitants of the FRG. The well-known weekly DEUTSCHE VOLKSZEITUNG/DIE TAT wrote: "Support for the trends toward a distancing from the American policy of confrontation which are easily discernible in EUREKA... is assuming particular significance for the democratic movement."²⁴

Many people in the FRG believe that in its present form the EUREKA program may be categorized merely as an imaginary alternative to the SDI creating only the "semblance of conflict" between West Europe and the United States. Of the 10 projects approved at the Hanover meeting, almost half are easy to orient for use for military purposes (the vector computer could be installed on fighters and in tanks, the laser equipment in an antimissile system and so forth). Many of the firms enlisted in the American SDI program will work on the "peaceful projects" of EUREKA (MBB, Siemens and others, for example).

EUREKA will not release the West European countries from American diktat. But under the conditions where West Europe aspires to resist the hegemonist ambitions of the United States and strengthen its positions in the world, various West European associations, EUREKA included, could contribute to the assertion of the region's independent role. Projects like EUREKA are capable of strengthening these processes. For this, J. Reuschel believes, "the EUREKA program should proceed primarily from West European interests and be oriented toward the development of socially significant projects contributing to the processes of social democratization, disarmament and the strengthening of all-European security."²⁵

Currently, as a result of a number of peace-loving proposals of the Soviet Union providing for an appreciable mutual reduction in all types of arms, favorable prerequisites for constructive international cooperation have appeared. The S&T revolution should be oriented not toward the destruction of civilization but the further flowering of human society. Within the framework of the Comprehensive Program of S&T Progress up to the Year 2000 the CEMA countries have expressed an endeavor to coordinate their actions "with other interested countries, within the framework of programs of international S&T cooperation of a humane peaceable focus which they are adopting included." A strengthening of cooperation in this field would contribute to a solution of the problems of all-European security.

FOOTNOTES

1. DIE ZEIT, 1 November 1985, p 1.
2. WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE, 2 May 1986, p 25.
3. See DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG No 40/4086, 20 October 1985, p 4.
4. DIE ZEIT, 1 November 1985, p 17.
5. WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE, 18 October 1985, p 17.
6. Ibid., 6 December 1985, p 40.
7. BLICH DURCH DIE WIRTSCHAFT, 7 October 1985.
8. WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE, 30 May 1986, p 58.
9. DIE ZEIT, 1 November 1985, p 1.
10. EG-MAGAZIN No 9/10, 1985, p 8.
11. HANDELSBLATT, 6 November 1985.
12. FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 21 June 1985.
13. DIE WELT, 17, 27 June 1985.
14. FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 26 Jun 1985; WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE, 2 May 1986, p 34.
15. See GENERAL-ANZEIGER, 28 November 1985.
16. HANDELSBLATT, 6 November 1985.
17. DER SPIEGEL, 28 October 1985, p 37.
18. DER WELT, 18 October 1985.
19. HANDELSBLATT, 15 August 1985.
20. FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 9 May 1985.
21. HANDELSBLATT, 15 August 1985.
22. See DER SPIEGEL, 20 May (no year given), p 127.
23. HANDELSBLATT, 19/20 July 1985.
24. DEUTSCHE VOLKSZEITUNG/DIE TAT, 23 May 1986, p 9.
25. Ibidem.

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1986.

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SOVIET JOURNAL REPORTS EDINBURGH DISCUSSION OF SDI

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 86 (signed to press 12 Aug 86) pp 112-116

[A. Likhotal, A. Masko report: "The Edinburgh Discussions--Complex, but Useful Exchange"]

[Text] Among the international forums where urgent problems of world politics are discussed, a special place is occupied by the Edinburgh discussions: "How To Survive in the Nuclear Age? Achieving General Security". The regular meetings of Soviet and British and, since 1982, American public representatives, diplomats and specialists in international relations have been held since 1980 alternately in Edinburgh and Moscow under the aegis of Edinburgh University and the Scotland-USSR Friendship Society on the British side and the Soviet Friendship Societies Union and also the USSR-Great Britain Friendship Society on the Soviet side.

The 7-year history of these meetings testifies that the name "discussions" fully corresponds to their character. They are conducted without an advance agenda and in the form of a confidential and frank exchange of opinions. The emphatically unofficial atmosphere (to which even the seating arrangements for the participants, who, comfortably arranged in easy chairs placed in a semicircle around an old fireplace, hold a leisured conversation, contributes) affords an opportunity for reducing sterile polemics to a minimum and concentrating attention on a constructive search for ways to lessen international tension and remove the threat of war.

Largely thanks precisely to this atmosphere the representatives of the three countries succeeded in finding a common language and reaching accords even in the period of the start of the 1980's, which was most unpropitious for East-West dialogue. For example, in 1982, when the United States had openly proclaimed the "possibility of victory" in a nuclear war, the participants in the discussions declared in the final document adopted at the conclusion of the meeting that the very idea of waging nuclear war was "pure madness" and that "there can be no rational justification for a decision to resort" to it. "In reality," the document goes on to say, "there is no... alternative to detente and peaceful coexistence."

By some fatal confluence of circumstances the Edinburgh discussions have been held, as a rule, at crisis moments of the development of the international situation. Nor was the last meeting any exception. To begin merely with the fact that it had been scheduled for September 1985, but this then proved impossible in view of the British authorities' provocative actions in respect of a number of officials of Soviet establishments in Great Britain. As a result the participants in the discussions were able to continue the dialogue only this April.

Greeting us with rain and fog, Edinburgh was improbably beautiful. The mysterious contours of the ancient castle and the medieval architecture of one of Great Britain's oldest universities and its adjacent buildings put us in a philosophical frame of mind and engendered thoughts of beauty and eternity. We were reminded of the problems which we were to discuss only by the collection of cold steel in the Walter Scott house in Abbotsford, where the participants in the meeting were kindly treated to tea by the mistress of the house, the great-great-granddaughter of the great writer.

But this atmosphere of seeming calm and general harmony did not last long. The second day of the meeting was "accompanied" by the explosions of the American missiles and bombs in Tripoli and Benghazi. The dangerous exacerbation of international tension brought about by the bandit raid on Libya demonstrated as graphically as can be how small and fragile the modern world is for wars and power politics.

From their very start the Edinburgh meetings have attracted considerable attention from political and government circles of Great Britain and the United States. The composition of the participants in the last meeting testifies to this, inter alia. They included G. Barnet, rector of Edinburgh University, D. Bolton, director of the Royal Armed Services Institute, Ambassador L. Hansen, deputy head of the American delegation at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures, Security and Disarmament in Europe, R. Thomas, director of the Strategic Technology Center of the Texas Experimental Engineering College and member of the U.S. Defense Department's SDI Commission, and others.

At the center of the debate, which was inaugurated by the cochairmen of the meeting--G. Yanayev, deputy chairman of the Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries, and G. Barnet--were most urgent problems of the present day: security in Europe and the world as a whole; a lessening of the risk of an outbreak of nuclear war; SDI and prevention of the militarization of space. It is perfectly understandable that the participants in the debate paid paramount attention to the recent Soviet initiatives set forth in the statement of M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, of 15 January 1986, the CPSU Central Committee Political Report and other documents of the 27th party congress and also to the accords contained in the joint Soviet-American statement adopted in connection with the results of the top-level meeting in November 1985.

In the course of the exchange of opinions two opposite approaches to the solution of the problem of the preservation of peace in the world clashed: the Soviet concept of equal security for all by way of a reduction in arms and

disarmament as far as the complete elimination of all types of weapons of mass annihilation and the American concept based on an illusory belief in the possibility of ensuring strategic stability and security solely by military-technical means. It was attempted for the umpteenth time to impress upon us that the most efficient and realistic means of preventing war is strength in general and nuclear weapons in particular and that peace is possible only thanks to the existing "balance of terror".

Yes, truly, security is built today, to call things by their proper name, on terror in the face of collective suicide, although this is not our choice. According to available estimates, the total number of nuclear warheads in the world amounts to 50,000, and their total power is the equivalent of 13 billion tons of TNT. This means 1 million bombs similar to that which destroyed Hiroshima. Approximately 3 megatons of explosives were expended throughout WWII. Now, however, the same charge could be concentrated in one thermonuclear bomb.

The threat with which the current situation is fraught was evocatively and accurately formulated by the well-known American physicist C. Sagan. When he was asked to review the book "Fate of the Earth" by the American current affairs writer J. Schell, which had elicited extensive comment, he wrote a single sentence, which said it all: "Each second a whole WWII, even so, a whole long lazy afternoon." To this should be added the disastrous climatic, ecological and other consequences of a nuclear conflict. Where is there further to go? From the viewpoint of elementary commonsense, nowhere. After all, continuation of the nuclear arms race will only increase the equal danger and could bring it to a limit where even parity ceases to be a factor of stability.

Strategic parity represents a complex system, and such systems, as is known, radically alter their behavior when they go beyond the limits of stability. In specialists' terminology, there is an "overstepping of the threshold". Transition to a new state, which is initially characterized by unpredictability of behavior and chaos, is often observed here. At the edge of the range of stability even slight changes and a negligible external impulse could lead to appreciable and unpredicable changes. In this case people speak of a "trigger mechanism," which operates like a bang--a loud noise--in the mountains which is capable of "triggering" an avalanche of snow.

As M.S. Gorbachev emphasized, answering questions put by the newspaper L'HUMANITE, "in order for the worst to happen it is not even necessary to perpetrate an unprecedented stupidity or crime. It is sufficient merely to act as people have acted for millennia--to rely in the solution of international matters on weapons and military power and, when an opportunity offers, to use it." The nuclear age confronts mankind with the urgent task of cultivating new political thinking. It is essential to adopt a new "scale of values" based on a new understanding of the meaning of state policy, in accordance with which the sphere of international relations should be seen not simply as a field of struggle for one's goals but also as a particular reality and some total sum of interests.

The concept of ensuring general security put forward by the 27th CPSU Congress proceeds from the fact that the nature of modern weapons affords no state a hope of defending itself by way of a buildup of military potential. In addition, an all-around analysis of the strategic situation leads to the unequivocal conclusion that attempts to achieve military superiority to the other side, instead of contributing to a strengthening of one's own security, lead to the reduced degree thereof inasmuch as the undermining of strategic stability engenders unpredictability in policy and specific actions. Whence it follows that ensuring security is increasingly a political task, which may be tackled only by political means. It is a question here not only of the need to prevent war but also of the creation of dependable guarantees against the threat thereof arising in the future.

Unfortunately, the course of the discussion showed that the majority of speakers are still in the grip of outdated ideas concerning the correlation between military, particularly defensive, potential and the degree of security. The American participants in the meeting upheld the viewpoint according to which R. Reagan's "strategic defense initiative" affords an opportunity for the elaboration of mutually acceptable parameters of strategic stability with regard for the interconnection of offensive and defensive arms. Otherwise, they asserted, a new spiraling of the offensive strategic arms race in combination with realization of the SDI is inevitable.

Some British participants attempted to justify the "star wars" program by references to the fact that it represents merely a concentration of research which, they said, has been under way for a long time everywhere. They consider it necessary here to negotiate on the kind of research to be considered permissible in the future.

With a perseverance worthy of a better application speakers endeavored to persuade us that the SDI is geared to the creation of a "shield," is of an "exclusively defensive nature" and will ultimately lead to the removal of the threat of war and disarmament.

In general, a familiar set of arguments, not one of which withstands criticism. To begin if only with the attempts to portray the system of space-based arms being developed within the SDI framework as a "shield". Even if this were the case, it cannot be forgotten that, as the history of war testifies, the appearance of the shield by no means led to a renunciation of spears and swords but, on the contrary, gave rise to the need for their constant improvement.

But in practice the American plans for the militarization of space have nothing in common with defense. With what were armies armed from the means of attack and defense prior to the invention of the atom bomb? Sword and shield, cannon and armor. Inventions in the sphere of defense were always possible, it seemed. However, with the appearance of nuclear weapons the situation changed fundamentally. In the centuries-old competition of "shield" and "sword" the latter has won a decisive victory.

On the basis of a detailed study of this problem scientists and specialists in various countries of the world are concluding that no system of intercepting missiles can be totally impenetrable in practice. With figures in hand they are demonstrating the transparency of the hopes of the creation over American territory of some idyllic antimissile "umbrella". As calculations show, it may be possible with it to protect at best individual targets like, for example, ICBM launch positions and also enhance to a certain extent the survivability of a number of command, control and communications centers.

But ensuring protection of the entire territory or just all vital centers of the United States is impossible. First, because "absolute defense" is impracticable even theoretically. Second, there is a whole number of types of weapons, bombers and cruise missiles, for example, against which the planned system of space-based arms is obviously powerless. Third, simpler and cheaper means of overcoming the most sophisticated antimissile "shield" will always be found.

It is sufficient to adduce a short list of the already widely known so-called passive means capable of reducing the efficiency or neutralizing even a superintricate ABM system: dummy missile launches (with the aid of infrared sensors); concealment of actual launches by way of the creation of a smokescreen: multilayer missile deflecting coverings protecting them against lasers; the launch of decoys; and much else. Of the active means we may cite ballistic interceptor missiles with high initial acceleration for destroying stations, space-based mines and ground-based lasers of great power and "clouds" of obstacles (metal fragments on the trajectory of the battle stations, for example). And all these means would be far cheaper and simpler than a space-based antimissile system.

The "technological optimism" of the SDI's official propagandists and its disciples is being sharply and convincingly criticized not only by Soviet but also many Western scientists and specialists. We may cite as an example the collective study "Fallacy of the Star Wars Concept," which was published by the Union of Concerned Scientists. H. Bethe, winner of the Nobel Prize for physics and formerly a leader of the Manhattan Project and a member of the U.S. President's Science and Technology Consultative Committee, Adm N. Gaylor, former director of the NSA, and also H. Scoville, former deputy director of the CIA, took part. As the authors of the book note, not without sarcasm, the supporters of SDI in the scientific world who liken the task of the creation of ABM defense to the S&T projects carried out by the United States in the past (the landing of a man on the Moon, for example) "are seemingly losing sight of the following fact: when work on the Apollo Program began, we already knew that the Moon was not inhabited by a strong people intent on thwarting our plan."

Developing this idea, H. Bethe writes: "The engineering systems necessary for protecting the population against nuclear ballistic missiles are at the limits of the possibilities of contemporary science and technology and for many reasons will most likely never be sufficiently reliable. On the other hand, there is already a surplus of cheap and efficient means of combating such systems.... If we really wish to protect America against the dangers

connected with nuclear weapons, we should by no means embark on the path of creation of ABM defense since this could lead merely to the opposite results: to a significant increase in the number of nuclear weapons targeted at us in combination with the creation of a colossally complex defensive system whose efficiency would be shrouded in mystery until the tragic moment when it had to be activated. A situation which is more unstable and susceptible to accidents is hard to imagine."

So the task of ensuring "guaranteed survival" is nothing more than a bluff and profitable political slogan, by exploiting which certain circles would like to legalize the militarization of space. This would not simply lend impetus to a race in all types of arms but would put an end to any curbing of such a race. This was declared with all certainty by the Soviet participants in the Edinburgh meeting, emphasizing that the question now is thus: either the militarization of space is prevented or it becomes a source of menacing danger for mankind.

As might have been expected, a large place in the course of the debate was occupied by the problem of verification of compliance with agreements in the disarmament sphere. Unfortunately, the pronouncements of the speakers on this score were little different from the West's well-known position on this question. We once again were witness to attempts to substitute the idea of arms verification for questions of disarmament verification. How else to interpret the "regret" expressed by some American participants in the meeting that the Soviet Union had turned down the American proposals that it send its specialists to the Nevada Test Range to observe the test explosion of a nuclear weapons. American propaganda kicked up a big noise in connection with this invitation. However, neither in the United States nor in other NATO countries has anyone yet been able to explain the point of it. Nor did we obtain clarification in Edinburgh either. For what reason should Soviet specialists be present at an American test range and observe nuclear tests? In order by their presence to sanction them? The USSR, as its leadership has declared repeatedly, will not consent to this.

The essence of the Soviet approach to problems of disarmament is as follows: disarmament without verification is impossible, but verification without disarmament is pointless. This applies fully to verification of the nonconducting of nuclear tests. The Soviet Union has believed and continues to believe that national means of inspection are adequate for it. At the same time the Soviet leadership, endeavoring to contribute to the speediest solution of this problem, has declared its readiness to consent to the strictest inspection measures, including on-site inspection. Our country has demonstrated its good will by having three times extended the unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions, which has been observed since 6 August 1985.

What was the position on this question of the Western participants in the meeting? At first sight it was in principle no different from ours. All the speakers spoke of the need for a halt to nuclear testing. But such pronouncements were largely devalued by the subsequent clarifications. First, given the present level of nuclear confrontation, a suspension of nuclear tests

could only be a "long-term" goal inasmuch, it was said, as under current conditions testing is essential for ensuring the efficiency of nuclear deterrence--the basis of strategic stability and security. Second, a suspension of nuclear testing was connected with the creation of the so-called "necessary conditions," by which is meant the preliminary development and implementation (!) of improved verification measures.

It is not difficult to spot the illogicality of such a position. Essentially the cart is being put before the horse. After all, if the United States does not intend in principle abandoning the nuclear testing program, giving as the reason for this the need to upgrade the nuclear weapons and increase their efficiency, what, one wonders, has the problem of verification got to do with it? And, what is most important, what is the point of talking about the task of halting nuclear testing while at the same time refusing any realistic steps in this direction?

A quite sharp debate arose in connection with the question of a ban on chemical weapons. Certain Western participants portrayed matters in this connection such that the main reason for the lack of changes here is the Soviet Union's "stubborn reluctance" to consent to on-site inspections. To tell the truth, we did not understand what was concealed here: ignorance of the Soviet position on this issue or a "stubborn reluctance" to see what is obvious. But it is most likely a question of the latter. An interview with a participant in the meeting, D. Bolton, broadcast by the BBC World Service on 15 May, in which he attempted in advance to justify the NATO Military Planning Committee decision on a "modernization" of the bloc's chemical arms, confirms this supposition.

In describing the sixth meeting within the framework of the Edinburgh discussions we have deliberately endeavored to show the complexity and seriousness of the debate. Nonetheless, it did not descend to sterile polemics. On the contrary, it was obviously precisely thanks to the fact that the exchange of opinions was of a candid, businesslike and constructive nature that the participants in the meeting were able to agree on and adopt in connection with the results of the discussions a comprehensive communique, which observes, *inter alia*, that:

ensuring lasting peace is inseparably connected with the task of the creation of an all-embracing system of international security incorporating political, military, economic and humanitarian aspects;

the continuing arms race is not only undermining the existing level of stability but also creating a situation in which the efforts aimed at the consolidation of peace have become considerably more complicated;

the proposed Soviet-American top-level meeting must lead to specific agreements on a reduction in nuclear arms and also the prevention of an arms race in space, given a halt thereto on earth.

Our account would be incomplete if we did not say a few words of gratitude to the organizers of the meeting. The finely conceived program, the flawless precision and the solicitous attitude toward the participants of G. McAlister, general secretary of the Scotland-USSR Friendship Society, J. Erickson, director of Edinburgh University's Center for Defense Studies, and M. Westcott,

assistant rector of the university, largely contributed to the creation of a benevolent and constructive atmosphere.

Evaluating the results of the meeting, it may be said as a whole that a difficult, but useful exchange took place which is to be continued. The importance of such contacts is obvious. Only dialogue makes it possible to create the infrastructure of cooperation and engenders the mutual understanding without which it is impossible to solve the problems confronting mankind on the threshold of the 21st century.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

CANADA: CITIZEN COMMENTATOR ON SDI AS BARGAINING TOOL

Ottawa THE OTTAWA CITIZEN in English 3 Nov 86 p A6

[Article by Ilya Gerol]

[Text]

Since the original outburst of emotions that spawned the epithet Star Wars to describe U.S. President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative, the number of opponents to SDI has shrunk dramatically.

This doesn't mean that there is no serious opposition to SDI any more. But the character of the opposition has changed.

The serious discussion is now about the SDI and not about Star Wars.

The Star Wars platitude is left mainly to professional peaceniks and headline writers.

SDI meanwhile, has become — whether one wants it or not — the main avenue for developing a new system of deterrence to replace nuclear weapons, which don't deter anything or anyone for the simple reason that they can't be used.

The majority of NATO countries — except Iceland, which doesn't have armed forces and Canada, which does have the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security — have in one way or another supported research, testing and development of SDI.

The decision to support SDI was both a strategic and philosophical one.

In western Europe, there are many reasons to worry about the future: 52,000 Soviet tanks and a ratio of four-to-one in favor of the Soviets in air force strength. Historical experience has proven beyond any reasonable doubt that the accumulation of excessive military might is habitually used by one totalitarian system or another.

The western half of Europe was attacked by Germany twice and the eastern half was eventually included in the Soviet sphere.

The Europeans have always thought the deployment of U.S. missiles with nuclear warheads, coupled with the possible use of British and French nuclear forces, was a temporary deterrence to further Soviet expansion. Then it became clear that the idea of fighting a "limited" nuclear war so much loved by some American generals and their

equally bright Soviet colleagues was dangerous nonsense.

A limited nuclear war would become a global disaster in a matter of minutes.

When both Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev said in Geneva last November that a nuclear war couldn't be won and consequently couldn't be started, they weren't making an incredible intellectual discovery. They just admitted the truth.

There were people who were not glad to hear it. These people weren't ultra-rightwingers or ultra-leftwingers who would gladly use a nuclear weapon to solve their problems. No, the people who were worried about the disappearance of a nuclear deterrent were the majority of western Europeans and their political leaders. If nuclear weapons were no longer to be the deterrent, what would be?

SDI proposed to build a new system of deterrence and was accepted as the answer by western Europe's political establishment. In fact, western Europe's influence played a crucial part in the decision made by Reagan's advisers in Reykjavik not to sign agreements with the Soviets, however attractive they might be, if this endangered SDI.

Opponents of SDI are represented by two schools of thought. The first, mostly the professional members of peace movements — including some retired generals — say that SDI is wrong because it is not feasible, it just can't be built.

The best answer to this argument was provided by the Soviets. Their decision in Reykjavik not to compromise on SDI despite far-reaching concessions from Reagan shows that Moscow believes SDI is more than feasible. Why else would they oppose an American attempt to implement such a costly and useless idea?

The second group of opponents to SDI have more serious arguments. They say that the technological and economic superiority of the U.S. gives the Americans a clear advantage in making the defence of space a permanent threat to the Soviet Union and would force the Soviets to look for any — even the most desperate — way of bridging the gap. They say it could provoke a military confrontation and they have a good point.

SDI can serve its purpose, which is to provide a mutual, non-nuclear and effective deterrence, only if it is made negotiable. The world has reached a point in its development where neither side needs superiority. Parity is the best guarantee of security. And nothing could be more efficient in providing the parity of non-nuclear deterrence than negotiating SDI in exchange for arms control accords, or sharing its technology.

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

CANADA: EDITORIAL ON ABRAHAMSON PRESS CONFERENCE

Ottawa THE OTTAWA CITIZEN in English 14 Nov 86 p A8

[Text]

Replying to questions from the *Citizen* in the course of a worldwide electronic press conference this week, Gen. James Abrahamson, director of the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), confirmed unequivocally that Star Wars deployment would be a decision for the Western alliance. This should help allay fears that the U.S. might go it alone in the absence of an agreement with the Soviets.

The SDI chief claimed that was always the U.S. intention. That may be so, but blurring the distinction between prior consultation and joint decision-making on such a vital issue is of crucial importance to all other members of NATO, including Canada.

Abrahamson was also asked whether Canadians should be concerned about ballistic missile defence requiring the use of Canadian territory at some stage. Specifically, in what circumstances and for what purposes would our territory be required?

He replied that SDI envisaged at some stage the use of both ground- and space-based systems, but it was premature at this time to say whether Canadian territory would be needed. In any event, such a question would be a matter for decision by Canada. Similarly, other sovereign countries would have to decide whether to allow such systems to be based on their soil.

The general was also confronted with statements he purportedly made to the effect that "a perfect astrodome defence is not a realistic thing." He acknowledged that he had been quoted correctly (by Robert McNamara in *Blundering into Disaster*). But he claimed his statement was taken out of context. His aim was to create a defensive system that was as effective as possible.

Abrahamson told a European questioner that the U.S. still intended to conduct SDI research into technologies that could be used to protect both North America and Western Europe against Soviet ballistic missile attack. This is a little-publicized aspect of Star Wars. It is apparently designed to assure European allies that the U.S. has no intention of turning inward and abandoning its commitment to defend them.

Whether the allies want such a Star Wars defence is another matter. Talk of a separate European missile defence system has surfaced but is still in the discussion stage.

The director's explanations were a useful contribution to understanding a program that has been much maligned by its critics. Whether from East or West, these usually portray it as a potentially destabilizing move in a world that demands balance to preserve peace.

The more light we can throw on SDI the better. We need a more informed discussion to replace the current dialogue of the deaf.

Today's "debate" usually doesn't even mention the extensive Soviet missile defence program. It has been in existence for years and is still going strong.

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CSO: 5220/13

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR NOVOSTI OFFICIAL EXPLAINS SOVIET SUMMIT POSITION

LD221856 Prague Television Service in Czech 2100 GMT 21 Nov 86

[Unidentified correspondent's interview with Yegor Vladimirovich Yakovlev, "assistant director of the Soviet NOVOSTI press agency and chief editor of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI" date and place not specified; question and answer in Russian fading into Czech translation--recorded; no video available]

[Text] [Correspondent] Yegor Vladimirovich, you took part in discussions along with foreign journalists who were in Reykjavik. With what is your newspaper currently occupied?

[Yakovlev] MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, as an international edition of the NOVOSTI press agency, is sent to 140 countries. We try to answer questions arising in the ranks of the world public in connection with Reykjavik. There are many questions. One of the most symptomatic was put at a roundtable discussion with Japanese journalists. And it was my interlocutor who raised the question: Did we not hurry the development through Reykjavik; was it worthwhile to discuss the whole set of proposals directly in Reykjavik; would it not have been better to discuss it at a preliminary conference, for instance, in Geneva, and only afterwards to come forward with those proposals because the American side was not prepared--this is clear--for such a range of proposals. I answered with a question to the question. Imagine that there was no Reykjavik. Imagine that we would have quietly put forward in Geneva that set of proposals where it would have quietly died down, since the Americans did not want to yield in the SDI sphere. How can it be compared with that enormous wave of interest in international politics throughout the world, or with that hole which has appeared in connection with the possibility of liberating mankind from weapons? It is a totally clear moment of truth regarding who wants to get rid of weapons and the threat of war, and who resists it.

My interlocutor told me that in our internal restructuring we set a rapid pace, and that we want to conduct ourselves at the same pace in the international field. With regard to internal restructuring, we say that the present time does not allow us to be held back, either by economic or other problems. I believe that the present time does not allow us this, even more so on the international arena. The issue is not that we are in a hurry, but to ensure that we arrive in time. You ask why the bourgeois press finds it so difficult

to write about the Reykjavik results? The customary bias of the bourgeois press is clear. There are also some symptomatic features here. The first concerns the American press--the lack of ability to understand that everything today must be done on the principles of parity. The Soviet Union made certain concessions when putting forwards its set of proposals. The Americans must do the same. At present, they are unable to understand this.

The second aspect is an approach to international politics as a propaganda matter. It goes round and round--how many points did we score, and how many did the Americans score? They do not understand that points are won in a game, and that we are not engaged in a game. We went to Reykjavik to reach a specific agreement on specific historic aspects needed to maintain peace. We are not concerning ourselves now whether we are better and the Americans are worse. It is necessary to come to an agreement, but the Americans reject this reality, although it is precisely our moratorium which is that reality which is eliminating the propaganda issues and raising the [word indistinct] issues.

Lastly I would cite the inability to understand the depth of the changes taking place within the Soviet Union. To many journalists it seems to be a temporary matter--questions of public discussion of matters, questions of social justice--that, to put it briefly, it will stay for a while and then disappear. At the same time we call our restructuring, using words: More socialism. What is it, this more socialism? It is more democracy, greater participation of people. Deeply democratic policy practised within the country cannot be aggressive in foreign policy matters. It has never been such in history, and cannot be so. And from here springs the suspicion that there exists some kind of second plan for Soviet policy, that we want to conceal something. They do not understand that our foreign policy is as sincere as our domestic policy. I think that these aspects, to a certain degree, are a hindrance.

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CSO: 5200/1127

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR'S ARBATOV ON REYKJAVIK, SDI EFFECT ON U.S. ELECTION

AU131221 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 7 Nov 86 p 5

[Interview with Georgiy Arbatov, director of the United States of America and Canada Institute in Moscow, by foreign policy columnist Istvan Zalai: "Interview with Georgiy Arbatov on Reykjavik and Soviet-U.S. Relations"; date and place not given -- first paragraph is newspaper's introduction]

[Text] What happened in Reykjavik and how does the famous American analyst see relations between Moscow and Washington after the summit, an analyst who took part in the talks held in Iceland as an expert? Georgiy Arbatov, member of the CPSU Central Committee and director of the United States of America and Canada Institute in Moscow visited Budapest recently. Istvan Zalai, our newspaper's foreign policy columnist, interviewed him.

[Zalai] Almost a month has passed since the Gorbachev-Reagan summit in Reykjavik but, analyzing the fateful issues of world politics, politicians and journalists repeatedly refer to the summit held in the capital of Iceland. In your view, why was it necessary to hold the Reykjavik summit?

[Arbatov] In order to be able to answer this question, I must refer to the situation prior to the Reykjavik summit or, if you like, to the changes in political thinking. Considerable changes have begun in the Soviet Union in the last 1 and 1/2 decades and we are stating the reasons for this quite openly: We must adjust our concepts to the quickly changing realities in the economy, public life, ideology, and of course in foreign policy and military policy as well.

In the course of reevaluating our concepts, we could not disregard the fact that the disarmament talks have taken on a particular character. They are continuing, and it is not a very good idea to give them up. We did so, but this was not the most successful step in our foreign policy, even if we acted in this way because it seemed that the talks were leading nowhere. We saw, however, that these talks were used quite contrarily to their aim, namely, to cause the continuing arms race to be forgotten, and to calm down the allies and public opinion. In reality everything remains the same, impossible complicated and impenetrable. We thought that things could no longer continue like this, and we made an attempt to cut "the Gordian knot." That is the reason why the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee suggested the summit in Reykjavik, to decide on what next.

What was, after all, the result of the summit in Reykjavik?

People all over the world could see through the veil of mist and prejudices and become aware of the truth: It is possible, after all, to come to an agreement and it is

possible to eliminate nuclear arms. But it is also partly true that the Americans were not ready for this.

[Zalai] Following the Reykjavik summit, one could often hear the argument that "Gorbachev lured Reagan into a trap."

[Arbatov] We did not set any trap for President Reagan, at most he possibly fell into his own trap. According to the U.S. argument we forced something on the President that he did not expect and took him unaware, although he had time to prepare. We repeatedly spoke about the fact that there was a need for a serious approach and big decisions, but they wanted only bagatelles. The proposals we made in January contained all the things we submitted in Reykjavik. They had 9 months' time to think these things over.

What is the reality? As I have already mentioned, they indeed fell into a trap, into the trap, into the trap of their own propaganda. They convinced themselves that there were divergences of opinion in our country, that Gorbachev was facing opposition and could not come with serious proposals. Therefore, they were virtually shocked at what happened and were surprised when Gorbachev told them that they could logically have deduced these proposals from the declarations made in January, and from everything that had been said at the 27th CPSU Congress. If they were surprised by this, that means that they simply did not read these things. In their place, in the place of the colleagues overseas, I would have had to resign long ago if I had failed to inform the leadership about the type of proposals to be expected.

[Zalai] Nevertheless, ever since the summit in Reykjavik a great variety of explanations have been published overseas on what really took place in Hofdi Castle. What is the truth?

[Arbatov] No matter how the U.S. side tries to distort the facts, we arrived in Reykjavik with our proposals in writing. I have a copy myself, since I also took part in the preparations. We decided that we would not hide what had happened and we would not be willing to play the American game of using the system and the confidential aspect of the talks to mislead people.

At the first meeting, Mikhail Gorbachev handed over the English text of the proposals that made up some three typewritten pages and which was entitled as follows: "The Directives of the President of the United States and of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee for the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union and the United States." It contained the following: Meeting in Reykjavik Reagan and Gorbachev discussed these issues and agreed on a summit to be held in Washington on (the place of the date to be announced), and here they would sign the agreements for the preparation of which the Foreign Ministers had been instructed.

But I will not expound on them in detail. Our proposals for compromise and our concessions are well-known.

The debate started and it turned out that the Americans were totally unprepared and came to the summit empty-handed. Do you know where we found this out? During the nighttime negotiations with the experts.

[Zalai] You also took part in this night conference. What was this marathon night conference like from the inside, a marathon conference held in Hofdi Castle?

[Arbatov] We conferred from 8 o'clock in the evening till 6:30 in the morning. I will never forget the most dramatic moments. There were three times as many Americans as

there were of us; Nitze, Perle, Rowny, and the entire negotiating team were sitting opposite us.

We tell them that we propose this and this. Silence. We ask them what they are waiting for, here are the documents in English and in Russian, let us discuss them. Again silence. Akhromeyev asks them: Are we discussing our text first or will you give us yours and we will start with that? The answer is silence again. The Americans kept sending each other all kinds of notes and kept whispering among themselves, and then asked for a recess. After 40 minutes we started again. We proposed to simply record the things on which we could not reach agreement, and then we would inform the General Secretary and they would inform the President. Again nothing. Things so far had probably worn poor Nitze out so much that he began reading one of the notes sent to him aloud, and then suddenly realized that we were not supposed to hear that. Another request for time-out followed. [paragraph continued]

The recess lasted almost 1 and 3/4 hours, I even mentioned that it was possible that they had fallen asleep somewhere. Finally they came and handed over the text. We read it and it turned out to be the same old stuff, smelling of mothballs, that we already knew from Geneva. Akhromeyev asked Nitze: What is the difference between these proposals and the proposals submitted by you on 18 September? There was suddenly a silence I have never experienced in my life. At last, Nitze said that they were identical. There were some more questions, and then we said we would now leave to speak to the leadership. We boarded the ship at 2 o'clock in the morning (Gorbachev's quarters were on the ship Georg Ot's) and returned after an hour. Finally, we discussed two very important issues and simply forced them to debate these issues seriously.

It was a funny night, everything was upside down and everything seemed to go in the opposite direction. I would have never thought that I would witness a scene in which Marshall Akhromeyev would keep on convincing Perle on the need for on-the-spot verification and Perle would try to avoid it by almost all means. No, no - he says - we will publish a declaration on the cruise missiles deployed at sea, you have to believe us, we have a Congress in our country and an open society. But Akhromeyev does not give in. No, everything should be verified on site. You should carry out verification on our sites and we on yours. The debate went on somewhat like this.

Naturally, the following day Reagan hesitated between two different feelings. One could have probably been something like: Deep in my soul, I would, after all, like to enter history, and I have the possibility to do so if I now sign something that would free mankind from the great danger. On the other hand, he was not prepared for this, he was kept back and one could feel it. Later, U.S. officials said thank heavens, he succeeded in holding out. In my view Assistant Secretary of Defense Perle labeled this as a great "historic" achievement.

[Zalai] It was, after all, SDI that blocked a concrete agreement...

[Arbatov] No it was not, although the meeting on Sunday afternoon was a rather dramatic one. Imagine what they were insisting upon and why Reagan refrained from signing the agreement: Because it would place a ban on tests carried out outside the laboratory for 10 years, a period in which all nuclear arms would have to be eliminated. But even if they had the possibility to carry out tests anywhere in the coming 10 years, they would still achieve nothing by this, because this would only be a research period and there would be no arms. Gorbachev asked Reagan the following: What is the use of a system that, according to the Americans, will cost \$3 billion? To defend yourself against something that would not exist? Then, Reagan came up with all kinds of excuses like, for example, the SDI would be a guarantee against madmen who might lay their hands on an atomic bomb, and even named a few politicians he considered as such. But

this is totally absurd. Let us suppose that someone nevertheless lays hands on an atomic bomb; how would he launch it? SDI would be a defense shield against missiles but not against ships and planes. That is, the whole argument was only an excuse.

Then he came up with another thing, namely, what if the Soviet Union cheats the United States and maintains a few missiles. But that is also nonsense. First, because it is impossible to hide an intercontinental ballistic missile — the one SDI is meant to attack. Everything can be observed from outer space and it cannot be built and deployed unnoticed. Second: We take into consideration all three methods of verification, and we say that we are for the strictest three-fold verification — national, international, and on site — and we do not allow any kind of doubt to emerge. If, despite all this, one does not trust the other side, then what kind of agreement can one sign: no matter what one does, it means that one does not want to sign an agreement.

[Zalai] In your view, is it possible to block SDI, since this is not simply the President's dream?

[Arbatov] In my view the question should be put differently. Yes, SDI must be blocked. If we do not stop it, we have to count on a very difficult process, a process because this involves not simply the SDI, but a new and terrible round of the arms race. Beside, there are also different types of SDI. One belongs to the President and is a dream, and I do not know who else shares this dream with him. But there is another SDI too, a means of torpedoing the negotiations and in Reykjavik we could see how this type works. This is Weinberger's and Perle's SDI. There is also an SDI that, in the dream of some officials, is a means of destroying and exhausting the Soviet Union economically. There is, of course, also an SDI that wants to concentrate economic and technological resources on technological development, and there is also an SDI that regards the entire affair simply as good business.

But I would add something that seems to be very interesting. The impression that emerged in Reykjavik is that everything depends on whether the SDI tests should continue under laboratory conditions or also outside the laboratory. I was very surprised by this, and I did not understand very well why Reagan or the U.S. experts had not asked us about what we meant exactly by laboratory tests. It seems that they did not ask us because they did not want any kind of agreement. It is possible that they were looking for an excuse to reject the entire agreement.

[Zalai] You mean that it is possible that in that case SDI was only an excuse for the Reagan administration to avoid an agreement?

[Arbatov] I have such a feeling. In my opinion they were not ready for an agreement, and what they could use to block such an agreement is completely irrelevant. They will also change only under great pressure, because these are different people, with a different way of thinking, and people who are related to the arms race. I think that every step is opposed by these people. They tried to make use of everything, and the President's "favorite child" — the SDI program which, in their view, "provides defense" against a nuclear attack — came just at the right moment. However, at the Geneva summit the two leaders came to the right conclusion — also put down in writing — that there can be no victor in a nuclear war. The axiom of our age, therefore, is that nothing can defend us from nuclear arms except their elimination. This political process has now gained tremendous encouragement.

[Zalai] In Reykjavik the Soviet Union made several unilateral concessions on various issues. How do you justify this?

[Arbatov] This is a complex question. In his television address, Gorbachev spoke about the fact that we ourselves were also gradually learning a lot and were breaking away from stereotypes and prejudices. Therefore, the question of where the limit of compromises and concessions lies is very much a relative one. It has turned out that certain non-exceedable limits are not in fact so. The firm reserves offered by the strategic balance are also clear today. Taking a better look, it also becomes clear that the compromises were made not to the Americans but to common sense.

There are, of course, limits, and these were shown by Reykjavik or the affair of the diplomats. Our leadership can also be very flexible, but also as hard as marble. We are well aware of the area where another step would already threaten our essential interests, and we do not go beyond that limit. We will see what happens next, but this much is already clear: A very interesting situation has emerged and our new tactics and flexibility have confused the Americans. Some of them frankly said that the most tragic thing would be if the Soviet Union were to accept the Western proposals.

[Zalai] Following Reykjavik, Mikhail Gorbachev said that the doors would stay open. There are, however, Soviet experts who say that it is impossible to arrive at an agreement with Reagan. What is your opinion?

[Arbatov] The next 2 years will show whether it is possible to come to an agreement with him or not. But chances are dwindling with the passing of every month. Knowing the U.S. experts, I feel that even if Reagan came to an agreement, these people would sabotage his decision in the course of these 2 years. I fear that very much. But we are not naive people either. We do not believe — although we would very much have liked to — that we can succeed in turning the course of events in 2 days. We know that change can only be the result of a political process, and in Reykjavik we did a lot for this process.

[Zakai] Let us now reverse the question. There are experts who believe that the Soviet Union must come to an agreement with Reagan because he is strong enough to get the agreements accepted?

[Arbatov] We have had agreements signed both with conservative and liberal U.S. Administrations. Our best relations were in Roosevelt's time and then in Nixon's time. I would say that this depends, after all, on the general situation. Why would we not want to come to an agreement with Reagan? We want an agreement as soon as possible. Primarily, because we are aware of the dangers inherent in the arms race and in tension. It also makes a difference if we succeed in concentrating far greater means, resources, and brains on peaceful activity rather than on defense.

[Zalai] Last time you gave an interview to our newspaper, in February 1985, you said "We have not yet received an answer to the most important question: What does Washington want?" Now, after Geneva and Reykjavik, do you think there is already an answer?

[Arbatov] If I wanted to be very polite then I would say that we have not received it yet. If I speak quite frankly, I will say that we have received it. A lot of people in Washington want to follow the old ways and, at the same time, other people are coming forward who regard this old way as impossible and dangerous. I believe that, following the Congressional elections held this week, the debate in the United States will become stronger. Both parties find themselves in a complex situation. The essence of the problem is the nature of the Reagan administration. Instead of politics, it took up the characteristics of a Hollywood ad-machine but this could not lead to solving the problems but only to postponing them. No matter who comes, he will have to take this into account. The Republicans are in a different situation because

the struggle begins with who should take Reagan's place, and nothing is yet clear with the Democrats either. But in my view the Americans cannot be hypnotized forever, and so, sooner or later, the kind of answer they should give to the real issues, and thus to the challenge of our new policy and our new way of thinking will become a matter of unavoidable debate in the United States.

[Zalai] In the midterm elections in the United States, the Democratic Party also gained a majority in the Senate in addition to the House. In your opinion how can this fact affect the President's situation in the coming 2 years?

[Arbatov] The Democratic majority in the Congress will undoubtedly cause difficulties in the relations between the administration and the Congress, for example, from now on, the Democrats will be able to decide on the issues to be presented to Congress. The last 2 years, therefore, promise to be difficult for the Reagan administration, but not only because of this. The election was a good reflection of the political situation, because Reagan himself threw everything onto the scales.

In addition, he tried to present SDI as a main issue and he put it almost in a McCarthyite way: If you vote Democrat then you vote for Gorbachev instead of the President of the United States. But they lost nevertheless.

Of course, we will have to seriously analyze the outcome of the elections and that needs time. I am not convinced that dissatisfaction with the President's foreign policy played a great role in the final results, but it is clear that the budget deficit and everything else that is connected with the astronomical military expenditures did play a great role in the outcome of the elections.

[Zalai] You also mentioned that the U.S. leading circles are trying to destroy the Soviet Union economically with the arms race and the SDI. Reagan's most conservative followers urge the President to refrain from signing any kind of agreement with Moscow because such an agreement might ease the acceleration of the Soviet social and economic development. In your view, what kind of effect can such an effort have?

[Arbatov] The aim of these efforts is to weaken us from an economic and social policy point of view, and to cause us difficulties. This is no doubt one of the aspects of the U.S. policy and also the reason behind the arms race. This trend has been characteristic of the current administration from the beginning. A good example: In its defense guidelines for the years 1984-88, the United States set the goal of making obsolete the Soviet investments in defense made so far by expanding the arms race into a new sphere, the most expensive one ever. We are aware of this danger and of course we are doing everything to make these plans end in failure. We will not follow this road and this is also clear from the way we have approached "Star Wars." We will not follow a road suggested to us, that is the "Star Wars" road of astronomical expenditures and financial collapse. According to our scientists, there are dozens of incomparably cheaper methods of defeating this SDI. It is true that we would also like to avoid these cheaper methods, because these too will cost us a lot.

But there are limits to the possibilities of even such rich countries as the United States, and SDI is not cheap for the Americans either. Therefore, I think we will succeed in changing the world situation after all, to an extent that it will enable radical disarmament steps.

[Zalai] After Reykjavik the media quoted you as saying that "SDI brought the negotiations to a dead-end." Ultimately, however, you have just considered radical disarmament steps to be possible. How should we interpret this?

[Arbatov] If we talk about a long-term period, then I am an optimist because I cannot imagine that the current irrational stipulation will last for long, if not for other reasons, then at least for economic ones. In the long term, the fact that people have never before understood the danger of nuclear war so well is also a cause for optimism. Reykjavik also played a very important role in this respect. It enabled people to realize that it is possible and we must come to an agreement on eliminating the nuclear danger.

If we speak of shorter periods, however, say 1 year or the next 2 years, then I will be much more careful. It seems that in 3-4 months we will see whether we still succeed in doing something during Reagan's presidency or not. We have the doors open, but the Americans have to understand that they cannot force us to surrender.

[Zalai] Thank you for your interview.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR'S FALIN: SDI CRUCIAL IN REYKJAVIK OUTCOME

AU141041 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 10 Nov 86 p 5

[Interview given by Valentin Falin, chairman of the NOVOSTI press agency, to Jerzy Kraszewski, TRYBUNA LUDU moscow correspondent: "Reykjavik 30 Days on -- The Opportunity Is Still There" -- in Moscow, date not given]

[Text] Valentin Falin, the noted Soviet diplomat, political and press activist, and chairman of the NOVOSTI press agency board, received Jerzy Kraszewski, head of the TRYBUNA LUDU Moscow bureau, and talked with him about some international issues in the light of the results of the M. Gorbachev and R. Reagan meeting. V. Falentin was one of CPSU General Secretary M. Gorbachev's experts during the Reykjavik trip.

[Kraszewski] The further we move away from Reykjavik, the more heated the world discussions about the results, open difficulties, and problems of the Reykjavik meeting become. At the same time, Washington continues to distort the essence of the Soviet initiatives and to give a false picture of the course of the meeting. A campaign of disinformation and of falsifying the essence of the talks is still continuing in the United States....

That is why I propose that we should turn to the night of 11-12 October. To recapitulate: Following the first day of the talks between M. Gorbachev and R. Reagan, two groups of Soviet and U.S. experts began their work, which was reported to have continued from 2000 until 0430 the next day. What did you work on and what really happened during that session?

[Falin] The experts were asked to draw up a concrete accord on the strength of the M. Gorbachev-R. Reagan exchanges of views and the proposals submitted during the first meeting on 11 October. That is why the question asked by Marshal Akhromeyev, who led our group, was simple and specific: What is the American side able to say about Gorbachev's proposals put forward during his meeting with Reagan? Our proposals were submitted in writing -- in Russian and English. The Work of Experts [subhead] [position of subhead as published]

The marshal asked this question, which was followed by a long and wearisome silence. He repeated the question and suggested that the session should concretely examine the Soviet formulations -- sentence by sentence and word by word. Unfortunately, a constructive and positive response, which we expected from the U.S. side, did not materialize. Nitze, Rovny, Kampelman, Edelman, Perle, and others asked for an adjournment.

Although our American colleagues did promise that their consultations would be short, the adjournment was very long. When they returned they handed us a sheet of paper with a message, which we examined and concluded there was nothing new in. The marshal asked whether the U.S. representatives were able to tell what was new in the U.S. counterproposal in relation to the position assumed by the United States at Geneva negotiations on 18 September. The USSR had replied to this earlier.

There was another pause. After a while an embarrassed Paul Nitze declared that their counterproposal did not contain anything new and was really a repetition of the 18 September position.

The marshal then recalled that we had been instructed by our leadership not to discuss the proposals that had already been examined in Geneva and on which views had previously been aired.

We were instructed to prepare joint working documents, worked out by the two groups of experts. We had to adopt the 11 October exchange of views between the two leaders as a point of departure for these proposals.

Our American colleagues then gave us to understand that they were not ready to examine the issues in this way. In this situation the Soviet experts proposed that we should adjourn and inform M. Gorbachev and R. Reagan about the new situation. Our proposal was accepted.

We met again at 0300 and we noted that the conduct of the U.S. delegates was a little different. They agreed to open a specific discussion of the text and formulation of the materials under preparation. As a result of this discussion and exchanges of view and, not without difficulties and disputes, including disputes within the U.S. delegation itself, a draft accord was produced on the elimination of strategic weapons in two phases within 10 years.

It was proposed to reduce the strategic carriers of nuclear weapons and nuclear warheads by 50 percent in the first phase and to eliminate all nuclear weapons [bron] in Europe in the first phase, that is, in the first 5-year period. This was that we proposed, but the American insisted that the "zero alternative" should also be applied to the Soviet medium-range missiles [rakiety] in Asia. We said that we could not agree to such a concept, but in the end the two sides agreed to submit the issue of medium-range missiles [rakiety] in Asia to Delegation Chairmen Gorbachev and Reagan.

The issue of verification [kontrola] was a very difficult aspect of our work. We insisted on accepting the principle of triple verification: through national resources, supranational resources, and on-site inspection. The Americans, especially Perle, had doubts about on-site inspection with regard to many specific kinds of weapons, primarily sea-based missiles. We could not agree with them. Motivated by the principles of equality, we argued that on-site inspection must cover all kinds of weapons, including the systems to which the Americans attach special significance for various reasons.

We then discussed the issue of halting nuclear tests. The examination of this issue began from two different poles, if I may say so. The Americans proposed to prepare an accord on the conditions under which explosions would be continued, but rejecting their concept we declared that in line with the two sides' international obligations we insist on drawing up an accord on wholly and completely halting all tests.

In the end, showing great resistance and unwillingness, the Americans conceded such a possibility and our discussion began to revolve around a gradual halting of tests. We

agreed that the power of explosions would be gradually lowered and that other restrictions would be introduced. However, all this would be done under the provision that, within a definite, measurable, and specific time, the sides would sign an accord on wholly halting nuclear tests.

Finally, the issue of the absolute observance of the accord on restricting the systems of antimissile defense produced differences that could not be overcome. The Americans adopted an interpretation of the accord that would ultimately reduce the accord to naught. In fact we are asked to participate in the elimination and demolition of this accord. The Americans argued that it was actually obsolete and inconsistent with the present situation.

In this connection they revoked point "D" of the protocol and the right of the United States to terminate the accord. That is why Marshal Akhromeyev pointed to the fact that our partners had falsified the substance of the protocol and that they wanted to apply point "D" to Article 5, although it was Article 3 that was involved. As for Article 5, it simply forbids any work that exceeds the framework of permitted actions, that is, the operation of a restricted number of antimissile defense systems in a single region on earth and only on earth. Article 5 forbids installing, creating, and testing the systems and components of weapons using mobile sea, air, and space bases.

The U.S. representatives did not question this reservation, but they argued that their views were different. We agreed to report to our leaderships on the situation that developed. And this was in principle the conclusion of everything.

I repeat: We achieved considerable progress. In fact we were able to formulate conditions for eliminating nuclear weapons in two stages. In the first 5 years we would reduce all systems of offensive strategic weapons by 50 percent and wholly eliminate them by the end of the 10-year period. Other issues remain partly open -- the issue of medium-range missiles in Asia and the issue of the accord on restricting the antimissile defense systems. The United States refuses to fulfill its obligations stemming from this accord.

Two Sides of the Same Coin [subhead]

[Kraszewski] I take the following view of what you have just said: The U.S. side was taken aback by the scale and unusual nature of the Soviet proposals. The U.S. side was not ready for serious discussions. How can this be explained? Why did President Reagan come to Reykjavik empty-handed? What did he count on? What principles is he now following when he ascribes to himself his own initiatives and those that are not his?

[Falin] All this is most complicated, you know. Of course, the U.S. President came to Reykjavik empty-handed insofar as constructive, wide-ranging initiatives and a qualitative breakthrough in disarmament negotiations are concerned. It could be that, believing in various rumors and reports supplied by various U.S. agencies, he thought that we would be satisfied with some partial and intermediate settlements, with some cosmetic actions, or with some temporary accord in order to keep alive the feeble embers of dialogue....

Of course, the President was not psychologically prepared to decide on a radical change in the situation and in the very method of negotiations. He was not prepared to turn away from the nuclear world to a non-nuclear one within the specified deadline of 10 years, to erect barriers to the arms race in new areas, and to halt the present dangerous development of the situation.

On the other hand, as a man and president and, especially as the leader of the U.S. governing faction, prior to elections he did not want to appear in an unfavorable light and be regarded as a politician whose appraisal of prospects was not quite correct or was quite incorrect. Judging by many post-Reykjavik events, it is apparent that his tactic involved the following concept: To achieve an accord on the strength of the Soviet proposals on eliminating nuclear weapons and then "put aside" everything, confront this accord with the SDI program, and put forward the "Strategic Defense Initiative" as an initial condition for Soviet agreement to demolish the accord on restricting the antimissile defense systems and as a premise for achieving some measure of progress in some other areas, if theoretically at all possible.

From the viewpoint of disarmament issues and the methods of negotiations all this is completely illogical. Every reasonable human being realizes that it is impossible to count on progress in disarmament by demolishing what was previously achieved in this regard and what is one of the sine qua non conditions for continuing the process of disarmament.

Attempts were made to turn unfaithfulness to one accord into an invitation to conclude another.... They want to sacrifice the interminable accord on restricting the antimissile defense systems to definite ambitious plans, saying in this connection that the United States is a good partner for some future settlements....

And what if our conduct were like that? The United States would and should have rejected it, if it stuck to a logical line on preserving and strengthening the norms of international law. It is a fact that only on the basis of these norms is it possible to create normal and stable relations among states.

It goes without saying that the Soviet side had to reject the U.S. concepts. It could not help rejecting them. Otherwise we would have betrayed principles. I wish to stress clearly that from the very beginning -- from the moment when the 1972 accord on restricting the antimissile defense systems was negotiated and signed -- the sides were aware that there was a mutual link between restricting the arms race on earth and preventing such a race in other spheres. There is a mutual connection between restricting strategic offensive weapons and restricting strategic defense weapons. These are the two sides of the same coin. Severing this connection would amount to incapacitating both restrictions. In such a case there would follow an unrestricted offensive arms race and, correspondingly, an unrestricted arms race in those areas that we formally call defensive.

Why is the U.S. President now ascribing to himself other people's initiatives and ideas? Let us be more specific and say "some of the other people's initiatives and ideas," because he is far from wholly ascribing them to himself. What he is doing is merely fishing out from other people's proposals and initiatives only that which he is able to present to the American people in an attractive way. It is most probable that this is a result of the domestic peculiarities of the U.S. situation and of the recent elections. You have to put a good face on a bad game....

The Historic Dimension of the Soviet Proposals [subhead]

[Kraszewski] How do you appraise the world's response to the results of the Reykjavik meeting?

[Falin] I think that the general response, the response of the majority, shows that people are aware that a constructive and positive breakthrough could have been achieved in Reykjavik, that there were conditions for such a breakthrough, that the Soviet

proposals are of truly historic dimensions, and that they created opportunities that could ensure a further development of civilization on stable foundations and guarantee clear and transparent prospects.

People are also convinced that Reagan has sacrificed this opportunity on the altar of the U.S. militaristic plans. And if the minority, that is, the governments of countries that are closest to the United States or rather the NATO political groups that are closest to the White House (Thatcher, the Kohl government) approve of the Reagan stand, then theirs is not a genuine homage but a homage to the narrow and coldly calculated interests that link the imperialist countries within the aggressive NATO bloc. Of course, as world public opinion polls and other facts indicate, these positions of the governing circles are in conflict with the views of most peoples, even of those in the NATO countries.

[Kraszewski] However, some Western circles pose this question at times: Could not the USSR take yet another step and agree to the American alternative? I mean SDI. Why is it so dangerous? What are the dangers involved in this program? Another question indirectly connected with this issue: How would you appraise the post-Reykjavik course of the present round of Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva?

[Falin] All compromises have their limits. Wherever principles are violated a possibility for compromise no longer exists. The United States did not seek a compromise. What it wanted was for the other side to capitulate before the unreasonable and extremely dangerous U.S. demands. I have in mind the demand to demolish the accord on restricting the antimissile defense systems and to start an arms race in space.

But the facts are: If we want to end the arms race on earth we cannot permit the arms race to be transferred to this space. If we do not want to prevent an arms race in space, this means that we want to step up the arms race on earth. This is the only way in which the issue can be viewed. That is why Gorbachev told Reagan the following: The Soviet Union cannot countenance doing away with the treaty on limiting antimissile defense systems, and will not take part in the process. If the Americans want to assume responsibility for destroying a treaty that is the cornerstone of the entire disarmament process that is their affair. The Soviet Union will not be their partner in this.

Why does the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative pose a danger? Because SDI is not a defensive system, it is not even a antimissile defense system. SDI is an attempt to make the arms race enter a qualitatively new phase. It is an attempt to create a weapons system based on new principles in physics, a weapons system whose scale and consequences are comparable to those of nuclear weapons. One can say that it is an attempt to find a way out of the blind alley in which the world finds itself at the present time with the help of even more dangerous weapons, weapons that are even more treacherous. The Union States believes that this weapons will provide it with military superiority, at least at some point in its development. They wish to exploit this possible superiority in a struggle with the socialist countries.

The world, all of us, face a choice at the present time: Should we permit such a course of events to take place or not? Should we allow mankind to be exposed to a new danger and become even more dependent on military technology than at present?

The system we are talking about is meant to operate so quickly that a human being will not have an opportunity to make a conscious decision when a danger arises. Control of the arms race, even in theory, will not be possible. It will not be a question of

there being hours or minutes to make a decision, but seconds. There are no geniuses or wise men who would find those few seconds sufficient time to reach a decision.

And that is where the root of the entire danger lies. SDI is a label, the packaging for other objectives. Besides, this has been the case in the past. Can one mention at least one postwar American strategy that was not called "defensive" in U.S. terminology? The planned elimination of socialism and communism throughout the world was also called "defensive." In this sense, nothing has changed. The directives for the development of the American Armed Forces formulated by the Pentagon in May 1982 set everything out plainly, in black and white. The aim of the arms race in space is to divest all the defense investments of socialist countries of their value — investments made over decades — and to compel the USSR and other socialist countries to embark on an arms race in spheres that we find uncomfortable.

As M. Gorbachev said: We are in a position to respond to these "uncomfortable spheres" by applying far more economical and effective solutions. If SDI takes the form of a weapons system that orbits the earth, we will be able to put it out of action by using only a small part of the resources that the Americans will have to expend in order to build themselves a system of this kind.

However, the technologies developed to meet the needs of the program will remain. It will not be possible to render these technologies harmless. Once they have been created, technologies live, exist. The spreading of these technologies throughout the world will make the fate of civilization rest on whether an unfortunate accident takes place or not. When one considers prospects for the future, this is precisely what needs to be clearly borne in mind.

The Geneva Negotiations [subhead]

And now for your question about the course of the Geneva negotiations.

Our position, which was formulated by the CPSU Central Committee general secretary, is as follows: The Soviet proposals are on the table. We believe that the only correct way forward is one that starts from the point reached at Reykjavik. Reykjavik brought us to a point at which it was already possible to issue ministers with concrete directives and to establish real principle for agreements for the elimination of nuclear weapons over the course of the next 10 years.

The Soviet side would, of course, like to assume that the Americans will go forward, and that they will not start to back out. Unfortunately, there is no certainty that they will behave this way. More than that, the facts attest to the outcome being quite the opposite.

[Kraszewski] The following doubts emerged during the course of discussion on the results produced by the Reykjavik meeting: Is it not the case that the USSR is going too far in the compromises that it is prepared to make? Will concessions not weaken the security of the USSR and its allies? What is your view of these doubts?

The compromises discussed at Reykjavik do, of course, carry a certain risk. If there was a danger that the American side would not accept the obligations that it might undertake then the USSR and its allies would be faced with certain complications. This might prove to be the case if only because, as you know, the nuclear forces of France and England would not be covered by the first stage of a possible settlement.

But it is certainly true that the compromise discussed at Reykjavik does have a foundation, a basis that is fully justified, and that it also suits the new stage in

political development and the development of military technology. However, it does rest on one condition: that a U.S. decision on radical reductions in nuclear arms followed by the complete abandonment of such weapons will be serious and lasting, and on condition that the situation that arose 10 years ago does not repeat itself. The United States promised that it wanted detente and peaceful coexistence but later proceeded, in effect, to back out of these promises. If one accepts that in theory such a reversal in American policy is possible, then I am prepared to agree with the fears that you have expressed. Compromises do conceal a risk.

But if at the very outset we assume that the other side will not observe treaties and other possible agreements, then it is best not to start negotiations at all. We want to believe that the United States can and ought to be a reliable partner because in the final analysis this also lies in its interests.

"Can one believe President Reagan at all? He said one thing in Reykjavik and then something entirely different when he returned to Washington." This question was posed in" letter sent to the editors of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA by a reader in Irkutsk. He is not the only one to have such misgivings.

What Next? [subhead]

[Kraszewski] I realize that it is difficult to make predictions at the present time but I would like to end our conversation by asking a question: "What next? Is there a chance that an agreement that would pave the way to complete nuclear disarmament can be concluded with the present administration? Are you, personally, an optimist or a pessimist?

[Falin] It is understandable that trust in the American Administration has not grown in Moscow after what we have been witnessing in the United States, these downright attempts to "rectify" Reykjavik, to call white black, black white. I think it is doubtful whether people in the United States believe Reagan more today than yesterday. Probably not. The President and his ministers cannot strengthen people's trust in them if what they say today is different from what they said yesterday; if tomorrow they deny what they say today; if commentaries from Speakes and others are necessary to clarify the essence of the ambiguous words that Reagan uses; and if no one at all knows what is going to happen next.

However, there is one big "but." It is not we who determine the election of American presidents, senators, and members of the House of Representatives. Elections are held in accordance with the principles that obtain in the United States, principles that it is customary to call democratic. These principles produce an unstable mechanism of government marked by policy inconsistencies and unpredictable actions, which are a burden for the entire world community. However, we have no other partners.

Should we wait until someone wiser appears or until this President comes to his senses? We can. But time flies and time is not neutral. New weapons systems appear, stockpiles of old weapons grow, and new dangers and problems which are increasingly difficult to resolve accumulate. Thus, there is only one way out: We must try again and again to convince the leadership, the society, and the United States Congress that rejecting the offer of cooperation from the socialist states does not lie in their interests.

We must try to convince them that it is no longer possible to create a security system exclusively for the United States, one that is based on threatening others. Today, security can only be a common and universal matter. We must convince them that it is not possible to solve security problems by employing military means, that the main problem is a political one.

Whether we succeed in this depends on the responsiveness of governing people in the United States to new, fresh ideas. It will depend on the ability of these people to use power for positive ends and to overcome what has been America's weakness for many decades — as one American journalist wrote — all the United States' problems stem not from imperfect muscle but from imperfect reason.

One should be neither an optimist nor a pessimist, but a sober realist. One should not allow the opportunity that exists to pass us by, and one should not see things in excessively dark colors, even when the actions of the United States give no grounds for being particularly optimistic...

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR'S CHERVOV REBUTS ROWNEY ON REYKJAVIK, EXPERTS' TALKS

LD282325 Budapest Television Service in Hungarian 2015 GMT 28 Nov 86

[From the "Panorama" program; interview with Colonel General Nikolay Chervov, chief of a department of the general staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, by correspondent Alajos Chrudinak in Moscow; Chervov speaks in Russian fading into superimposed Hungarian translation; date not given -- recorded]

[Text] [Presenter] Alajos Chrudinak has traveled to Moscow to talk with General [title as heard] Nikolay Chervov, member of the Soviet General Staff, about Soviet-U.S. polemics in connection with Reykjavik.

[Chrudinak] We interviewed General Edward Rowney, President Reagan's adviser, and military expert, on Hungarian television. General Rowney denied in the interview that any kind of agreement any kind of accord, could have come about between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at Reykjavik. What is your opinion on this?

[Chervov] I cannot agree with this statement by General Rowney. We managed to agree on many things at Reykjavik. We developed mutual agreement on the radical reduction of arms, on the complete destruction of strategic offensive nuclear weapons as well as on the complete abolition of medium-range missiles in Europe. That cannot be denied; it is the truth.

[Chrudinak] That is, you would destroy all types of strategic offensive weapons?

[Chervov] Completely, without exception: intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missiles placed on submarines and heavy bombers. President Reagan himself told General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev that we, that is, they, agree with that Soviet approach, and they are ready to instruct the U.S. delegation to prepare an agreement in accordance with that.

[Chrudinak] Is there some kind of paper, document, that proves President Reagan really made such a statement to Gorbachev?

[Chervov] The text of this, written down in shorthand, exists. I also have it here.

[Chrudinak] Shevardnadze also quoted from it.

[Chervov] Our foreign minister also quoted from it. He expressly quoted the words of the President of the United States. This document is here, with me. I can also quote from it. The text, in truth, verifies that President Reagan...

[Chrudinak interrupting] Please read it.

[Chervov] ...said the following: I should like to ask, said the President, whether the case is — because in my opinion it would be very good — that by the end of the next two 5-year periods, we shall destroy all of the nuclear explosive devices, including the nuclear bombs, the tools of the theater of war, the cruise missiles, the weapons placed on submarines, the medium-range missiles, etc.?

If we now agree that by the end of the 10-year period we shall destroy every nuclear weapon, I emphasize that Reagan said every nuclear weapon, then we can hand over this agreement, accord of ours, to our delegation in Geneva, so that they should prepare the treaty, which you — Reagan was addressing his words to Mikhail Gorbachev — will be able to sign, when you visit the United States. These were the words of President Reagan.

[Chrudinak] General Rowney said that the reason for the failure of the discussions, talks held in Reykjavik, was that the Soviet Union did not assent to the destruction of the Soviet ballistic missiles, or the reduction of their number. In his opinion was the reason for the failure of Reykjavik.

[Chervov] That is not true. In truth, the U.S. side thwarted every Reykjavik agreement. Since, as I have mentioned, we managed to reach agreement in the issues of strategic nuclear weapons and medium-range missiles alike; we made great concessions. We assented to the complete destruction of all strategic nuclear weapons. We proposed it. For that reason, Rowney's statement is completely incomprehensible to me. Where does he get it all from?

[Chrudinak] Then, in that case, what is to be done? Does that mean that for as long as President Reagan is in power, for 2 years, it will not be possible to reach agreement with the United States?

[Chervov] If the U.S. side is willing to accept the realities, not only in words, but with deeds too, if it states that it will adhere to the agreements worked out in Reykjavik, then, in my opinion, it is conceivable that the stances will approach one another.

[Chrudinak] The United States says that the Star Wars program, The Strategic Defense Initiative, is merely a scientific research program that the USSR should not be afraid of.

[Chervov] The most important purpose of the weapons created within the framework of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative program is to destroy, to liquidate, the most important satellites belonging to the other side. What does this mean? It means that they want to destroy satellites that give advance warning of a nuclear missile attack — the telecommunications satellites, the navigational satellites, and the reconnaissance satellites. This in reality means that they want to blind the other side. This is how they want to make us deaf and dumb. Can we describe this as defense? No! Its objective is to deprive the other side of the ability to take countermeasures.

[Chrudinak] General Rowney says that these laser weapons cannot penetrate the atmosphere, so they cannot be deployed against the earth.

[Chervov] Rowney makes up arguments that are not really arguments. We are at least as familiar with these questions as Rowney is, and we know what a nuclear-generated laser

weapon is for. It's the X-ray laser [Roentgen lezer]. It is possible to create a laser weapon through a nuclear explosion that is capable of destroying objects 4,000 to 5,000 km away. The United States is working on the creation of this very weapon. For the moment, they are not successful, but this does not mean that they will not be able to manufacture this weapon in 10 to 15 years time. The possibility of this exists.

[Chrudinak] Viktor Karpov, head of the Soviet delegation at the Geneva talks, said the other day that the USSR was also conducting tests with similar weapons, with similar space structures, that the USSR also had a space program. What does this mean?

[Chervov] I cannot imagine that Viktor Karpov, or any other Soviet leader, could have said that we were pursuing an identical program, and that we also were conducting such tests. I cannot imagine this, because...

[Chrudinak, interrupting] Karpov was not referring to tests. I am sorry about the slip of the tongue. Karpov spoke about research, and not tests.

[Chervov] That's right -- research.

[Chrudinak] Yes, research.

[Chervov] I must tell you that we too are conducting basic research relating to outer space, including research of a military nature. But we do not have a Star Wars program. We do not create space-based strike weapons, and do not want to enter the arms race in space because we do not want to wage a battle with the United States in this area.

[Chrudinak] So only research is being pursued?

[Chervov] Only basic research.

[Chrudinak] The next question is very important: Do you think it is at all possible to reach agreement on the space weapons issue?

[Chervov] In principle, I think it is possible, even with the present U.S. Administration. They are now saying that the USSR has now given up and prefers to wait for the next U.S. Administration. This is not true, because there are still 2 years ahead of us. We must not waste time. One of the things that emerged in Reykjavik was that on this issue it was possible to reach agreement even with the Reagan Administration.

[Chrudinak] General Edward Rowney, President Reagan's adviser, told us that the USSR did not want any kind of inspection.

[Chervov] This statement by Mr Rowney is lacking in seriousness. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, speaking about arms inspections, officially announced that we were prepared to accept any kind of inspection, bilateral or multilateral inspection, including on-site inspection. Because we are talking about a real reduction of nuclear weapons, how could it be possible without inspection? How could it be possible without on-site inspections? Mr Rowney made that up himself.

[Chrudinak] I would be interested to hear -- after all, you took part several times in these negotiations -- what General Edward Rowney said at these talks.

[Chervov] I took part in talks involving the experts, where we prepared the Reykjavik summit. Mr Rowney also attended these. It was at these talks that I became acquainted with Mr Rowney.

In the negotiations, lasting more than 6 hours, Rowney said practically nothing. He sat there mute as a fish. But what he says now in interviews is a matter for Mr Rowney.

[Chrudinak] In this interview Rowney also said that the SALT II treaty was contrary to the interests of the United States, since this treaty, as he said, made it possible for the Soviet Union to attain military superiority. This is why Rowney opposed SALT II.

[Chervov] This statement by Mr Rowney lacks seriousness. The SALT II agreement was reached as a result of compromises and mutual concessions. After all, the reaching and signing of this agreement was only possible by the sides making mutual concessions and by them taking into consideration each other's security interests. Mr Rowney, I am sure, knows this very well, but he talks about this agreement, he evaluates this treaty, as if he were an outsider. As regards the question of military superiority...

[Chrudinak, interrupting] Rowney broke with the Carter administration because of this.

[Chervov] That is possible. However, as regards his statement regarding our alleged superiority in the sphere of strategic nuclear weapons, Rowney distorted the truth.

[Chrudinak] What will be the Soviet response if Washington ends the SALT II treaty?

[Chervov] I shall give only a brief reply to this question: This is a bilateral agreement, a Soviet-U.S. treaty. If one side terminates its adherence then the other side can also consider itself no longer bound by this treaty.

[Chrudinak] Colonel General Chervov, what do you expect, what do you hope from the Soviet-U.S. negotiations in Geneva, which will get under way at the beginning of next week? What is this extraordinary 1-week meeting? What will be discussed and what do you expect from these discussions?

[Chervov] In Geneva we shall now return to the basic question which was, in essence, the starting point of the Soviet-U.S. dialogue: Can a compromise come about between the U.S. and the Soviet sides?

[Chrudinak] Is there some hope therefore?

[Chervov] I can tell you that there must be some hope.

[Chrudinak] Does this mean that there will be, after all, a summit meeting between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan?

[Chervov] If we reach some sort of agreement at the negotiations, then, naturally, a summit meeting is possible. However, a summit must bring results. What happened in Reykjavik must not happen there. This is precisely why Reykjavik was necessary before the summit, before the planned summit, which must be held in Washington.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR'S KARPOV INTERVIEWED ON DISARMAMENT, VERIFICATION

AU040540 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 30 Oct 86 p 2

[Interview given by Viktor Karpov, head of the disarmament delegation of the Soviet Union and ambassador at large of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Ferenc Szaniszlo: "Interview with Soviet disarmament expert Viktor Karpov -- The Elimination of Nuclear Weapons Is Verifiable" -- date and place not given; first paragraph is newspaper's introduction]

[Text] Viktor Karpov is a leading diplomat of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union dealing with issues of disarmament. His name is often seen in dispatches; he is the leader of the Soviet delegation at the Soviet-American disarmament talks in Geneva. Our Moscow correspondent, Ferenc Szaniszlo, asked him about the Soviet package deal, the various methods of eliminating nuclear arms, and the chances of a mutual moratorium.

[Szaniszlo] The man in the street has no idea how nuclear weapons can be eliminated...

[Karpov] This question calls for special attention, and we at the talks regard it as a special point on the agenda. We do have some experience already, for instance, with the SALT agreement. The Soviet Union and the United States agreed that the launching of more submarines carrying missiles above those permitted would be accompanied by a proportionate reduction in their land-based missiles.

There are exact provisions for disassembling the inner part of a missile silo or exploding a vault inwards to prevent further deployment and on a whole series of similar measures. In other words, we do have some experience. In the future, we must draw up an agreement that provides a strict guarantee for eliminating nuclear arms, including nuclear warheads.

[Szaniszlo] You have mentioned the problem of verification. How is this done in practice? Will Soviet experts go overseas to personally observe the disassembly of nuclear arms and vice versa?

[Karpov] As far as I know, these questions have not as yet been drawn up in detail. Principally, we do not exclude any form of verification. It is necessary for both sides to be satisfied that the nuclear weapons covered by the agreement have been eliminated and that no "reserves" remain. This is why on site verification is necessary concerning both the process of elimination and those that remain, those not included in the agreement. As for the latter, only the number set forth in the agreement may remain. That is, according to our proposal, only 50-50 [as published] percent of strategic nuclear missiles may remain.

[Szaniuszlo] Let us assume that both sides have eliminated their nuclear means. However, the technology to produce them will remain, and this will make it possible to manufacture missiles and warheads in a very short time, in days, perhaps in hours...

[Karpov] The already developed production technology will, of course, remain. On the other hand, an effective international security system could guarantee that neither of the signatories would violate the agreement. If, however, such a thing happens, the system -- international or another kind of monitoring -- would indicate this.

[Szaniuszlo] The second issue I would like to mention is Western Europe. Does one not think that the governments in Western Europe have adopted a rather ambiguous stance? On the one hand, they would like the Soviet Union and the United States to eliminate their own strategic nuclear means and perhaps abandon even the SDI. On the other hand, they are opposed to the withdrawal of American medium-range missiles from their territories, referring to a danger "threatening" them from the East....

[Karpov] This is also my impression. Official circles in certain Western countries -- Great Britain, the FRG, and France -- think that Western Europe needs nuclear weapons, because this is the only way to guarantee a balance against the alleged superiority of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact as regards conventional arms. I think that this kind of argument is less and less convincing. On 11 June this year the member states of the Warsaw Pact expressed their willingness to accept a significant reduction of European conventional arms and armed forces from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. We are willing to completely ban chemical weapons, and this is at present under discussion. According to England, however, nuclear forces are the only means to protect itself against chemical warfare "coming from the East."

Let us destroy the stockpile of chemical weapons and significantly reduce European conventional arms and armed forces, because this will make the argument for the alleged need for nuclear weapons in Western Europe unnecessary. There is absolutely no need to have nuclear arms and chemical weapons; so, these barbarian means must be destroyed. And, with respect to the large-scale and systematic reduction of conventional arms and armed forces, we are ready to negotiate even today.

[Szaniuszlo] Under the Soviet disarmament proposals, both the British and French nuclear means will remain undisturbed. Would this not pose a risk, since both the Soviet Union and the United States would destroy their entire nuclear force over 10 years, while two NATO states -- allies of the United States -- could maintain theirs. Thus, balance would disintegrate....

[Karpov] Indeed, your question is a subject of serious and thorough examinations. It is also included in our proposal that we submitted on 15 January, which refers to destroying nuclear weapons by the end of the century. According to these proposals, both the Soviet Union and the United States would initially reduce their nuclear weaponry by 50 percent. The question may arise, however, how the states in possession of nuclear weapons, such as England and France, could join this process.

Our proposal underlines the point that these countries would join the Soviet Union and the United States in the second stage and that, as an initial step, would freeze the number of their nuclear weapons. After this, following our example, they would begin destroying their nuclear missiles, especially those of the tactical offensive type.

[Szaniuszlo] In Reykjavik, the problem of a moratorium was treated as a central issue. In your view, this could be discussed by a separate negotiating group at the Geneva talks.

[Karpov] We suggest comprehensive negotiations.

[Szaniuszlov] That is, the moratorium would be discussed in Geneva?

[Karpov] It might as well be in Geneva. But I think the moratorium could be the subject of separate talks, because it involves technical issues that call for negotiations by experts. At present, we are talking with U.S. representatives about issues that also refer to the problem of a possible mutual freeze on nuclear tests, verification. The next round will take place in November. [paragraph continues]

However, these negotiations are merely dealing with the issues of the problem, although in our view we need comprehensive political discussions aimed at a total ban on nuclear arms tests.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR'S KARPOV ON REYKJAVIK FAILURE, SDI, LINKAGE

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[From "The Week" program; interview with Viktor Karpov, chief of a USSR Foreign Ministry department, by correspondent Alajos Chrudinak; date and place not given — Karpov's remarks in Russian with superimposed Hungarian translation; recorded]

[Text] [Chrudinak] How do you, as head of the Soviet delegation at the Geneva talks, see the reasons for your traveling to Geneva in early December to conduct a round of unscheduled talks for a week with the Americans? What are the objectives?

[Karpov] These are not unscheduled talks, but another attempt to take stock, nevertheless, of what we have achieved in the talks so far and to determine where we stand at the moment, before the seventh round of talks starting in January.

[Chrudinak] But General Secretary Gorbachev has himself stated that nothing has happened in Geneva in the last 2 years, and that you merely waged a war of numbers. I have interviewed Professor Arbatov, who has also said that in his view the problems will not be solved in Geneva. All the important decisions, in his opinion, will be made in the two capitals, Moscow and Washington, and that the Geneva talks deal only with minor matters, details. What is your opinion of this?

[Karpov] I would not say that the tasks we have now been assigned are trifling. So I do not agree with Comrade Arbatov on this point. But he is right when he says that questions of fundamental importance will be decided in the capitals. This is only natural. At the same time, unlike the situation that characterized Geneva before Reykjavik, there are some very serious new Soviet proposals in Geneva now. In our view these proposals are such, that if the U.S. side were to approve them they would achieve a breakthrough in nuclear disarmament, and we could take a step forward toward a real nuclear-free world. This is where the difference lies in comparison to the things we did in Geneva before Reykjavik, and because of which we were criticized — quite correctly, in my view — by Mikhail Gorbachev, who said that all we had managed to cook up with Mr Kampelman in all that time was a tasteless stew.

[Chrudinak] This implies that progress can be made in the near future only on the basis of the Reykjavik agreement, if you manage to agree on what happened there, and when you finally agree on what you agreed in Reykjavik?

[Karpov] Unfortunately negotiations are not a one-way street where one can reach one's exact destination. Here there is also oncoming traffic, on the part of our partner, the other participant in the talks. Unfortunately, at present we are moving along

different routes. We, for your part, are treading the road marked out in Reykjavik: the road of nuclear disarmament. The U.S. delegation, on the other hand, the U.S. side attending the talks, has changed course. We are now doing our utmost to usher them toward the road we marked out in Reykjavik. But the U.S. side is resisting, and is trying to deviate from this course.

[Chrudinak] So you are saying that the main reason for failure at the Soviet-U.S. talks in Reykjavik is that Washington does not want to place restrictions on the testing of space weapons and does not want to alter its Star Wars program. Was this the fundamental reason?

[Karpov] Yes, this was the fundamental reason. The fundamental reason for the failure was that the Star Wars program has apparently become a sort of sacred cow for the Reagan administration.

[Chrudinak] But you also made some concessions, in the continuation of laboratory tests. What in your view do the terms laboratory and laboratory experiments mean?

[Karpov] This question remains to be discussed. The two sides must compare their interpretations of this concept.

[Chrudinak] Look, I do not want to make guesses at this point about what these laboratories should be like. This is up to the experts. They have to sit down opposite each other and determine what is a laboratory, what is a laboratory test, and what can be regarded as tests outside the laboratory. I am not an expert in these technical matters, so I shall not even attempt to define these things.

[Chrudinak] I am not an expert either, but General Secretary Gorbachev's statements on this have led me to deduce that you are opposed primarily to tests carried out in space.

[Karpov] This is perfectly true. We have clearly stated this. We are opposed to the testing in space of all the elements of antiballistic space-based missiles systems.

[Chrudinak] So some sort of compromise is possible here?

[Karpov] We have not even discussed this question, so it is too early to talk of compromise. For the moment it must be determined what the two sides think of it. The U.S. side simply avoids discussing these questions.

[Chrudinak] What concessions do you, as head of the Soviet delegation, expect? What necessary concessions do you expect of the United States?

[Karpov] We expect the United States....

[Chrudinak, interrupting] What would be the most important concessions?

[Karpov] First and foremost a recognition of what we agreed in Reykjavik. This is the most important, because that is where we decided...

[Chrudinak, interrupting] But that is no concession.

[Karpov] This is exactly what I am trying to say, that is, that the achievement of Reykjavik, the things agreed, or those we nearly agreed, were a package of mutual concessions. If the United States were to restrict the SDI space program exclusively

to laboratory tests and research, this would be for us the Americans' most important concession.

[Chrudinak] Can these questions, the four big arms limitations questions, be solved separately, or only together as a package? Some people say that the USSR launched its all-or-nothing negotiating policy in Reykjavik. So do you think that some individual issues can be solved separately?

[Karpov] The situation is that -- as I have already said -- a package of proposals came together in Reykjavik whose components balance each other. This is the balance of interests, the balance of mutual concessions. So within the framework of the Reykjavik package the issues must be solved together. In this balanced group the sole component which can be solved separately from the group -- and the sooner it is done the better -- is the ending of nuclear weapons tests. Here we are prepared to reach agreement at this very moment, separately from all other aspects.

[Chrudinak] Separately?

[Karpov] Separately. As for the other parts of this range of issues, they must be settled together.

[Chrudinak] And the Euromissiles, the medium-range missiles?

[Karpov] We have two options for settling this matter. One of them offers a solution separately from the others, and this proposal of ours continues to be valid. We proposed this solution last January within the framework of the program on the elimination of nuclear weapons until the year 2000. So this proposal is also on the negotiating table. If the West prefers this, we are prepared to settle the issue on this basis. But we also proposed another option in Reykjavik. This is part of the package. Should the West prefer this, well, gentlemen, let us discuss it and settle the matter accordingly.

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CSO: 5200/1127

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

PRAVDA HITS REAGAN TIME MAGAZINE INTERVIEW ON REYKJAVIK

PM041906 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Nov 86 First Edition p 5

[T. Kolesnichenko "Rejoinder": "Free Cheese..."]

[Text] Who said what in Reykjavik on the American side? Almost 1 month has passed since then, but still nothing is clear in Washington. [paragraph continues]

Contradictory statements, to put it mildly, continue to come out, sometimes refuting each other. This particularly concerns the U.S. President's position. Either he "did not say that" or he was "misunderstood . . ."

A few days ago TIME magazine published an account of an interview which President Reagan had granted by telephone to the magazine's correspondent. At last, the reader might think, the American side will tell the truth, only the truth, and nothing but the truth!

But don't be hasty with your conclusions. "My paramount aim," Reagan said, "was to eliminate ballistic missiles. These are the most destabilizing weapons, which instill the greatest fear. Therefore, as I have already said, I have always dreamed that at some time we will finally be able to totally rid ourselves of all nuclear arms." What, then, follows from this. The fact that this time the President himself is clouding the issue, as it were. Instead of honestly confirming the on-the-record situation in Reykjavik, when the President agreed to the elimination of not only ballistic missiles but also all strategic weapons, R. Reagan transfers that specific accord to the category of a "dream" which may "at some time" "finally" be realized. No whiff of the truth there. For, in fact, the question of eliminating nuclear weapons and not just ballistic missiles was discussed in Reykjavik.

Going on to speak of SDI, the President repeated the full set of propaganda admonishments concerning these first-strike weapons. SDI, he said, is just a "shield," and "we would share this with the Soviet Union," and so forth. In the end the President remarked that he "used all means, even an old Russian saying -- 'Trust, but check.'"

But when he lavishes praise on SDI and promises to share its technology with us for nothing, it is not a Russian but an American saying that comes to mind. And it goes like this: "The only free cheese is in a mousetrap."

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS CRITICIZES WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT ON REYKJAVIK

LD031504 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0915 GMT 3 Dec 86

[Text] Washington, 3 Dec (TASS) — The White House has made a statement on Soviet-U.S. negotiations on nuclear and space weapons timed to coincide with the interim working meeting in the context of these negotiations that has started in Geneva.

Observers have above all noted the interpretation which the U.S. Administration gave in that document to the Soviet-U.S. summit in Reykjavik, crediting the United States with the role of a kind of "initiator" of real disarmament efforts and the USSR with that of a mere passive spectator.

The statement acknowledges that in the course of the recently-ended latest round of negotiations in Geneva "both the United States and the Soviet Union put forward new proposals reflecting the results of the significant narrowing of the area of differences between the two countries on arms control issues achieved in Reykjavik by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev". But further on in the document the progress achieved in Iceland thanks to the USSR's efforts and torpedoed by President Reagan, who arrived for the meeting empty handed — as U.S. observers and specialists admit — is credited exclusively to the United States. The statement contains, in particular, affirmations to the effect that "in Reykjavik the United States managed to obtain Soviet agreement on a number of important areas," that "the President hopes the Soviet Union now shares the U.S. commitment to a genuine arms reduction," and so on.

Such affirmations do not bear up to any criticism and are refuted even by U.S. political figures themselves. During the Reykjavik meeting the U.S. delegation was not only unprepared to give a constructive answer to the wide-ranging Soviet proposals but during the talks was unable to define its position, stated former defense secretary, James Schlesinger. The United State's counterproposals were put forward merely to create the appearance of a serious approach, he stressed. As a result of this, immediately after the meeting, the White House started to deny its statements made in Iceland.

It is indicative that the White House document on the Geneva talks was made public only a few days after the United States had violated the basic provisions of the Soviet-U.S. SALT II Treaty. This step clearly demonstrated that Washington is proclaiming the need to make progress in restraining the nuclear arms race in words only but is in practice undermining efforts in the disarmament sphere. Observers note that Washington, to judge from appearances, has no intention of abandoning this unconstructive position in the future either. Thus, THE WASHINGTON POST, commenting on the opening of the interim working meeting in Geneva, reports, "representatives of the Administration report that the U.S. delegation has not brought any new proposals to the current meeting and

instead intends to 'await' new concessions on the part of the Soviet Union." High-ranking U.S. officials, according to the newspaper, "over the last 2 weeks have been making pessimistic comments regarding the prospects for concluding an agreement in the nuclear arms sphere in the last 2 years of Reagan's Presidency."

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: FURTHER COMMENTARY ON U.S. INTERPRETATION OF REYKJAVIK

Statements 'Reminiscent' of Orwell

LD122045 Moscow TASS in English 2013 GMT 12 Nov 86

[Text] Moscow November 12 TASS -- By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev:

Casuistic pronouncements are being made in Washington over President Reagan's remarks in Reykjavik, chiefly on problems of eliminating all nuclear arsenals of the USSR and the United States within the next ten years.

Some administration officials unceremoniously deny the very fact of the President's consent to the total destruction of all nuclear arms by both sides by 1996.

Others claim that Ronald Reagan made a slip of the tongue, that he was misunderstood.

Versions are being advanced that the President failed to set out clearly the U.S. stance on the question of abolishing all nuclear arms due to the "sudden" (?) termination of the meeting.

"Interpretations" of the President's clear and unequivocal statements during the Soviet-American summit meeting are acquiring at times tactless, if not shocking, forms in Washington.

In an ABC television programme, American journalists quoted Reagan's Reykjavik statement about his approval of the proposal for eliminating all nuclear arms by the end of the ten-year period, and asked the chief of the White House staff to comment on the President's remarks.

Donald Regan, not in the least abashed, said that the President merely shared with the Soviet leader his dream of a world without nuclear arms, but he did not propose signing a corresponding agreement during Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to the U.S.

In "explaining" the President's remarks, Regan failed, however, to say why concrete dates had been given.

"Broad", "narrow" or simply obscure interpretations of the course of the Reykjavik talks, made in Washington, do not explain or specify anything.

Their aim is, clearly, to revise the essential understanding reached in Reykjavik and retreat to the positions that existed before the Soviet-American meeting.

The manipulations conducted by Washington propagandists with the President's statements on nuclear arms are reminiscent of the work of bureaucrats in George Orwell's novel "1984," who daily rewrote and republished the past history in order to make it serve the short-term selfish interests of their bosses.

U.S. Reykjavik 'Disinformation'

LD130836 Moscow TASS in English 0927 GMT 13 Nov 86

[Text] Moscow November 13 TASS — Political analyst Yuriy Zhukov today commented in PRAVDA on a large-scale disinformation campaign which had been conducted by Washington for a month now to distort the results of the Reykjavik meeting and renounce the accords that had been hammered out there.

"U.S. leaders are claiming again and again that they only agreed to scrap ballistic missiles — and even that not for certain," he said.

"The u-turn from the understandings reached at the summit level, which is unprecedented in diplomatic history, has a simple explanation. The idea of a nuclear-free world just does not meet the interests of the U.S. military-industrial complex — the true boss in Washington," Zhukov said.

"There is no other way to explain a series of ominous events last month, including provocative actions against the Soviet Embassy in Washington, a resumption of the 'visa war', an ostentatious declaration of an intent to exceed the nuclear arms limits set by the SALT-2 treaty, continued efforts to stoke up dangerous regional conflicts, and interference in the domestic affairs of Iran, among other developments," the commentator said.

"This has been the background for obstinate attempts to call off everything that the sides agreed upon in Reykjavik and replace the accords reached there with a new package of issues that were allegedly discussed there but are now truncated beyond recognition," he said.

What was now being proposed, Zhukov said, was effectively unilateral disarmament for the Soviet Union and a guaranteed right to military superiority for the United States.

Karpov Cites U.S. Revisions

LD132325 Moscow TASS in English 2321 GMT 13 Nov 86

[Text] Geneva November 14 TASS — The central event of the latest round of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons, which determined the content and character of the work of the delegations in the closing phase, was the meeting of the Soviet and the U.S. leaders in Reykjavik on October 11-12, the head of the Soviet delegation to the talks on nuclear and space weapons, Viktor Karpov, said in a statement. The results of that meeting created a new situation in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, including at the ongoing talks.

The main thing is that a realistic opportunity has appeared, if the sides agree on further compliance with and strengthening of the regime of the ABM Treaty, to reach

accords on deep cuts in strategic offensive weapons and the elimination of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe and thus open the prospect for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as the Soviet programme for nuclear disarmament, announced on January 15, 1986, envisions.

The agreements practically reached in Reykjavik are directly related to the problems which are the subject of the Geneva talks. That is why the delegations should now make everything possible for the Reykjavik agreements to be translated into practice.

The Reykjavik meeting culminated in the coincidence of the positions of the Soviet and U.S. leaders on the elimination of all nuclear weapons, with the U.S. President agreeing to an even shorter schedule than that initially proposed in the Soviet statement of January 15, 1986. Understanding was reached on reductions at the first stage, before the end of 1991, of all the components of the sides' strategic triads. A formula for the solution of the problem of medium-range missiles was approved: There would be no Soviet or American missiles of that class in Europe. The only obstacle to the implementation of these measures, leading to nuclear disarmament, was American SDI, the implementation of which would mean that a way of obtaining one-sided military superiority by one of the sides, clearly the USA, would remain open.

In view of the positive achievements of Reykjavik and the causes which prevented the finalization of the accords, the Soviet delegation tabled at the latest round a complex of new major proposals on the entire range of the problems of nuclear and space weapons. These proposals constitute a detailed programme for reaching agreements on the basis of the Reykjavik understandings. The Soviet programme is giving a good impetus to the talks and makes it possible to reach mutually acceptable solutions in strict accord with the principle of equality and equal security within a reasonably short timeframe.

The radical character of the Soviet proposals and the fact that they are leading the sides into the phase of concrete practical decisions on deep cuts in nuclear weapons to the point of their eventual elimination make it necessary to take decisions comprehensively on all the aspects of those proposals on cuts in strategic offensive weapons, the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe, the strengthening of the ABM Treaty and the termination of nuclear testing. Any other approach would mean the upsetting of the balance of the security interests of the sides, the balance of compromises, which underlies the comprehensive solution proposed by the Soviet Union.

Regrettably, it was precisely that goal that the American side set out to achieve at the talks, as the results of the round demonstrated. Its stand, aimed at revising the Reykjavik accords, blocks the translation of those accords into the language of diplomatic documents.

The American side is still opposed to blocking the channel of the introduction of weapons into outer space and refuses to consider any proposals which would restrict its "Star Wars" programme in one way or another. Contrary to what was agreed upon in Reykjavik, the American side talks about eliminating only ballistic missiles rather than all the strategic offensive weapons, clearly hoping to secure one-sided advantage to the prejudice of Soviet security. The American side is also pursuing a line of the continued arms race and the growing level of nuclear confrontation in problems related to medium-range missiles.

The position taken by the U.S. delegation to the talks since Reykjavik is worrying. The natural question is what goals the American side is going to pursue. The Soviet

side would like to hope that during the interval between the latest and the next round of the talks Washington will carefully study the Soviet proposals and that the U.S. delegation will return to Geneva not with its old luggage but with a position which would make it possible to formulate practical measures to realize the positive assets of Reykjavik.

USSR Army Paper View

PM191453 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Nov 86 First Edition p 4

[Article by Colonel (Reserve) V. Chernyshev: 'Metamorphosis of White House Policy']

[Text] "After President R. Reagan took up his post in 1981 it seems he entered into a firm alliance with ideologists both within the administration and outside it (neoconservatives included) who wish to create such a quantity of weapons as to intimidate the Soviet Union and, possibly, even begin and win a nuclear war," the American newspaper THE NEW YORK TIMES wrote recently. These figures, the newspaper explained, have always been opposed to nuclear arms control agreements, dream of a showdown in relations with the Soviet system, and wish to use American economic might and technical advantage to create a sufficient quantity of arms--both defensive and offensive--to make it possible for them to dictate their conditions to Moscow. They also want to replace their deterrence potential with such weapons as will allow them to wage a war. Significant arms reductions, such as those discussed in Reykjavik, are clearly at variance with their aims.

These are, in my opinion, highly noteworthy and justified observations. Also justified is another conclusion, drawn by A. Cox, secretary of the American Committee on American-Soviet Relations: The extreme right wing and neoconservatives were satisfied with their alliance with Ronald Reagan while he was building up the U.S. military potential, but now, when the head of the White House has turned to negotiations, he has come into sharp conflict with these figures. I would even go as far as to say that it was precisely "these figures" who ensured the extremely rapid revision of the results of the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik, "clarified" the president's position, and forced him to revert to the pre-Reykjavik period, "to the way things used to be" in Washington.

Let us briefly recall the actual "package of accords" put forward in Reykjavik. The main, general undertaking was that the sides would reach agreement on eliminating "all nuclear explosive devices," that is, all nuclear arms, over a 10-year period.

With regard to strategic offensive weapons--their total elimination in two stages. In the first 5 years strategic offensive weapons would be reduced by half; the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee proposed a 50 percent reduction in every element of the strategic triad and the American president was in complete agreement with this. In the second 5-year period all

remaining strategic offensive nuclear weapons would be eliminated. In this respect the American side wished to clarify one point only: whether ballistic offensive missiles would be eliminated; the reply was in the affirmative.

With regard to medium-range missiles the following formula was agreed: no medium-range USSR and U.S. missiles in Europe, plus a freeze on existing shorter range missiles in the Asian part of the USSR with the United States having the right to the same number of warheads on medium-range missiles on its own territory. Every component of this equalization process was separately designated and the American side consented to each one without making any provisos or observations.

On the question of banning nuclear tests, the USSR--which has been and remains a determined, convinced advocate of immediately ending all nuclear tests--proposed, while taking the U.S. position into account, that full-scale bilateral talks be started without delay. The question of nuclear explosion yield "thresholds," the number of nuclear explosions per year, and the fate of the 1974-1976 treaties could be discussed at these talks and progress thereby made toward drawing up a full-scale treaty on a complete, definitive ban on nuclear explosions. The sides were close to finding a formula on this problem also. But when there was a rupture over the question of the ABM Treaty the entire discussion broke down and the quest came to a halt.

The problem of "strategic defense" and the ABM Treaty. Here also important, principled mutual understanding was reached that the sides would not break out of the ABM Treaty for 10 years. But at this point a barrier arose, created by the American side: its refusal to agree to limit work on SDI to research and experiments in the laboratory and its desire to secure at all costs the USSR's consent to the abrogation of the ABM Treaty after the 10 year period, during which time the United States would have prepared for the deployment of its space-based weapon system.

Summing up, it can therefore be said that the Reykjavik "package of accords" was integral for both sides, with the exception of the SDI issue and, in part, the question of nuclear tests.

And suddenly it transpired that some people are more comfortable with nuclear weapons and that a rejection of nuclear arsenals is equivalent--to use the figurative expression employed by the British newspaper THE OBSERVER--to "someone threatening to strip them of their underwear." And "leaps backward" began in official Washington. The first leap: The president did not intend the elimination of all nuclear arsenals over a 10 year period, he was incorrectly interpreted. The head of the White House himself has been persuaded (or perhaps he had a "rethink" of his own accord, going back to the same "ideologists" with whom he allied himself back in 1981) that he only had ballistic missiles in mind. When, however, Washington was "caught out," as they say, when R. Reagan's statements at the Reykjavik meeting were produced, there followed rather clumsy, if at times quite ingenuous "explanations": Even if the president had agreed to the elimination of all nuclear arsenals over a 10 year period, this was simply "due to an oversight" and to the fact that he was "ill informed" regarding the differences between the different types of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, under pressure of facts, official

U.S. representatives have been forced to admit, as the CBS television company reported, that the president did discuss the question of eliminating all nuclear weapons with the Soviet leader. Step back has been taken, however, and Washington has "consolidated" it.

The second leap: The levels and sublevels, limits and sublimits which were definitively dealt with in Reykjavik in a coordinated accord have been dragged out into the light again in order to darken it. According to THE NEW YORK TIMES, sublevels for warheads on ballistic missiles, sublimits for warheads on ground-based missiles, and sub-sublevels for "heavy" ground-based missiles have been "revived" in place of the 50 percent reduction in each element of the triad in the "new" American proposals for a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons. "The new American plan," the newspaper sums up, "envisages continuing to insist on a series of sublimits in order to restructure the Soviet Union's forces...and dictate to the USSR what type of ground-based missiles it should have."

The third leap: The United States has also "amended" its consent, given in Reykjavik, not to break out of the ABM Treaty for 10 years. Now, however, THE NEW YORK TIMES has reported, the U.S. delegation in Geneva has been instructed to say that the United States retains the right to leave (!) the treaty in the event of "real violations" or a major change in the strategic situation posing a threat to the country's "highest interests." Aware, through experience, of the rapidity and ease with which official Washington invents "violations" and "changes in the strategic situation"--without troubling itself with any proof--it can be concluded that this "amendment" negates this extremely important coordinated underatking by the two sides.

Under pressure from the most right-wing forces, official Washington is revising the mutual understanding reached in Reykjavik and conducting matters so that it can rewrite the results of the talks in Iceland and basically strike them out. This once again demonstrates to the whole world that the ideas and realities of nuclear disarmament are incompatible with the ideology and practice of those circles in the United States which determine the policy conducted by the present administration of this country.

Reykjavik saw a reappraisal, a qualitatively new situation was created. No one can now act as he did before Reykjavik. The meeting prepared for a possible step forward in the direction of a real change for the better if only the United States will finally take a realistic attitude and give up its illusions in its appraisals.

Reagan 'Distorted' Discussions

LD211748 Moscow TASS in English 1641 GMT 21 Nov 86

[Isn't There Too Much Confusion and Distortion?] -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow November 21 TASS -- Follows commentary by Vladimir Bogachev, TASS military news analyst:

In the course of his latest news conference, U.S. President Ronald Reagan touched upon the results of the Soviet-American summit meeting and said, in particular, that "for the first time, there was an agreement reached on the desirability of eliminating all strategic nuclear missiles in a five-year period and then dealing with the intermediate-range missiles in Germany."

The President has for the umpteenth time been "inaccurate" on some points, which was immediately taken note of by hair-splitting newsmen. At the subsequent briefing, Larry Speakes, a White House spokesman, admitted that Reagan had made only one mistake and claimed that it was simply a slip of the tongue when the President mentioned a five-year period for the elimination of weapons instead of a ten-year period. This wouldn't be worth mentioning were it the President's sole mistake.

Unfortunately, the President has, apparently, that time not as a result of being absent-minded, distorted also the essence of the questions discussed at Reykjavik. As follows from the records of the conversations between the Soviet and the American leaders, in real fact, President Reagan expressed at Reykjavik preparedness to eliminate over a period of ten years not only strategic nuclear missiles, but also all nuclear systems, including bombs, battlefield weapons, cruise missiles, weapons of submarines, medium-range weapons, etc.

The chief executive of the United States agreed to prepare for signing the text of an appropriate agreement.

The White House spokesman clearly did not wish to correct the distortion by the President of the real course of the talks in Iceland. Moreover, reports appeared in the U.S. press claiming that also the Soviet officials declared that the point at issue at Reykjavik was a reduction over the first five years and elimination by the year of 1996 not of all nuclear systems, but only of ballistic missiles. This is no slip of the tongue, but a deliberate lie.

In its unbridled propaganda campaign aimed at presenting the course of the talks in Iceland in a distorted light, at revising the agreements reached there, Washington is having recourse to ever new, increasingly unscrupulous methods and manipulations.

It must be noted, for that matter, that at his news conference President Reagan claimed for an unknown reason that the point of discussion at Reykjavik was that of "intermediate-range missiles in Germany." Meanwhile, American intermediate-range missiles are deployed not only in the FRG, but also in other European countries -- in Britain, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands. On the other hand, there are no medium-range missiles either in the German Democratic Republic, or in other East European Warsaw Treaty member countries. All the Soviet medium-range missiles are based on the USSR's territory.

The latter "inaccuracy" can hardly be described as a slip of the tongue or a deliberate distortion of reality. Apparently, in this case it is an insufficiently profound knowledge of the essence of the matter, which does no credit to the President.

The news conference given by President Reagan, as is also pointed out in the American newspapers, again raises the question whether he exceeds in his public statements the limit of contradictoriness and confusion admissible for the head of a great power?

The Western observers point out that the U.S. President's latest statements in public create the impression of a dilettante approach by the current U.S. Administration to

the problem of war and peace, call in question the very possibility to trust U.S. actions in the international arena.

Tolkunov Hits Shultz 'Revision'

PM231915 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Nov 86 First Edition p 5

[A. Tolkunov "Rejoinder": "Reversing"]

[Text] Everything is in a real muddle in the White House and the presidential political court following Reykjavik. Everybody, including the President himself, is trying in his own way to strike out the accords reached there, which it proved impossible to implement solely because of the American side's unwillingness to abandon the "Star Wars" program.

Yet another example of this political disarray is provided by the lengthy speech delivered by U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz at Chicago University. We will leave to the secretary of state's conscience his arguments about the Soviet military threat and outright falsification of historical facts. All that is an old refrain.

What is new is that the secretary of state is no longer talking about the elimination of "all ballistic missiles," although, as is known, the destruction of all offensive strategic weapons, not just ballistic missiles, was discussed in Reykjavik. He made a further revision of the results of Reykjavik and even proceeded to renounce his words. He is now proposing "the retention of a small arsenal of nuclear ballistic missiles." And that is not all. "A large fleet of aircraft and cruise missiles would enable the United States and NATO to retain a powerful nuclear potential" -- this is what Mr Shultz is counting on.

But it was none other than Shultz himself who stated for all to hear, an hour after the summit meeting ended 12 October, that "all offensive strategic arms would be essentially eliminated in this 10-year period." Where is this promise just over a month later?

It has remained mere words. In practice, however, Washington is putting a match to something which other people built with such difficulty -- The SALT II and ABM treaties.

Where the priest leads, the congregation follows. The order for sabotage was given to the U.S. delegation at the Geneva talks, where the latest round ended recently. While the Soviet proposals submitted there fully correspond to the results reached at Hofdi House, the other side's proposals constitute a departure from Reykjavik and an attempt to distort its content. [paragraph continues]

The U.S. representatives are categorically opposed to sealing off channels for putting weapons into space and are erecting barriers to the elimination of offensive arms.

So G. Shultz' speech is extremely symptomatic. All the indications are that official Washington is not ready, not able, or rather simply not willing to think in a new way in our alarming nuclear age. Having taken a single timid step forward in Reykjavik, there has since been a sharp backward step to the accompaniment of squawks from militarist circles. But can reversing get you very far?

U.S. 'Duplicity'

PM221945 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Nov 86 Morning Edition pp 4-5

[TASS report: "The United States: Duplicity in Policy and Half-Truth. Press Conference Given by USSR Deputy Foreign Minister V.F. Petrovskiy", in New York on 22 November]

[Text] New York, 22 Nov — V.F. Petrovskiy has held a press conference at the offices of the Permanent UN Mission to the United Nations during which he touched on problems of international peace and security and certain aspects of the current development of Soviet-American relations.

Dwelling in this connection on President Reagan's recent speech at the Ethics and Public Center and also on recent statements by a number of high-ranking U.S. Administration representatives, he drew attention to the fact that they distort the real situation in the security sphere and events taking place in the world and contain insinuations about the USSR and the Soviet people.

We have to state bluntly that statements of this kind have caused resentment and indignation among the Soviet people and the Soviet Government, he noted. We see them as provocative attempts to wreck the positive process which the entire world is linking with Reykjavik and to rewrite and revise the positions agreed upon there. Here an attempt is being made to use half-truth, direct deception, and slander against the Soviet Union to cover up the duplicity of the U.S. Administration's course in international affairs.

The president's speech at the Ethics and Public Policy Center cannot be categorized as exemplary in either the ethical respect or from the viewpoint of public diplomacy. Regrettably it has to be stated that the virus of disinformation, a repulsive disease, seems to be penetrating increasingly deeply into the top echelons of the American leadership, which is attempting to combine a course aimed at military superiority with deception of the public based on primitive but overtly aggressive and thus particularly dangerous anticommunism.

The President's arguments about communist ideology and communists testify to precisely this.

These same statements unfortunately do not stamp him as a man who understands anything about the in-depth processes of our time. Absolute nonacceptance of the real picture of the modern world with all its complexities and contradictions, but at the same time a world interlinked through the community of destinies, is the only possible explanation for the U.S. leaders' gamble on fueling ideological intolerance and hatred and setting peoples against each other.

It is not just for the sake of it that the President is attempting to awaken a new wave of anti-Sovietism in the country, as usual using the fabricated "Soviet threat" as a cover and resorting to methods of distortion and sometimes even sheer slander not befitting a person of his rank. The grave problems the administration is encountering in its domestic and foreign policy as a result of the scandalous exposure of the duplicity of its approach to a number of important regional problems, the crisis in Central America, the growth of international distrust in the present American leadership's words and deeds, and the defeat in the elections are well known. Instead of honestly and openly admitting shortcomings and mistakes it is attempting to distract

the nation's attention, using as a life belt setting people against the Soviet Union and its policy. To achieve his time-serving objectives the U.S. President even proceeded to insult the Russian, Soviet people's national feelings and dignity.

In urging overt chauvinism and calling for the organization of another "crusade" against socialism the U.S. President has repeated himself: As soon as prospects have emerged for easing tension, halting the arms race, and improving the political atmosphere in the world he takes steps to wreck this positive process and complicate a dialogue that is in any case developing with difficulty.

This is also evidenced in part by his claim that the "position of strength" has provided Washington with something in talks with the USSR. These words are nothing more than a narcotic for propaganda self-gratification, although the president himself cannot fail to know that such a U.S. policy dooms any talks to sterility.

The Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik, which was the result of common sense, was a kind of touchstone of the two biggest nuclear powers' policy, showing the entire world who is who. The Soviet Union proposed bold and radical plans for a drastic balanced reduction of nuclear potentials and their subsequent complete elimination within a short space of time. By contrast the United States demonstrated itself incapable not only of traveling its half of the road but of getting moving at all. It was demonstrated quite obviously in Iceland's capital that the United States is obsessed with just one thing — persisting with the sinister "Star Wars" projects, the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI). In other words, securing the "right" to blackmail both the USSR and the whole of mankind. It is precisely this imperial-militarist approach on the part of the United States that is the main obstacle to ridding mankind of nuclear weapons.

In Reykjavik the President said literally the following: "If we agree on the elimination of all nuclear weapons by the end of the century we can convey this accord to our delegations in Geneva so that they can prepare a treaty you could sign during your visit to the United States." You only have to compare this statement with his subsequent statements to clearly see where the U.S. Administration's duplicity primarily lies.

First the administration began to deny that the accord related to all nuclear arms. Then it stated that only ballistic missiles were meant, excluding those parts of strategic forces in which the United States has traditionally had advantages. It is impossible to disregard the content of a Chicago University speech by Secretary of State G. Shultz in which he attempted to insist with astounding stubbornness on a distorted version of what happened in Reykjavik and also of the reasons for growing strategic instability. He even started talking about retaining a proportion of ballistic missiles. Such are the stages in the U.S. retreat from the positions reached in Reykjavik.

The President's claims that the United States has submitted at the talks proposals taking Reykjavik into account are designed for the uninformed, to put it mildly. What The United States is currently offering is a revision of Reykjavik, a retreat back to the mothballed old American position.

Nor is there a grain of truth in the claims that the USSR has only now produced proposals for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Starting back in 1946, it is impossible to find a single page in history, a single year when specific actions by the USSR in favor of eliminating the nuclear danger have not been recorded.

On 15 January this year USSR advanced a program of unprecedented specificity and realism for gradually freeing the world of nuclear weapons by the end of the century. It was this program that formed the driving force for the positive things it proved possible to achieve in Reykjavik.

The truth is that concrete proposals from the Soviet side designed to secure the speediest movement forward from the positions reached in Reykjavik are now lying on the table at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space arms.

The sides' proposals since Reykjavik are clearly targeted in opposite directions -- the Soviet proposals toward disarmament, and the American proposals toward military superiority.

The U.S. Administration claims that SDI is an insurance policy in the nuclear and space age. If there can be such a thing as an insurance policy in politics it should consist of honesty in conducting affairs and elementary respect for your own word.

How U.S. policy fits in with the interests of the world community is convincingly evidenced by the results of the 41st UN General Assembly's examination of disarmament questions. Voting in the First Committee on draft resolutions relating to disarmament has just ended. The United States did not support more than half the decisions adopted, and on 15 occasions it voted against either completely on its own or in the company of one of two countries. Yet these decisions concern the elimination of the nuclear threat, the prevention of an arms race in space, the ending of nuclear tests, and other most important questions of war and peace.

The duplicity of American policy can also be seen in its approach to regional conflicts. For Grenada, as for Libya and Lebanon, Nicaragua and Afghanistan, the American dream as seen by the President has turned into a nightmare of violence and state terrorism. The messianic ambitions permeating the President's speeches boil down in practice to a policy of neoglobalism that guides the United States in its aspiration to transform the world into its domain, impose "the law of the jungle" on interstate relations, and suppress by force the people's desire for freedom and national independence.

We are realists, V.F. Petrovskiy stated in conclusion, and realize that sharp ideological polemics and rivalry between ideas about mankind's past, present, and future are also part of the modern world. But the USSR advocates that the ideological struggle does not turn into ideological warfare, does not serve as an obstacle to the development of relations between countries with different social systems, but constitutes a constructive element in an honest competition between spiritual values for the sake of establishing good-neighborliness and cooperation in a diverse but so closely interconnected world.

'Virus' of Misinformation

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[Excerpts] New York November 21 TASS -- Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy gave a news conference here Thursday to discuss international peace and security and some aspects of Soviet-U.S. relations.

Speaking of President Reagan's speech at the Ethics and Public Policy Center and latest remarks by senior U.S. Administration officials, he said they had misrepresented the true state of affairs in the field of security, distorted the substance of

international developments and floated insinuations against the USSR and the Soviet people.

"We should say bluntly that such statements have caused resentment and indignation among the Soviet people and in the Soviet Government," he said.

"We see them as provocative attempts to scuttle the positive process which is associated throughout the world with Reykjavik, and rewrite and revise the positions agreed upon there," Petrovskiy added.

"They are attempting to cover up the U.S. Administration's duplicity in international affairs with half-truth, outright deception and slander against the Soviet Union," he said.

Deplorably, one has to state that the virus of misinformation, a disgusting disease, seems to be penetrating deeper and deeper into the highest echelons of the U.S. leadership which attempts to couple the course of military supremacy and scaling up tension with the deception of the public built on primitive, openly aggressive and hence exceptionally dangerous anti-communism, Vladimir Petrovskiy said furthermore. The U.S. President's reasoning about the communist ideology and communists show precisely this.

Alas, these pronouncements do not characterize him as a man who perceives anything in the in-depth processes of our time. The U.S. leaders' stake on fanning up ideological intolerance and hatred, on putting peoples against each other can be explained only by absolute non-admission of the real picture of the modern world with all of its difficulties and contradictions, but which is at the same time interrelated by the community of destinies.

It is not a good life that forces the President to spark off a new tide of anti-Sovietism, using as usual the imaginary "Soviet threat" as a cover-up, and resorting to methods of distortions and sometimes sheer slander which does not befit a person of his rank. The grave problems encountered by the current administration in its domestic and foreign policies as a result of the scandalous revelation of the duplicity of its approach to a number of important regional problems, the crisis in Central America, the growth of mistrust in the world in words and deeds of the current U.S. leadership, the defeats at the elections are well known.

Instead of an honest and open admission of the shortcomings and mistakes, it tries to divert the attention of the nation, using the setting of people against the Soviet Union, its policy as a life-buoy. To attain these time-serving objectives of his the U.S. President went even to insulting the national feelings and dignity of the Russian, Soviet people.

In calling for open chauvinism, for staging a new crusade against socialism, the President has repeated himself: As soon as the prospect was opened up for relaxing tension, stopping the arms race and ameliorating the political atmosphere in the world, he undertakes steps to stymie this positive process, to complicate the dialogue developing uneasily as it is.

This is also evidenced in part by his allegation that the position from strength gave something to Washington at the talks with the USSR. It seems that the statements of this kind, by whoever they are made, have long since ceased to be received in earnest. [passage omitted]

"Substituting ideological sabotage and 'crusades' for ideological struggle is fraught in the nuclear and space age with a grave threat to the fate of peace. This is being done by those attempting to 'stop' communism by means of low-grade lies about socialist countries," he said.

"This is the meaning of the hysterical campaigns under the slogan of protecting freedoms and human rights, that is 'protecting' them in the Soviet Union and other countries, not at the crusaders' own home where they really need to be protected," the Soviet deputy foreign minister said.

"The President announced intent to keep a scrap of paper, allegedly received from a labor camp in the USSR, for all his life. By contrast, the international bill of rights, which ought to be hung somewhere prominently in the White House, has not even been remembered by the United States. This is not surprising, as it has neither ratified this bill or put it in effect," Petrovskiy said.

U.S. Retreat From Summit Accords

PM281215 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 27 Nov 86 p 3

[G. Dadyants: "Chances Since Reykjavik" -- first two paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] A great deal has been said and written about Reykjavik. But speculation continues in the West surrounding the Soviet proposals made at Reykjavik and the stand taken in this connection by the U.S. Administration. Is it now possible, when the U.S. side is clearly departing from the accords reached in the Icelandic capital, to accurately determine the significance of this meeting? Was it a success for the cause of peace or, conversely, did it signify a step backward -- for example in relation to the previous Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva?

This question is asked by many readers. Today, continuing our dialogue on the most important aspects of world politics, we return to the results of the meeting in Reykjavik between M.S. Gorbachev and U.S. President R. Reagan and its consequences for the cause of peace and the development of Soviet-U.S. relations, as well as relations between East and West as a whole. G. Dadyants, SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA international correspondent, answers the questions of V. Golynnyy, designer and engineer at the "Lvovpribor" plant.

[Dadyants] The meeting itself in Reykjavik cannot be called a step backward -- it can and must be called a step forward. In Geneva, if you remember, an accord was reached that there must be no nuclear war and that there could be no winners in such a war. Both sides also agreed that they would not seek military superiority. The next step was taken in Reykjavik in the search for a solution to the nuclear disarmament problem. What is more, one can say that this was a turning point in the move toward a nuclear-free world.

In his statements on the results of this meeting, M.S. Gorbachev has provided detailed information and given our appraisal of the events in Reykjavik -- including in his recent interview with Indian journalists. I will only reiterate the main point: Practical accord was reached in the Icelandic capital on an official 50-percent reduction followed by the total elimination of all Soviet and American offensive

strategic weapons by 1996, and also on the total elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe and their reduction to 100 units per side in Asia. The far-reaching proposal put forward by the Soviet Union and approved by President R. Reagan opened up the real possibility of reaching agreement on these and other issues of such importance for the cause of peace and security on our planet.

Even G. Shultz, U.S. secretary of state, who has taken on the unpleasant task of revising the Reykjavik accords, was forced to admit, when addressing the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, that a qualitative change in the very nature of the discussion of disarmament problems had taken place at this meeting. "For the first time," he said, "in the long history of arms control talks, a real possibility emerged of making significant reductions in Soviet and American nuclear weapons." The actual agenda of the meeting and the very word "elimination" mean, to quote Shultz, "a stunning turnabout."

However, Reykjavik cannot be unequivocally evaluated as a success for the cause of peace. This is because, despite the fact that the sides were two steps away from reaching a historic accord, they nevertheless failed to do so. The problem of freeing mankind from nuclear weapons in the full sense of the word came up against the U.S. reluctance to abandon the idea of taking weapons into space. If one were to sum up Reykjavik in one sentence, one could say that it engendered great hopes -- because it showed that the maximum results can be achieved in the minimum time -- but, at the same time, it also caused great disappointment, because it fully highlighted the difficulties still blocking the way to nuclear disarmament. The attitude taken by the American side since Reykjavik deepens this sense of disappointment still further.

[Golynnyy] Many of us are asking the question: Was President Reagan really sincere when he agreed in Reykjavik to these far-reaching Soviet proposals to eliminate nuclear weapons? Or was this simply a maneuver aimed at showing himself in the role of "peacemaker"?

[Dadyants] It seems to me that the question to be asked is not whether President Reagan is sincere or insincere, but whether the forces at present predominating in U.S. politics are those aspiring to confrontation with the USSR and to continuing the arms race or those trying to find a reasonable compromise and a means of reducing tension.

The fact that attempts were made immediately after Reykjavik to disavow what the President had said (they said he had supposedly been "wrongly interpreted," that the U.S. delegation had been in a state of "exhaustion and euphoria" and had consequently accepted the Soviet proposals without considering the "threat" they allegedly pose to U.S. security) shows that the military-industrial complex is adamantly opposed to the very possibility of an accord. [paragraph continues]

Vast resources are tied up in SDI, in particular, and the implementation of this program promises corporations in the military-industrial complex billions of dollars and, in the future, trillions of dollars in profits. They will not voluntarily give up these profits, of course.

The interpretation of the Reykjavik results being urgently circulated in the United States today is very interesting. It claims that the President consented only to the elimination of ballistics missiles and not to the elimination of all strategic weapons. It is this distorted version of the Reykjavik talks that G. Shultz conveyed in Vienna during his meeting with E.A. Shevardnadze, USSR foreign minister. According to this version, strategic bombers and cruise missiles would remain. This interpretation or, to be more precise, distortion of the Reykjavik accords not only has

the aim of trying to ensure military superiority over the USSR — it is also highly advantageous to the military-industrial complex. U.S. corporations have already made enough profit on ballistic missiles, but the profits are only just beginning to come in from cruise missiles, including those deployed on strategic bombers.

[Golynnyy] The U.S. side claims that an accord was not reached in Reykjavik because of the Soviet Union's uncompromising attitude regarding SDI. What is more, the matter is being presented in such a way as to make it seem that an accord is still possible — the USSR only has to take another step toward the United States and drop its objections to SDI.

[Dadyants] In Reykjavik the Soviet Union moved to meet not only the United States but the West as a whole. For example, we gave up our objections to the improvement of British and French nuclear weapons while the USSR and the United States would be in the process of reducing and then eliminating their strategic weapons and medium-range missiles. We also made concessions with regard to SDI — we agreed to a 10-year cycle of U.S. laboratory research on this program. It must be taken into account that 10 years is exactly the length of time in which the Soviet and U.S. strategic weapons would be totally eliminated. We proposed to President Reagan that after this period had expired talks be held to decide how to proceed further.

But Reagan insisted on the immediate U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and the deployment of space weapons immediately after the expiration of this 10-year period. The USSR naturally could not contemplate this, as it would not only be a question of the fate of the termless ABM Treaty — it would also mean giving the Americans unilateral military advantages over the Soviet Union. SDI is not a defensive program as the United States claims, it is an aggressive program to develop the most lethal weapons and, what is more, qualitatively new types of such weapons. Accepting U.S. demands under these conditions would mean jeopardizing the security of our country and of our allies.

It is, therefore, not a question of the Soviet Union taking an uncompromising attitude. Our partners in the talks proved unwilling in practice to conclude an agreement which envisaged equal security for both sides. The United States is still prey to the illusion of it being possible to gain military superiority over the Soviet Union.

[Golynnyy] Why are some West European countries so suspicious of the accord reached in Reykjavik to scrap the "Euromissiles"? They used to be in favor of R. Reagan's "zero option." Can one deduce from this that West European policy is evolving in the wrong direction?

[Dadyants] There are indeed forces in West Europe which, only yesterday, were strongly demanding the elimination of the Soviet SS-20 missiles, but now they do not want the U.S. Pershing and cruise missiles to be withdrawn from Europe. A member of M Thatcher's cabinet described the situation as follows: "Suddenly Europe has become attached to its arsenals."

Nevertheless, I would not say that West European policy is evolving in the wrong direction. Europe is still in the vanguard of the detente process. Evidence of this is provided by the accords reached in Stockholm, and the Vienna meeting now in progress. Europe is still capable of accelerating the course of events — if it give up its old way of political thinking.

[Golynnyy] What, in the present conditions, when the Americans are renouncing the Reykjavik accords, are the prospects for further dialogue between the USSR and the United States? Will the earlier planned visit by M.S. Gorbachev to the United States still take place?

[Dadyants] Dialogue, of course, will continue. The situation in the world is so dangerous that no chance of agreement should be missed.

Of course, the time that has passed since Reykjavik has shown that the U.S. side is taking an unconstructive attitude. All the old garbage of the pre-Reykjavik U.S. proposals — all the levels and sublevels, limits and sublimits — which are intended to deadlock the talks has been brought up again in Geneva. Attempts are being made to take individual issues out of the general context -- for example, the idea of resolving the issue of medium-range missiles as something separate from the package of Soviet proposals. In other words, to accept the concessions contained in the package without accepting the package as a whole. The United States has declared a real war on all international treaties restraining the arms race, and especially the SALT II Treaty. In his recent speech at a center for research in the sphere of ethics and social policy Reagan once again tried to stir up a wave of anti-Sovietism in the United States and resorted to crude slander against the Soviet Union. All this is a manifestation of the bankrupt policy of acting from a position of strength.

The contemporary world is rapidly changing, however. It can no longer be what it was before Reykjavik. As B. Craxi, prime minister of Italy, rightly observed, it is now impossible to deviate from and disregard the fundamentals of accords which were so close to being reached and which must form the core of future talks.

This is basically the answer to your second question -- regarding the prospects for a new Soviet-U.S. summit meeting. No one has called it off [nikto yeye ne otmenyal], but it must be constructive and take into account the fact that going back on what was achieved in Reykjavik is unacceptable and impermissible.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR ARMY PAPER: U.S. POST-REYKJAVIK POSTURE, TESTING SCORED

PM211651 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Nov 86 Second Edition p 3

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA observer A. Golts "Military-Political Review": "The Strength of Policy Against the Policy of Strength"]

[Text] A little more than a month has passed since the Soviet-American summit in Reykjavik. And throughout this time mankind has been living in conditions of a new political situation. It is characterized by two important features. On the one hand, and this is the main point, all peoples have seen in the accords reached in the Iceland capital a real opportunity to completely eradicate nuclear weapons, an opportunity to attain a nonnuclear world in the comparatively near future.

But on the other hand it appears that, fearing the consequences of these accords, Washington is diligently refusing to have anything to do with them. It is doing this not only by demonstrating its former adherence to the "Star Wars" program--that same sinister program which turned out to be the stumbling block on the road to historic agreements. Under pressure from the military-industrial complex the White House has started to deny the chief element on which accord was reached at the summit--on the elimination of USSR and U.S. nuclear arsenals within 10 years.

And here the U.S. administration has had to go to extremes. The English poet Alexander Pope rightly warned that "He who lies does not realize the difficulty of his task, for he must lie 20 times to support the first lie."

And that is what has happened. The first lie drags with it a second, and that one--a third.... One story contradicts another. Washington's powerful propaganda machine is floundering in the quicksands of deception, disinformation, and manipulation. Matters reached such a point that, when the White House was yet again caught lying, Poindexter, the president's assistant for national security affairs, instead of making excuses, gave to understand that deception is "a legitimate instrument of foreign policy."

One gets the impression that some people across the ocean are doing everything to provoke the Soviet Union and dreaming that Moscow will slam the door. But these calculations are in vain. Our country considers that, in a situation where ultradestructive weapons are being improved and are growing at a great

pace, not a day must be lost. That is why the USSR is consistently pursuing a course aimed at resolving difficult international problems at the negotiating table.

The CPSU Central Committee Politburo session held 13 November stressed the importance of the struggle to consolidate the historic frontiers reached in Reykjavik on the path to nuclear disarmament, and of the U.S. administration's active involvement in specific work aimed at preparing effective agreements, based on the principles of equality and identical security, on the whole package of questions discussed there. To preserve what was achieved in Reykjavik: This was precisely the task that the Soviet representatives set themselves at the meeting with the U.S. side in Vienna. The document "Key Provisions of Agreements Between the USSR and the United States in the Area of Nuclear Disarmament Open to Further Preparation for Signing," prepared earlier by the Soviet side, was placed on the negotiating table.

In this context the discussion of a kind of "framework accord" was proposed which, after being ratified at the highest level, must become the basis for drawing up the texts of specific agreements. Let us recall this document's basic provisions. The USSR considers that on strategic offensive weapons it is essential to take as the basis the accord in principle reached in Reykjavik that, in the course of 5 years, the sides will cut all components of the strategic offensive forces by 50 percent to an equal number of delivery vehicles and warheads. And to eliminate the remaining 50 percent of all strategic offensive forces by the end of 1996. Concerning long-range sea-launched nuclear cruise missiles, which are not included in the strategic triad, the finding of a separate, mutually acceptable solution to limit their deployment is envisaged.

The formula for medium-range missiles is also based entirely on the Reykjavik accords. Leaving aside the question of the British and French nuclear potentials, the sides would sign an agreement on the complete elimination of Soviet and American missiles of this class in Europe. Talks would quickly be started on missiles with a range of less than 1,000 kilometers, the level of which would be frozen. Simultaneously Soviet missiles in Asia are being reduced to 100 warheads, with the United States being entitled to deploy the same number on its territory.

As before, the USSR considers it of prime importance that, at a time of such deep reductions in nuclear potential, neither side has the opportunity to gain military superiority. That is why the Soviet proposal that both sides remain within the ABM Treaty for the next 10 years, strictly observing all its provisions, remains in force.

Displaying political realism, the USSR did not insist on a halt to all tests within the framework of the SDI program. A ban must be imposed on the testing of the space-based elements of ABM defense in space. It has become essential to begin high-level talks in the near future with the aim of determining what work on antimissile weapons is allowed by the ABM treaty, and what is not. The USSR considers it essential to agree also on banning antisatellite weapons,

because their development opens up yet one more channel for deploying space-based ABM systems.

The USSR is a convinced and firm supporter of an immediate and total ban on all nuclear tests. But taking into account the situation which has arisen, the Soviet side has proposed to start without delay full-scale bilateral talks which must lead to a complete ban on nuclear explosions.

As we see this document pursued the goal of consolidating the Reykjavik accords and beginning their implementation. But both in Vienna and in Geneva--where the next stage of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons has just ended--the U.S. representatives demonstrated an overt desire to conduct matters in the style of the theater of the political absurd. In the course of the negotiations they were talking as if Reykjavik had indeed taken place but that it was by no means the kind of meeting you thought it was. Washington has tried to alter the package of accords elaborated in the Icelandic capital into a document from which the fundamental accord on the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been removed, while others have been diluted with many provisos, conditions, and one-sided interpretations. Once again levels and sublevels and limits and sublimits, which merely obscure the crux of the matter, have reemerged from political non-existence. Once again an attempt is being made to speculate on differences in the structure of the U.S. and USSR strategic forces. The American side now wishes to talk about eliminating ballistic missiles only, leaving strategic bombers, of which there are almost four times as many in the United States than in the USSR, outside the accords' parentheses. The aim is clear: to gain military superiority.

In a word, U.S. diplomacy is doing everything possible to forget Reykjavik and to retreat from the boundaries reached there. As we see, it is a question of continuing the notorious policy of strength, which is backed up by U.S. war preparations unprecedented in scale.

Here are the events of the past week only.

The U.S. President signed the bill on the military budget for fiscal 1987. Enormous resources have been allocated to increasing strategic offensive forces, manufacturing chemical weapons, and further implementing the "Star Wars" program.

Four MX first-strike intercontinental ballistic missiles have already been installed in silos and placed on standby alert at the Warren Base in Wyoming. By the end of the year, as the Newhouse News Service notes, "The lights on the panels of the underground command point will start to flash, indicating that 10 MX missiles are ready to receive the signal following which they will roar off on their way to the Soviet Union." Next year their number will be brought up to 50. But even this is not enough for the Pentagon. It intends to seek appropriations for the construction of another 50 MX missiles.

The other day administration representatives once again stated that they do not intend to observe the provisions of the SALT II Treaty. It was stated

that the installation of cruise missiles on the 131st B-52 bomber will soon be completed and that it will be sent to the Fort Worth AFB. This means that the United States will be exceeding the limit set by the treaty and that the way will be open for a totally unrestrained buildup of strategic weapons.

Finally, it is impossible not to mention an openly defiant step. A nuclear test has been conducted at the test range in Nevada. A device with a yield of 150 kilotons has been detonated.

This is the 23d test since the Soviet Union's introduction of a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions, which has already lasted for 15 months. Let us note that the previous, 22d explosion was conducted in the United States 16 October, almost the day after the Reykjavik meeting. The thunder of nuclear explosions in Nevada bears witness to one fact: U.S. militarist circles are not even contemplating eliminating nuclear weapons. In spite of the demands of millions of people from all countries in the world, in spite of American public opinion, Washington intends to continue improving and building up its nuclear arsenals.

The White House does not wish to join the Soviet moratorium mainly because the tests in Nevada are directly linked with implementing the "Star Wars" program. No day passes without new reports on even more fantastic and dangerous projects in the framework of this program. Reports have come in that work on creating (sozdaniye) a nuclear reactor which it is planned to install in strike space complexes is in full swing at the Hanford test range. These reactors, work leader R. (Udriig) calculates, will be able to generate the very high-yield impulse necessary for beam weapon systems.

So all these facts show that the military-industrial complex has directed the administration toward the creation of a unified offensive-defensive complex in which the means of a first nuclear strike--intercontinental ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, strategic bombers, and missile-carrying submarines--would be combined with some sort of space shield which is to ensure the aggressor's impunity.

But attempts to cover Reykjavik with a pile of nuclear missiles and to stifle it with the rumble of nuclear explosions are doomed to failure. "There is no way back," M. S. Gorbachev has stressed, "but the way forward is only through new political thinking." Examples of this thinking are set by the socialist states. The participants in the working meeting of leaders of the CIMA socialist countries' fraternal parties which took place 10-11 November in Moscow supported the USSR's principled position and stressed the necessity to build up joint efforts in the interests of the struggle to eliminate nuclear and reduce conventional weapons and to strengthen peace and international security.

And today millions of people share this view.

In those countries where governments prefer to be guided by the obsolete dogmas of "nuclear umbrella" or "Atlantic solidarity," the people's masses are assimilating the new way of thinking. The events in Reykjavik have activated this process. But the world has not only seen hope, Reykjavik has revealed the true face of those who up till now have wanted to hide behind the mask of lovers of peace.

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

PRAVDA ON NATO REACTION TO REYKJAVIK, PACT ARMS CURB PLAN

PN201417 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Nov 86 First Edition p 4

[Ye. Grigoryev article under the rubric "Echo of Reykjavik": "Hypocritical Maneuvers: The Prospect of a Nuclear-free World and the Conventional Arms 'Factor'"]

[Text2 If you read U.S. correspondents' reports from West Europe or the right-wing West European press itself, you learn that the 'Europeans' (this is the term used) are extremely worried now, after Reykjavik. Are they upset, you may wonder, because the hitch with SDI made it impossible to open the door to the elimination of medium-range missiles from our continent? And to the destruction of all nuclear arms? Well, as far as the people's masses and the broadest circles of the European public are concerned, this is indeed so. But it is not they who are asked. What is presented as 'the Europeans'' opinion is the reaction of relatively narrow but influential (influential because it is they who rule) circles of, mainly, three European NATO countries--the FRG, Great Britain, and France. And the reason why these circles are sounding the alarm is precisely the emergence of the prospect of a nuclear-free Europe and a nuclear-free world which was really delineated and agreed in principle in Iceland.

Looking at it from a logical viewpoint, this phenomenon seems incredible. On the eve of Reykjavik the governments of the aforementioned countries are unstinting in wishing the summit well, especially in respect of nuclear arms control. Prior to that, all the present West European leaders had made so many speeches in favor of the medium-range missile "zero option" in Europe that even a computer could not total them all up. The FRG chancellor, for instance, when listing the deployment of new U.S. nuclear missiles on his people, swore to them that his government "would advocate that talks continue until the opportunity arises to totally eliminate medium-range missiles."

And now it has arisen, a real and tangible opportunity. And it has caused... alarm. The advocates of nuclear weapons had no idea that the USSR would put forward such radical proposals and that their forceful logic would prompt the U.S. President to agree to deep cuts in nuclear arms and their subsequent complete elimination by 1996. Formally, even these NATO allies welcomed Reykjavik. After all, one of the sides was their main partner, and anyway, no one can now reject nuclear disarmament out of hand because of public opinion. However, practically as soon as the summit was over, they set about

discrediting the results of Reykjavik. This line even led to the emergence of a "triangle" of sorts between Bonn, London, and Paris, although the interests and motives of those who form the "corners of the triangle" are very different. Adding the NATO headquarters in Brussels, where Reykjavik's accords in principle prompted a "mutiny among the generals," another "geometrical figure" emerges.

The positions that have been taken up look approximately like this: "Our defense depends and will continue to depend on nuclear weapons," the British Prime Minister M. Thatcher said a few days ago. "Of course, we would like the number of nuclear weapons to be reduced. After the meeting in Reykjavik this aim has come much closer." And so the aim appears to be the reduction, but not the elimination of nuclear weapons, not a nuclear-free world. The underlying reason for this is the nuclear rearmament program which has been approved by the Conservative Government, the orientation toward the preservation of what are portrayed as independent nuclear forces. In Paris the motives are on the whole the same. The French military nuclear program is declared inviolable and long-term. "Concern" is obviously evoked in both capitals by any trend toward antinuclear development since this does not fit in with the concept of security based on nuclear weapons.

As for Bonn, the ruling circles there have become virtually the main organizers of resistance to Reykjavik on this side of the Atlantic. The first mine was planted by Federal Chancellor H. Kohl himself. He lost no time declaring that with nuclear disarmament, war in Europe would again be "possible and likely." Departing for Washington later (and emphasizing that he was acting as a "representative of Europe"), the chancellor set forth a whole series of reservations, warnings, and preconditions on questions of nuclear disarmament. The "threat" of a nuclear-free Europe forced Bonn to unmask itself. Very little indeed remains of the proclaimed "predictability" of the present FRG Government's course. The only thing that is predictable is its alignment in favor of preserving nuclear arsenals. You get the impression that the West German militarists have still not given up their secret dream of gaining control and possession of means of mass destruction in one way or another. How else is one to explain the fact that the leaders of the FRG, a country literally choked with U.S. nuclear explosives, are opposed to a nuclear-free Europe?

Reykjavik has clearly reshuffled the cards of the opponents of detente and disarmament. It has compelled them to regroup their forces and invent new propaganda myths along the lines of the story about the "Europeans' concern." Both London and Bonn have their own reasons for their negative approach to nuclear disarmament, of course. There is also evidence of a certain amount of distrust of the U.S. patron. Yet you cannot help asking yourself: What is all the fuss about? Have events not made it clear that the U.S. administration itself has taken fright at the historic scale of the Reykjavik accords? Against this background the West European "revolt" against Reykjavik looks like something ordered from across the ocean. What they need there is just such a propaganda "lifeline." It is quite plain how willingly Washington is reaching out for this lifeline to justify its rejection of the agreements in principle.

As if at the "Europeans'" instigation, "misgivings" about the regional and global strategic consequences of the implementation of the proposals agreed in Reykjavik have been increasingly emphasized on the other side of the ocean in recent days.

The conventional arms "factor" is being cited as the main obstacle among all kinds of other reservations. The NEW YORK TIMES writes: "The prospect of substantial reductions in nuclear arsenals which emerged at the summit in Reykjavik has given rise to misgivings on account of the superiority of the Russians' nonnuclear forces in Europe." In this context, reference is made in Washington to utterances on the lines of the statement by French Foreign Minister J. B. Raimond, who said in part, "Any talks leading to the complete elimination of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe without a simultaneous reduction of the existing imbalance in conventional and chemical weapons would present a threat to the security of our continent." British and FRG leaders are expounding similar theories.

The situation is depicted as follows: Should Europe and the world become nuclear-free, the West, it is claimed, could fall victim to Soviet and Warsaw Pact superiority over the United States and NATO in conventional arms and armed forces. This "imbalance" (which has nothing in common with reality since in this area too an approximate equilibrium exists between the Warsaw Pact and NATO) is being noisily bandied about by Western propaganda as a self-evident truth. The fevered imagination of the opponents of nuclear disarmament is again depicting scenarios of a "Soviet invasion" of West Europe and local wars in other regions. The man in the street is being frightened with the prospect that in the event of nuclear disarmament he will have to pay out for programs to eliminate the notorious imbalance. Thus K. Adelman, the director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, told foreign journalists in Washington 13 November that "when we embark on nuclear arms reductions, if we ever do, we will be forced to strengthen our nonnuclear deterrent potential. We will have to build up our conventional deterrents," and so forth.

An obvious attempt is being made to impress on the public the idea that the way to nuclear disarmament is barred by Soviet superiority in conventional weapons rather than by the stance of the United States and its main allies in defence of the "Star Wars" program and the "nuclear deterrent." There is nothing new in these counterarguments. They were raised back at the beginning of the year when the historic Soviet program for the phased elimination of all nuclear arms by the year 2000 was put forward. Now, when Reykjavik has shown the realistic nature of this aim, a second attempt to discredit it is being made, as it were.

But it is an attempt which is doomed to failure. The political hypocrites are cynically gambling on the short memory or ignorance of people in Western countries. After all, the Soviet Union is by no means opposed to the elimination of chemical weapons or deep cuts in conventional arms and armed forces. On the contrary, it most resolutely favors these objectives. Back in the spring of this year, when the selfsame circles in West Europe first started expressing misgivings about their security in the face of the Warsaw Pact's armed forces and armaments, account of this was taken in Moscow. The plan

for the phased elimination of nuclear arms was complemented by a new large-scale initiative relating to conventional arms and armed forces.

This was later formalized in the official appeal by the Warsaw Pact member states to the NATO members proposing talks to draft a program for the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe. Let me recall that as a first step the socialist countries proposed that a mutual reduction of 100,000-150,000 men on each side be made in the numerical strength of the forces of the states belonging to the opposing military-political alliances over the course of 1-2 years. Within the framework of this measure a reduction in tactical strike aviation would be of great importance. As soon as this was done, the Warsaw Pact member states would be prepared to embark on further substantial reductions. As a result, provided that the NATO countries reciprocate, ground forces and tactical strike aviation of the two alliances in Europe could be reduced by approximately 25 percent compared with the present level in the early nineties. This reduction would total more than 500,000 men on each side. Thus the groupings of armed forces which confront each other in Europe would be reduced by more than 1 million men.

Almost 6 months have passed since these proposals were put forward. You will recall that to begin with they were evaluated in the NATO capitals as constructive proposals which demanded a serious answer. However, this has so far failed to materialize. It seems that it is stuck--not without ultimate motive--in the bureaucratic labyrinths of the military bloc's political structures. NATO's so-called "Halifax Commission," which was set up to define the NATO position on conventional arms, is proceeding at a snail's pace. So far they have not been able to agree among themselves in NATO on the framework within which the talks on conventional arms and armed forces reductions should take place. Meanwhile they are raising a ballyhoo around the conventional arms "factor" and using it as an obstacle to nuclear disarmament.

All this is ridiculous! There is no need to say how irresponsible this is toward the peoples. The weeks which have elapsed since Reykjavik have confirmed that there are powerful forces in both the U.S. and Western ruling circles which are seeking to thwart the process of nuclear disarmament. A difficult struggle against them lies ahead. On the other hand the situation of those who do not want to give up their militarist views is not simple either. They are forced to maneuver on the brink of self-exposure. At least some of these circles which favor the "nuclear component" are subject to doubts and internal differences of opinion. Sometimes there are even glimpses of sensible principles. In other words, in my view, a breakthrough to the new political thinking is possible for anyone.

The Soviet proposals put forward in Iceland, which form an integral package--a package of compromises, taking due account of the sides' contradictory interests, a package of reciprocal concessions and of a mutual balance of forces--remain on the table. They are working for peace and have become the main items on the agenda of European and world politics. They are supported by millions upon millions of people. They demand that a historic opportunity not be missed and that the prospect of a world without nuclear weapons which opened in Reykjavik be translated into reality.

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CSO: 5200/1127

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS: NATO CONCERNS INFLUENCE U.S. POST-REYKJAVIK STANCE

LD211828 Moscow TASS in English 1551 GMT 21 Nov 86

[Text] Moscow November 21 TASS -- TASS military news analyst Vladimir Chernyshev writes:

At the recent session of the NATO council in Brussels at the level of ambassadors -- permanent representatives, it was stated that the possibility of eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe and of all ballistic missiles 'gives rise to deep concern' among political and military quarters of the USA's NATO allies.

This fact, as well as speeches by some leading figures of Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, and France, indicate that the prospects for the deliverance of Europe and of the entire world from nuclear weapons, the possibility of which was shown by the meeting in Reykjavik, horrified some people in West European capitals.

In London, Bonn, and Paris they began to assert that nuclear weapons were almost a boon, that there was no alternative to the nuclear strategic, and that the elimination of U.S. nuclear arms in Europe would tell on the political and security ties between the United States and Western Europe, and so on and so forth.

'New terms' or, putting it in a simpler way, obstacles to the process of disarmament, are being thought up. Attempts are being made to tie the nuclear arms issues up tightly with chemical and conventional arms.

All those distracting manoeuvres are designed to help the U.S. Administration to cover up its departure from the results achieved in Reykjavik, to confuse the public, and to damp the peoples' enthusiasm for peace and detente.

At the same time, London and Paris seek to uphold their imaginary privileges to nuclear status. Fearing lest the issue of British and French nuclear forces should arise in the near future, they are stating with great haste that the plans for the upgrading and building up of their nuclear forces remain unchanged.

Quite recently officials in those capitals were singing the praises of 'zero option' for Europe, voicing 'righteous indignation' over the Soviet demand for taking into account British and French nuclear arms, and were virtually giving consent to the elimination of all medium-range missiles in Europe, accepting NATO's 'two-track' decision.

Now that, due to the Soviet initiatives, real opportunities have come about for setting the beginning to nuclear disarmament, officials in those capitals are confirming that they had bluffed before and engaged in demagogery, and are showing actually that it is not at all European peoples' security that is the object of their concern.

The aims of such policy were frankly revealed by General Bernard Rogers, supreme commander of NATO Forces in Europe, who stated that the bloc should continue to maintain a first nuclear strike capability. Pentagon chief Caspar Weinberger, according to "DER SPIEGEL" magazine, has 'reassured' the West European nuclear arms advocates by saying that they might have no doubt that the words being uttered in Washington about disarmament would remain just mere words.

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CSO: 5200/1127

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

PRAVDA TIES KOHL'S ATTACK TO SUPPORT FOR U.S. ARMS POLICIES

PM281220 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Nov 86 First Edition p 5

[Editorial article: "Dangerous Atavism"]

[Excerpts] Is the world insured against the passing repeating itself? This question springs to mind when you study certain recent remarks by H. Kohl, head of the FRG Government, on foreign policy questions. What they have in common is blind hostility toward the Soviet Union, the GDR, and world socialism in general, and a failure to accept the realities of the nuclear missile age and the demands and tasks facing the world community.

In contrast to his routine, customary exercises in anti-Sovietism and endless vows of devotion to his American patrons, in an interview for the American magazine NEWSWEEK before his trip to the United States, H. Kohl indulged in the crudest attacks on the Soviet leadership, even to the extent of drawing vile parallels with Nazi Germany. These remarks by H. Kohl, which are unprecedented in the history of Soviet-West German relations, and indeed in any relations between states which have diplomatic relations, caused profound indignation everywhere, including in the FRG. Their irresponsibility is staggering.

It is noteworthy that the massive hostile attacks on the USSR and its peaceloving foreign policy are taking place after Reykjavik, when the possibility of creating a nuclear-free world emerged so clearly for the first time. The prospect which emerged in the Icelandic capital for the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe and radical reductions of strategic offensive arms, not to mention the Soviet proposals for preventing the militarization of space, that is, the implementation of this whole integrated program for delivering mankind from nuclear weapons, evidently frightened some people in the top FRG leadership. Doubts began to be voiced as to the expediency of everything that was achieved in Reykjavik. Not only Bundeswehr generals, but also certain politicians began to depict disarmament, rather than the arms race, as the real danger. Yesterday's supposed supporters of nuclear arms limitation in Europe are really giving themselves away: Now it is clear that those who today reject the "zero option" on medium-range missiles advocated it in the past only on the assumption that the USSR would reject it.

The federal chancellor and his associates are now hurrying anxiously to the assistance of the American Administration. The administration is trying to prove what cannot be proved, distorting the nature of the package of accords reached in Reykjavik, and modifying them to suit its own selfish purposes. So people in Bonn started doing the same thing. The opponents of disarmament began to think up one obstacle after another. First the elimination of medium-range missiles is made dependent on the

resolution of the question of short-range missiles. Then it is declared that the missiles cannot be removed until the "disproportion" between conventional arms in the East and West is evened out -- a disproportion which, incidentally, does not exist. The authors of all these "conditions" deliberately keep quiet about the fact that the Soviet Union advocates the elimination specifically of all nuclear arms in Europe, and together with its allies has proposed a plan for the radical reduction of armed forces and conventional arms.

Instead of adopting a serious, responsible approach to the USSR's new, truly revolutionary proposals on disarmament issues, Bonn started talking about "upgrading" in short-range missiles, as was the case with the Pershings and cruise missiles, and about "upgrading" in conventional types of weapons. No, the age-old longing for weapons has not died out in the FRG.

Then there is the FRG Government's unconditional support for the "Star Wars" program, the main barrier on the path to accords which the USSR and the United States embarked on in Reykjavik. Surely the West German leaders realize that SDI is a new, more dangerous stage in the arms race, a move toward new, more powerful types of weapons of mass destruction, with the aim of securing military superiority and dictating the U.S. will to other peoples of the world. And if Bonn nonetheless helps the U.S. military-industrial complex to push through the space militarization plans, is not this a flagrant attack of atavistic thinking? It is time to grasp the threat that all this entails to the FRG, to Europe, and to the world as a whole.

Clearly reluctant to learn the lessons of recent German history and heed his own people's voice, the chancellor continues to pin his hopes on the wisdom of the White House and ostentatiously heed the advice of all kinds of renegades from among the ranks of professional anti-Sovietists.

Although H. Kohl, as chancellor, is responsible for defining the government's course, it is not as easy as all that for him to impose his own basically atavistic ideas, ideas which are alien to the requirements of the present day, on his fellow citizens. It would therefore be wrong to identify the positions and actions of the advocates of confrontation and the arms race with the sentiments of West German society as a whole. In the FRG there are forces -- and not only in the opposition parties -- which sincerely seek to strengthen peace and develop cooperation, forces which regard Reykjavik as a base for decisive progress in all avenues in the sphere of disarmament and the strengthening of stability on the continent. Naturally, they value good relations with the USSR and the other socialist states and mutually advantageous multifaceted cooperation.

These aspirations have always met with the understanding and support of the Soviet leadership and all Soviet people. The USSR's line of developing constructive cooperation with the FRG, including cooperation on the cardinal questions of ensuring peace and security, remains unchanged. Anyone who is afflicted with the incurable disease of hostility toward other peoples cannot expect respect. It is time for those who are constantly flogging the dead horse of revanchism to understand that this policy is doomed to failure.

One would like to think that Bonn will eventually draw practical conclusions from all this both as regards ensuring European and international security and in bilateral Soviet-West German relations, will clear the political dirt away from these relations, and will consider the advantages of a sound, clear-cut perspective.

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW TV HITS THATCHER STANCE ON INF, STRATEGIC ARMS, SDI

LD232357 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1500 GMT 23 Nov 86

[From the "International Panorama" program, presented by Nikolay Shishlin]

[Text] There is no doubt that it was precisely Reykjavik and its results which were the pivot of the talks held by British Prime Minister Thatcher with U.S. President Reagan. After these talks the British press wrote that Thatcher is now becoming Reagan's understudy and she will be taking the determining initiatives in the development of East-West dialogue on arms problems. However, Margaret Thatcher did formulate what might perhaps be called a British minimum program. (?This looks) approximately as follows: The first thing, she believes, is the need to solve the problem of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe. Then, to come to agreement on a 50-percent reduction in Soviet and U.S. strategic offensive weapons. Then she believes it is necessary to ban chemical weapons; all this of course will be subject to international monitoring. In this minimum program there is this important statement: We — the pronoun is used meaning Reagan and Thatcher — well, we have also reached a joint opinion on the need to continue the SDI research program, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty. However, in the reasoning of the British prime minister, there is also the theory that a permanently stable, general equilibrium is needed. This, of course, all sounds very nice, but only for inexperienced ears.

Look at what is missing from the British package, relatively speaking. Well, first let's start with the fact that there isn't a package. The package on the whole is in pieces. Then, while talking of reductions in strategic offensive weapons, Thatcher leaves out the idea of eliminating all strategic weapons which, incidentally, was the issue in Reykjavik. I'm not looking now at the fact that commitment is being declared time and again to SDI, that is, to the Star Wars program, not a word is being said about stopping nuclear testing and not a word is being said about Britain's own position on Britain's own measures aimed at increasing arms, including nuclear arms, production. In this connection, I should like to say yes, they're not forgetting Reykjavik in West Europe, but the activity of West Europeans, at least of a sector of West Europeans, is heading in a strange direction. Fears are being increasingly whipped up, and legends of all kinds are being artificially exaggerated to the effect that, they say, freeing Europe from nuclear arms will lead to the security of Europe being shaken, if it doesn't actually collapse. Thoughts involuntarily creep in that this is being done consciously. Someone, in Europe it seems, has an interest in the United States being deeply drawn into confrontations with the Soviet Union.

Inasmuch as this confrontation itself, you know, places a certain burden on the U.S. economy, and given the complex interrelationships of West European capital with the

pushing transnational corporations, then this utter involvement confrontation apparently suits certain sectors of West European political and so called business circles. This, of course, is serious. Therefore, it seems the demand, the need for reaching the new political thinking, should not just be addressed at West Europeans, but at their relations with the United States, so that West Europeans too can fully realize the responsibility which today lies with each country for the future of Europe and of the whole world.

This new political thinking however is unfortunately still being established in the minds of West European politicians with some difficulty. I'm not talking now of those political forces in West Europe which represent, not yesterday, but the day before that. That day before yesterday though is present on the European political scene, particularly on the West German one.

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CSO: 5200/1127

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

GORBACHEV TO FINNS, GREEKS ON REYKJAVIK RESULTS

Finnish Peace Group

LD261428 Helsinki Domestic Service in Finnish 1300 GMT 23 Oct 86

[Text] The Soviet party leader Mikhail Gorbachev has replied to the peace appeal from the Finnish UN Disarmament Week Citizens' Committee. In a reply submitted by Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Sobolev, Gorbachev describes the summit meeting of the leaders of the superpowers in Reykjavik as useful. The meeting showed that dialogue is necessary and the destruction of nuclear weapons is possible, Gorbachev said. At the same time he regretted that in Reykjavik it was not possible to reach a mutual understanding with binding agreements. Gorbachev also stressed that the Soviet Union appreciates international appeals for disarmament.

One Finnish Citizens' Committee sent the appeal to the leaders of both superpowers at the Reykjavik meeting.

Message to Greek Peace Group

NC012037 Athens Domestic Service in Greek 1930 GMT 1 Nov 86

[Text] Soviet Ambassador in Athens Viktor Stukalin has conveyed to the Greek Committee for International Detente and Peace a message from Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Stukalin handled the message to Committee Chairman Alkis Aryiadihis and the members of the committee's secretariat.

Gorbachev's message stresses that the Soviet leaders are always motivated by the wishes and demands of the international public, who justly demand that mankind halt its course toward the nuclear abyss. The message also analyzes the results of the Reykjavik meeting, stressing that this historic opportunity for a radical solution to the problems of war and peace should not be wasted.

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CSO: 5200/1127

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

CANADIAN CONFUSION OVER REAGAN REYKJAVIK STAND EXAMINED

Ottawa THE OTTAWA CITIZEN in English 30 Oct 86 p A9

[Article by Dan Turner]

[Text]

That the Soviets and the Americans disagree as to what led to the breakdown in disarmament talks at Reykjavik is unfortunate, and terribly, terribly sad.

That the Canadians and Americans disagree over the same issue is:

- (a) Something almost nobody has noticed.
- (b) Silly.
- (c) Also a little sad.

The Americans and Soviets have been disagreeing over whether U.S. President Ronald Reagan expressed a willingness at Reykjavik to abolish all strategic nuclear weapons over 10 years.

The Russians say he did, the Americans say he didn't.

The Canadians and Americans have been disagreeing over where the Reagan administration stands on the development of Star Wars — the Strategic Defence Initiative — since External Affairs Minister Joe Clark rose in the House more than a week ago to express Canada's optimism about what had happened in Iceland.

What occurred over the next few hours had an Alice-in-Wonderland quality to it that the TV cameras were unable to capture — the essence of it being the contention of Clark and his officials that, no matter how insistent Reagan has been about his enthusiasm for getting a space-based anti-ballistic missile system ready to deploy, he's either confused or kidding.

Reagan says he's not kidding, his officials say he's not kidding, but unless he's kidding Canada can't support him, and since we do support him ... he's got to be kidding.

It gets complicated. But it's worth unravelling because what we're talking about here is a defence system critics claim would destroy the nuclear balance of terror by giving the Americans a first-strike capacity against the Soviets.

And what we're also talking about is an independent Canadian foreign policy, or lack thereof.

The first thing you must know is that the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty is regarded as the cornerstone of international arms control, primarily because it is designed to prevent — or at least drastically impede — the building of the Star Wars type of system.

It is true that the treaty does not forbid a country conducting *research* on such a system. But it does prohibit *testing, development*, and naturally, *deployment* of such a space-based system.

This is not hair-splitting. There is a big difference between doing experiments — in the lab, space, or anywhere else — to try to find out what lasers are capable of, and developing them to the point where you incorporate them into weapons systems and knock things down with them.

A year ago some U.S. hawks began muttering that, because of another clause in the ABM treaty, it really wouldn't prevent the testing, development, and even deployment of Star Wars.

They were largely shouted down, and U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, somewhat grudgingly, agreed to stick with the "restrictive" interpretation — that the treaty actually does what it was designed to do.

Always lurking in the background, however, has been the threat that the administration would switch to the "permissive" interpretation — that testing, development, and even deployment are allowed.

The Canadian position has been that, while the Mulroney government considers it "prudent" to conduct research on Star Wars, it considers it both wrong and illegal to proceed to testing, development and deployment.

Immediately following the breakup of the Reykjavik summit, Reagan issued a statement saying he could not accept a Soviet demand that the U.S. not "develop, test and deploy a defence against nuclear missiles" for 10 years.

Oh, oh. As a Canadian External Affairs official was later to say, this sounded very much like "what (Reagan) was saying was that he had insisted upon a permissive interpretation of the ABM treaty, and the Russians had said no."

This seemed to call for an expression of concern on Clark's part — on several occasions he had publicly stressed the fundamental importance of the restrictive interpretation.

But when he addressed the House last week, Clark said the issue had been misinterpreted. Reykjavik had not broken down over any argument about restrictive or permissive interpretation of whether non-fixed ABM systems could be tested or developed.

It had broken down over whether SDI "research" should be conducted inside or outside of the laboratory, which was a different issue.

He then went on to laud the progress both sides had made, with particular compliments for the Americans.

He was immediately lambasted by both Liberal External Affairs critic Don Johnston and NDP Leader Ed Broadbent. Broadbent insisted that it was clear the president wanted the right to go ahead with development and testing of Star Wars over the next 10 years and to deploy the system at the end of the decade.

Clark's aides, obviously distressed at the head-shaking over Clark's position, invited several reporters to a background briefing.

There it was explained that Reagan had not meant what he said after the Reykjavik meeting.

"What happened is that you were dealing in a room with four very exhausted men... and at that point there was uncertainty, there was confusion..."

In fact, briefings the Canadians had received from the Soviets and the Americans shortly after the mini-summit indicated "it does not appear that that (testing, development and deployment) was the issue that caused the problem at Reykjavik," said one senior official.

"I think what Reagan really meant to say is 'the Russians were trying to stop us from doing the kind of research that would have enabled us, 10 years from now, to know if we could develop and deploy.'"

But whatever he meant to say in his exhausted state at the time, the U.S. president couldn't seem to shake his wording when he made a national television address to Americans one day later.

Reading from a text, Reagan said the U.S. had been prepared to move towards the elimination of ballistic missile stockpiles, but only if "during that time we would proceed with research, development and testing of SDI."

Then he added: "All done in conformity of ABM provisions."

According to Clark's interpretation of the treaty there are no ABM provisions for development and testing.

Don Mathes, assistant press secretary at the White House, confirmed this week that Reagan meant what he said. The president hadn't been confused and wasn't kidding, he said.

"The hitch came when the Soviets did not want us to develop or deploy, or test, thereby depriving the U.S. of coming up with a workable system. That would have been the end of SDI."

"I think it's very clear."

There's always a chance, of course, that Mathes is confused.

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CSO: 5220/11

SALT/START ISSUES

USSR: REACTION TO U.S. DEPLOYMENT OF 131ST ALCM/B-52

U.S. 'In Effect' Destroys SALT II

LD122030 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 2000 GMT 12 Nov 86

[Text] A Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman has said that if the United States goes beyond the limit established by the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, SALT-II, that basic agreement will in effect be destroyed. The spokesman made the statement in connection with the coming adoption for a service [as heard] of the United States 131st strategic bomber carrying cruise missiles. He warned that if the bomber was transferred to the United States Air Force without adequate cuts in strategic arms, the Soviet Union would consider itself free of its commitments under SALT-II.

Petrovskiy Briefs Spain

LD290026 Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish 2300 GMT 28 Nov 86

[Text] Vladimir Petrovskiy, Soviet deputy minister of Foreign Affairs and an expert on disarmament negotiations with the United States, is in Madrid. He is the USSR's special envoy to brief Spain, a NATO ally. Our colleague Juan Antonio Sacaluga met with him and has this report:

[Sacaluga] The USSR wants Spain to present to the Reagan administration its sense of political realism regarding international relations, a realism that favors an agreement on nuclear and conventional disarmament. The Soviet deputy minister of foreign affairs expressed himself along these lines in comments made this evening to Madrid Radio. Petrovskiy described the U.S. decision to bring a new nuclear B-52 bomber into service as dangerous and irresponsible. This surpasses the SALT II agreement, the only one that serves to limit the strategic nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers. In any event, the USSR does not want to interrupt the negotiations in Geneva.

U.S. Congressmen Protest

LD282325 Moscow TASS in English 2300 GMT 28 Nov 86

[Text] Washington November 29 TASS -- A Pentagon spokesman said on Friday that the 131st B-52 bomber, modernised to carry nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, had been added

to the U.S. strategic forces. In this way the United States violated the Soviet-American SALT-2 Treaty and exceeded the limits set by it on the strategic armaments. Democratic house members Les Aspin and Patricia Schroeder characterised that step as a blunder and a very wrong decision while Senator Sam Nunn stressed that the violation of the SALT-2 accord by the U.S. would worsen differences with allies.

Lomeyko Criticism

LD282336 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 2000 GMT 28 Nov 86

[Text] Washington has formally violated the Soviet-American strategic arms limitation treaty, SALT II, by putting the 131st cruise missile-carrying B-52 bomber into service. The special Soviet envoy Vladimir Lomeyko, has told a news conference in Vienna that Friday, the 28th, was a black day for the entire world because on that day a treaty was dashed that had been the most significant obstacle in the way of the arms race. No country, the Soviet official said, can idly watch the American Administration torpedoing the entire process of arms limitation.

Bogachev: 'Flagrant' Violation

LD281739 Moscow TASS in English 1735 GMT 28 Nov 86

["Washington Kills Another Treaty" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow November 28 TASS -- TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev:

Following orders from the White House, the 131st B-52 bomber was recently equipped with cruise missiles and has today been added to the U.S. strategic force and deployed at the Carlswell Air Force Base.

The fielding of that bomber with cruise missiles is a flagrant violation by the United States of the limits set by the Soviet-American SALT-2 treaty on the aggregate number of MIRVed strategic missiles and long-range bombers with cruise missiles. Washington has thus ultimately derailed another treaty on the limitation and reduction of armaments that had been concluded before Ronald Reagan assumed office.

During the 1984 election campaign, Reagan's lieutenants kept stressing that the incumbent President was honestly wishing to go down in history as a peacemaker and that if he was elected for another term, arms control would be problem number one for him. Yet the practical actions of the Reagan administration prompt the conclusion that its number one task is not the removal of the threat of catastrophic nuclear war but the "ultimate solution" of the problem of arms control through scrapping the last accords in that field.

The record of the U.S. Administration on problems of war and peace in the past 6 years includes Washington's renunciation of the treaties on the yield of underground nuclear tests and on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and the blocking of a tripartite treaty on a total and universal nuclear weapon test ban which was virtually ready for signature in 1980. The Reagan administration unilaterally stopped under far-fetched pretexts or without any explanations the talks on limiting military activity in the Indian Ocean, on arms sales and on anti-satellite systems, and thwarted the Soviet-American talks on the total prohibition of chemical weapons.

The American "Star Wars" plans imperilled the extremely important treaty on the limitation of ABM systems and accords on the prevention of the militarisation of space.

Washington spokesmen publicly claim that the United States "has walked an extra mile" and done everything it could and some more to resolve disarmament problems. One fears that if the current administration walks at least another quarter of a mile in that direction, not a single accord on lessening the threat of nuclear war will survive.

The renunciation of the SALT-2 treaty by the Reagan administration shows that Washington would like completely to remove the remaining barriers to the nuclear arms race and that the American military is prepared to continue to sacrifice the security interests of the nation to the arms merchants and their profits.

The reputation of the United States as a partner in the talks and a party to treaties has dropped to a very low point in the past six years. The ultimate cancellation of the SALT-2 treaty by the United States shows that some Washington politicians have panicked in the face of the prospects that emerged recently for the normalization of Soviet-American relations and the international situation as a whole.

Blinov Report

PM281450 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Nov 86 Morning Edition p 6

[Own correspondent A. Blinov report: "Violating the SALT II Treaty"]

[Text] Washington -- The White House is on the verge of officially violating the most important provision of the Soviet-American SALT II Treaty, which limits the number of MIRVed strategic missiles and bombers carrying cruise missiles.

On Friday 28 November, the 131st B-52 strategic bomber, equipped with cruise missiles with nuclear warheads, will be transferred from the auxiliary air force base at San Antonio to a bomber aviation unit at Carswell Air Force Base near Fort Worth (Texas).

In practice the United States exceeded the limit established by the treaty earlier this month, when the 131st B-52 bomber emerged from the hangar at the San Antonio base after it was refitted to take cruise missiles: Under the SALT II Treaty missiles and bombers carrying cruise missiles count as soon as they come out of the shops, factories, or other facilities.

Ignoring the clear language of the treaty, spokesmen for the American administration claimed that the 131st B-52 bomber is not regarded by them as operational until it arrives in a serving aviation unit. This step was originally scheduled for the end of December this year. [paragraph continues]

However, as THE WASHINGTON POST writes, President R. Reagan decided in the course of a meeting with Defense Secretary C. Weinberger and Secretary of State G. Shultz on 25 November to accelerate the transfer of the 131st B-52 bomber to the air base.

The White House's actions aroused criticism from U.S. political and public figures who advocate arms limitation. In the opinion of Democratic Senator A. Gore, President Reagan has made a miscalculation as serious as his mistakes in the story of weapons deliveries to Iran.

P. Warnke, who headed the American delegation at the SALT II talks, has condemned the White House's actions. In an article published in THE NEW YORK TIMES, he writes that the SALT II Treaty is the most significant strategic arms limitation agreement at the present day. Moscow has not violated the numerical limits it lays down, the author notes.

The Reagan administration has struck an unceremonious blow against the entire arms limitation process at a time when the USSR has put forward in Reykjavik far-reaching proposals in favor of new accords, P. Warnke writes in this connection.

Program Notes World Concern

LD282206 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1545 GMT 28 Nov 86

[From "the World Today" program presented by Eduard Mnatsakanov]

[Text] The U.S. Government has made the decision to introduce a new B-52 bomber into its operational strategic forces. It is reequipped to carry cruise missiles with nuclear warheads. This is the 131st bomber. The Soviet-U.S. SALT-II treaty, one of the most important international agreements in the area of arms limitation, has thereby been demonstratively and consciously broken. This action has caused very serious concern throughout the world. The Governments of Canada, the Netherlands, and some other countries have publicly condemned the provocative step of the United States. The Japanese newspaper ASAHI writes today: Washington intends to crush underfoot the SALT-II treaty and deprive the world of the most important obstacle standing in the way of a nuclear arms race. It is impossible to understand how, at this important moment, one can deliberately tear at the fabric of Soviet-U.S. ties, ties that are already delicate [tonkiy] anyway. Before it is too late, the newspaper states, the President of the United States must reexamine his decision.

Gerasimov Commentary

LD010038 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1500 GMT 30 Nov 86

[From the "International Panorama" program presented by Gennadiy Gerasimov]

[Text] [Gerasimov] The United States recently decided to station Lance operational-tactical missiles, capable of carrying nuclear or neutron warheads, in South Korea. These would be in addition to the types of nuclear weapons already there. At Reykjavik, the United States was on the point of agreeing to nuclear disarmament, yet now it is engaging in adding to its nuclear armaments.

This week saw the 131st strategic bomber armed with cruise missiles brought into service. That bomber has attracted enhanced attention, such as was not earned by the 130th and will not be earned by the 132d, because this was the proverbial first grain in the heap, the dividing line beyond which quantity becomes a new quality. This bomber took the United States beyond the limits established by the Soviet-U.S. agreement on limiting strategic weapons, known as SALT II. President Reagan has consistently criticized that agreement as deeply flawed, as one which merely limits weapons, while what is needed, it is maintained, is to reduce them. Yet it is reductions Washington is now rejecting in crossing the rubicon of limitations. This is a deliberate bellicose challenge. Strictly speaking, one more bomber does not make a decisive difference; its modernization could have been postponed. The increase in the bomber fleet will be less than 1 percent. In military terms it means additional hassle; in economic terms it means additional expense; but in political terms it means additional costs. Yet the step has been taken. The bomber's destination was Fort Worth in Texas, where it was to go on combat standby. One might, however, say that its destination was Reykjavik. The roar of its engines provides confirmation more convincing than any words that Washington today is in a bellicose frame of mind.

As it happens, the situation there at present is pretty chaotic. The U.S. TIME magazine has an article in its issue of 1 December -- and in case there is any

confusion here, U.S. weeklies are dated one week ahead -- entitled "Tower of Babylon," with a diagram showing Reagan and his subordinates speaking entirely at cross purposes. The scandal has so far gone through two phases.

First came the revelation that the United States had sold weapons to Iran, thereby both breaking its own law banning this and deceiving its allies whom the United States had been calling on not to do this. The President said at that time that there had been no third country involved in the secret machinations. But then it very soon came to be known that the weapons had reached Iran via Israel. That caused a great scandal. But then came an even greater scandal, when it was revealed that the profits derived from the operation -- and Israel was selling the Iranians the arms at highly inflated prices -- had gone into a numbered account at a Swiss bank, from which Nicaraguan contras drew money to buy military equipment from the U.S. Department of Defense via the CIA, such purchases contravening the congressional prohibition in force at the time.

It would seem that all of this was dealt with by just one man -- Colonel Oliver North, of the U.S. President's National Security Council. He was very smartly made a scapegoat and fired, while Admiral John Poindexter, the president's assistant for national security affairs, resigned in disgrace. He had been Reagan's fourth assistant for security matters. On 26 November the President appointed a commission of inquiry, but on the 28th Congress decided to set up its own commission. By analogy with the Watergate affair during the time of President Nixon, much is now being written about "Irangate," and forecasts are being made about who else will prove to be involved.

Already, though, there is all the material Americans could want as a basis for either indignation or sarcasm, according to one's choice. For instance, the President initially said that all the military supplies to Iran would have fitted in one aircraft -- in other words, it was all a storm in a teacup. But the fact is that such a capacious aircraft has not yet been built in the United States, for it has been reported that what Israel sold to Iran was over 2,000 antitank missiles, 200 antiaircraft batteries, and much else besides.

Testifying to a congressional commission, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State John Whitehead warned that if the inquiry went too far then, as he put it, the President would lose his ability to carry the free world with him, since, Whitehead said, the President would be left without clothes -- in other words, an emperor with no clothes. Senator John Glenn, for his part, said that if the President had not known what was going on then it means he is not coping with his job. So passions are running high, and this is happening not only as a result of the discrepancy between the eloquently proclaimed high official moral standards and the dirty tricks which have now leaked out but also on account of the issue of who is responsible for U.S. foreign policy. After all, Secretary of State George Shultz has said that he was not apprised of the whole of this affair. Scandal is also mounting over assessments of the political damage the President himself has suffered. His supporters are predicting that all will soon be forgotten, while his opponents are declaring that the damage cannot be shrugged off and that it will make the President what is called a lame duck, in other words not a ruling President but simply one sitting out his term of office.

Here is the opinion of yet another observer: Americans' relationship with Reagan was not so much a political one; it was more like a love affair. Of late Americans have begun asking whether they are being deceived, led up the garden path. There is danger here -- as happens in love affairs -- that love will turn to hatred and the whole affair will turn out even worse than it actually is.

U.S. Act 'Ultimate Renunciation'

LD11832 Moscow TASS in English 1811 GMT 1 Dec 86

[Text] Moscow December 1 TASS -- by TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev

On November 28, 1986, the United States exceeded quantitative limits set by the Soviet-U.S. Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty SALT-2, by phasing in a 131st B-52 strategic bomber.

Washington violated individual provisions of this treaty also earlier, in particular, when it began to develop two men intercontinental ballistic missiles, the Midgetman and the MX, which is prohibited by SALT-2 in no uncertain terms, and when it ignores its commitments under this treaty not to provide any deliberate camouflage for strategic systems.

But the latest case of the United States overstepping the limit on the total number of strategic MIRVed missiles and long-range bombers with cruise missiles is of a qualitatively new, political nature.

First, unlike the previous violations which the Pentagon either simply concealed or justified with casuistic interpretations of the treaty, the United States now has openly admitted the deployment of the "above-limit" bomber with cruise missiles.

Second, Washington has presented the violation as the U.S. ultimate renunciation of SALT-2.

A group of American senators, including Paul Laxalt, Strom Thurmond and Jesse Helms, asserted once that the existing arms control treaties and the process of talks only undermined the security of America and the "free world".

Washington's decision to brush aside the SALT-2 treaty marks victory for certain U.S. forces that look at the world through the cross-hairs of a sighting device.

The developments of recent weeks in the field of arms limitation and reduction show that Washington has responded by taking a step back to each Soviet attempt to move forward to accommodate the U.S. position and make it easier to look for mutually acceptable solutions.

It is in this way Washington has reacted to the Soviet Union's constructive proposals both for destroying the two countries' medium-range missiles in Europe and for their drastic cuts on a global scale.

The United States has beaten back from its own previous positions also in the issue of first reducing all strategic arms and then eliminating them completely.

The impression is that the White House is afraid of the very prospect of the sides' positions on the problems of war and peace getting closer.

The U.S. renunciation of SALT-2 is another step the present U.S. Administration has taken towards a "final solution" to the problem of limiting and reducing arms by destroying the corresponding agreements signed before President Reagan moved into the White House.

The Soviet-U.S. SALT-2 treaty of 1979 has been a result of the sides' reasonable compromise. It cannot be called ideal. From the Soviet point of view, the treaty could have been much more effective and comprehensive.

But even in its present form, SALT has been a reliable barrier in the way of the nuclear arms race. This is what has made its principal value.

What has made the U.S. Administration renounce a treaty which has, in the opinion of a vast majority of experts, including American ones, been advantageous to the United States?

The answer apparently is in Washington's desire to have its hands completely free to press on with the arms race.

The White House dislikes SALT for having sealed strategic parity and for hampering its illusory plans to gain military superiority.

By renouncing SALT-2, Washington has taken yet another step along the road of undercutting the very idea of solving international problems through talks.

The consequences of this decision as yet are hard even to predict.

Weinberger To 'Reassure' European Allies

PM021048 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Dec 86 First Edition p 5

[Vladislav Drobkov "Commentator's Column": "Will Sobriety Come?"]

[Text] Pentagon chief C. Weinberger flew to Europe on Monday. He will visit a number of capitals in the Old World, and will also take part in the winter conferences of the NATO military organs.

One of the main tasks of this trip, as UPI indicates, will be to reassure the allies, who greeted with concern the U.S. Administration's violation of the SALT II Treaty. America's partners have good grounds for concern. The transformation of the 131st strategic bomber into a nuclear cruise missile carrier, undermining the treaty, which took place last week demonstrated with the utmost clarity the true value of Washington's assurances on the desire for "arms limitation" and its cynical attitude toward international agreements.

Not only the peace-loving public and the progressive press, but even conservative newspapers and politicians are now criticizing Washington's actions. Thus the British Foreign Office stated that "the British Government has repeatedly made it clear that the SALT agreements should continue to be observed..." French President F. Mitterrand came out in support of the SALT II Treaty. Greek Prime Minister A. Papandreou, in a special statement, pointed out that the U.S. actions are leading to an unrestricted arms race. The Italian Government reiterated its position in favor of preserving the SALT II Treaty, while Prime Minister B. Craxi sent a personal message to the U.S. President. Representatives of the governments of Sweden and the Netherlands, Norway and Belgium, and a number of other countries expressed serious concern over Washington's action.

Paris' LE MONDE, characterizing the U.S. actions as a "shock" to the allies in Europe, writes that "the logic of Washington's policy is becoming less and less comprehensible." We will take the liberty of disagreeing with this assessment. The Pentagon's actions have their own "logic." But it is more like an insane "antilogic": By acting in this way, Washington is trying to prove that disarmament can be achieved only by means of... an endless arms buildup!

In this context it is apposite to recall the U.S. President's own words, uttered on Saturday during a radio address to the country for Thanksgiving Day: "Everyone knows that you cannot get richer by spending money, any more than you can get more sober by drinking."

When will Washington realize that you cannot endlessly get drunk on hopes of achieving military superiority? This question, judging by the West Europeans' alarmed reaction to the actions of their "senior partner," which has gone too far, is being asked by many of the U.S. allies.

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CSO: 5200/1124

SALT/START ISSUES

SOVIET GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ON U.S. SALT II VIOLATION

PM081001 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Dec 86 First Edition p 1

["Soviet Government Statement"-- PRAVDA headline]

[Text] The other day, the United States additionally put into service the 131st heavy bomber equipped to carry long-range cruise missiles without dismantling any equivalent nuclear-weapon delivery vehicle in compensation.

By making this step, it overstepped the aggregate limit, fixed by the SALT II treaty, of 1,320 units on the number of MIRVed strategic ballistic missile launchers and cruise missile-armed heavy bombers.

The U.S. does not conceal that this amounts to its total abandonment of the SALT II treaty which, as the U.S. Administration put it, was left behind it. Therefore, practical actions followed President Reagan's statement made last May about the intention to reject the 1972 interim agreement and the 1979 SALT II treaty, the statement that drew anxiety and condemnation around the world.

A treaty which has sealed military parity between the USSR and the United States and limited the nuclear arms race for a whole number of years in its central area -- the field of strategic offensive arms -- has now been trampled underfoot. The value and usefulness of this agreement consisted in its provisions on the sides' commitments to observe both quantitative and qualitative restrictions on their strategic nuclear means. The SALT II treaty provided for substantially narrowing possibilities to modernize these systems. Besides, it set corresponding limits on the main groups of strategic systems. Compliance with all these provisions, based on the sides' recognition of the principle of equality and equal security, ensured strategic stability and served as a point of departure in the search for ways of limiting and eliminating nuclear weapons.

The decision to beef up the U.S. arsenal of strategic means and violate the SALT II treaty has been dictated by nothing other than a desire by Washington to upset the military parity between the USSR and the United States and assure itself of military superiority. These actions are fraught with serious consequences for international security.

By undertaking them, the United States opens the gate to an unlimited race in strategic nuclear arms, which will inevitably sharpen the dangerous rivalry in the military field. The refusal to abide by the agreed restrictions on the quantitative growth and qualitative modernization of strategic offensive arms can make the situation unpredictable.

The United States has dealt the final blow to the SALT II treaty now but it has been undercutting it for more than one year. In the very first days after taking over the White House the Reagan administration gave up for lost the treaty's ratification. At the same time it launched activities that were in clear violation of the SALT II treaty. Ignoring the special restrictions set by the protocol to the treaty, for example, the United States has started mass deployments of long-range cruise missiles. Washington has obviously circumvented the treaty also by stationing its medium-range missiles in Western Europe as a supplement to the U.S. strategic potential.

Work has forged ahead at full tilt, in the meantime; to carry out an unprecedented program for modernizing and building up strategic offensive arms in all areas, with new MX and Midgetman intercontinental ballistic missiles, B-1B and stealth strategic bombers and nuclear-powered submarines with Trident-1 and Trident-2 missiles being developed and built.

Washington's attitude to the issue of stopping nuclear weapons testing has been a vivid manifestation of the militarist fever gripping it. The United States has not only refused to follow the example of the Soviet Union and declare a moratorium on nuclear explosions but has also been reluctant to discuss the issue and declined to go into talks whose aim would be a complete and ultimate end to nuclear testing.

The SALT II treaty was, of course, a serious impediment to all these militarist programs. This is why in Washington they decided to do away with it once and for all.

The military-industrial bosses' interests, connected with the development of a large-scale anti-missile defense system with space based elements and of space strike weapons, enter into conflict with the ABM treaty in just the same manner.

By means of the 'Star Wars' program the United States wants to extend the spiral of the arms race over to outer space and to convert outer space into a military citadel and staging area for the establishment of U.S. hegemony. This is why, to the U.S. Administration, the ABM treaty is next target after the SALT II treaty. The U.S. Administration has set about gradually shaking this agreement loose as well.

Washington cannot but be aware that such a policy gives rise to mounting indignation in the world. Hence, the endeavors to cover it up with talk about 'mutual restraint', and with declarative statements about commitment to nuclear disarmament, the statements which are being accompanied with every kind of inventions as to alleged violations of the obligations by the Soviet side.

The United States' break out of the SALT II treaty does not leave a trace of that scrim of verbiage and fully lays bare the militarist essence of the U.S. policy for the whole world to see.

As for U.S. propaganda efforts to misinform the world public by ascribing to the Soviet Union some violations of the strategic arms agreements, those are a desperate and dishonest attempt by diverting attention from the United States as the true destroyer of strategic stability and at finding if only some justifications for its departure from the international treaties.

The Soviet Union has been always strictly and honestly abiding by all the articles and all the provisions of the SALT II treaty, just as those of other international agreements as well.

It is significant that the United States decided to deal a blow to the structure of fundamental accords in the field of strategic arms limitation precisely at a time when a prospect for an improvement of the international situation had appeared, at last.

The Soviet program for the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000 has found wide-spread understanding and favorable response throughout the world. The initiatives which were put forward on the basis of the program and with which our country went to the meeting in Reykjavik opened up real ways towards a nuclear-free world.

The idea of a comprehensive system of international security is striking deep root. The new thinking in international affairs which has found reflection, in particular, in the Delhi declaration signed by the leaders of the USSR and India recently, is more and more tangibly supplanting the dogmas of power politics. Possibilities for a fundamental change in the entire international situation have begun to show.

The choice of precisely this moment by the U.S. Administration to torpedo the SALT II treaty cannot be regarded otherwise than a major provocation and an attempt at stopping the tendency towards relaxation of international tension.

The U.S. step is a logical element of the campaign of attacks against the historic opportunities which the Reykjavik meeting offered and which would open up the road to a nuclear-free world which, as it turned out, is being dreaded by the U.S. militarist circles so much.

Washington is making a big mistake. The exceeding of the limits set by the SALT II treaty will not strengthen U.S. security.

The results of the 6 years of the present administration's stay in office confirm: In the field of arms limitation the administration, without constructing anything, has destroyed and is destroying much.

Naturally, the U.S. decision, as the Soviet Government warned in its statement of May 31, 1986, gives the Soviet Union all grounds to regard itself free from its commitment under the 1972 interim agreement and the SALT II treaty.

At the same time, the Soviet side believes that there is still an opportunity for stopping the dangerous course of events that is being provoked by the irresponsible actions of the present U.S. Administration.

In America and outside it, it may be presumed, there is still enough political wisdom and the mere sense of self-preservation not to allow the wrecking of the entire structure of accords on the limitation of strategic arms that was created during 15 years.

Taking into account the immense universal importance of the issue and the need to preserve the key constraint on the strategic arms race, the USSR refrains for the time being from breaking out of the limitation under SALT I and SALT II.

All who cherish the cause of peace should realize that the task of uniting the forces in favor of the persistent search for a way out of the dangerous impasse into which the U.S. militarist circles are pushing mankind is urgent and acute today as never before. A reliable obstacle should be placed in the way of the imperial ambitions of domination on earth and in outer space.

The Soviet Union, for its part, resolutely counterposes a course of peace and international security to the irresponsible policy of the current U.S. Administration.

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CSO: 5200/1135

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TURKISH OPPOSITION TO PLACEMENT OF NATO MISSILES

Istanbul MILLI GAZETE in Turkish 10 Sep 86 p 3

[Text] Resat Yazak, Prosperity Party candidate for deputy in Izmir, issued a statement condemning the NATO plan to transform Turkey into a nuclear garbage dump. Yazak, who is a lawyer, maintained the following in his press release:

As supporters of a indigenous and honorable foreign policy we express severe condemnation of the plan by [Bernard] Rogers, commander in chief of NATO forces, who seems bent upon the transfer of some 10,000 missiles from Germany to be placed in our country, exerting pressures upon the Ankara government to that end.

In an U.S.-U.S.S.R. conflict Turkey is being set up as the initial target for U.S.S.R. The NATO commander misled into thinking that due to the present administration's posture they could dictate almost anything to Turkey. Even if the administration were to take decisions contrary to our national interest, there would always be a group of determined people ready to inform the public about these decisions and tell them the facts. Turkish people have an historic opportunity in these elections to invalidate this ploy which can only be seen as a conspiracy against their right to life. The by-elections are important in that they could bring about a change of government which would upset the dark strategies of the U.S. and NATO. The Turkish voter faces a situation in which he has to declare his stance.

One should never forget that Turkey is not a battlefield to be conceded by the U.S., or even less the latter's nuclear garbage dump. We do not want to see our country turn into a nuclear graveyard neither as an initial target nor as a result of an accident. At a time when people are having debates on the vital dangers of nuclear power stations we cannot place thousands of atom bombs in our country just to keep our American 'friends' happy, and cannot remain as spectators to such a ploy.

Prosperity Party is in the service of our nation with a program ranging from individual rights and freedoms to public interest, from territorial integrity to the protection of the environment, the establishment of law and justice, the realization of perfect independence, and the full protection of the right to life.

12466

CSO: 5200/2411

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

ONTARIO DECLARED NUCLEAR WEAPON -FREE ZONE

Legislative Vote

Windsor THE WINDSOR STAR in English 14 Nov 86 p A8

[Text]

TORONTO (CP) — The Ontario legislature voted Thursday by a wide margin to declare the province a nuclear-weapons-free zone.

But Premier David Peterson — who was not in the house for the 61-9 vote — said that while he supports the non-binding resolution as a moral statement, his government does not plan any moves to give it practical effect.

And Conservative house leader Mike Harris — who, with a majority of his party's members voted for the resolution — said the Tories view it as a symbolic gesture.

The private-member's resolution, proposed by New Democrat Richard Johnston and opposed by only two Liberals and seven Conservatives, calls on the government to prohibit the production, testing and transportation of nuclear weapons and component parts in Ontario.

Manitoba and the Northwest Territories, as well as dozens of municipalities across Canada have previously declared themselves nuclear-weapons-free zones.

"I'm shocked by the result," said Johnston, whose nearly identical resolution in 1983 was defeated by the

Conservative majority government. "I'm really surprised by the strength of our support."

His bill is a statement of principle that does not force the government to take any action. But, he said, the overwhelming decision should mean Peterson cannot ignore the result.

Most of the Liberal cabinet was not in the house for the vote, but Johnston said he was encouraged by the fact two influential ministers — Attorney General Ian Scott and Treasurer Robert Nixon — supported the resolution.

JOHNSTON AND spokesmen for several peace and church groups — who applauded in the public gallery when the result was announced — said the resolution was just the start of a campaign to rid the province, and Canada, of nuclear weapons.

The peace movement is growing and will not allow the resolution to "just sit there," Christine Peringer, of the Peace Research Institute of Dundas, Ont., said at a news conference after the vote. "This is just a beginning."

Johnston said he will give the government "a few days to let this sink in." He will then press the premier to

produce legislation to give teeth to the resolution, he said.

He suggested the government could, for example, withdraw provincial funding from Litton Systems, a Toronto company which makes parts for the U.S. cruise missile. It might also offer loans or other incentives for the firm to convert to production of goods not used for nuclear weapons.

Ontario Hydro could be told not to export tritium — a radioactive by-product of the Pickering nuclear-powered generating station — to the United States where it might be used to make weapons.

Peterson said he does not know what can be done beyond the resolution. Some decisions must be made by the federal government.

"I don't have any initiatives in mind at the moment," he said.

CITIZEN Editorial

Ottawa THE OTTAWA CITIZEN in English 18 Nov 86 p A8

[Editorial]

[Text]

Not many Ontario residents will sleep better knowing that the legislature has declared the province a nuclear-weapons-free zone. If ever the bombs start flying, they're not likely to bypass Ontario simply because our politicians have issued a decree.

The private-member's resolution by New Democrat MPP Richard Johnston is little more than a motherhood statement of abhorrence for fearsome weapons of mass destruction. While it calls on the government to prohibit the production, testing and transportation of nuclear weapons and component parts in the province, it is not binding on Premier David Peterson's administration.

Peterson has already said his government has no plans to give the resolution practical effect, but says he supports it as a moral statement, whatever that means.

Other than the most zealous advocates of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), few would disagree that the world would be a less frightening place if nuclear arsenals would somehow disappear.

But passing resolutions like this one won't produce that happy state. They just allow us to feel self-righteous without actually doing anything.

Yet because there's a chance voters will take these statements seriously and demand action by their governments, it's important to understand the implications of this disarmament strategy if it were actually adopted.

If every Western government declared its territory free of nuclear weapons, the effect would be unilateral disarmament. (Democracy in the Soviet Union being somewhat less robust, it would be naive at best, and reckless at worst, to assume that the U.S.S.R., inspired by the Western example, would benevolently junk its own nuclear arsenal.)

But perhaps the sponsors of Ontario's resolution really don't expect this. Perhaps they just want to get us out of the grubby business, while we continue to cower behind the American nuclear shield. There's a word for such moral selectivity; it's called hypocrisy.

RELATED ISSUES

CANADA: PEACE CONFERENCE TAKES UP CRUISE TESTS, SDI

Toronto THE TORONTO STAR in English 11 Nov 86 p A18

[Article by Gordon Barthos]

[Text] EDMONTON — Prime Minister Brian Mulroney has a problem.

It has to do with the girl with the spiked, electric purple hair. The one sporting a Cruise Busters button modelled on the *Ghostbusters* movie ads.

The one who wants to see Canada pull out of the Western alliance, "do a Finland" and perhaps even disband the armed forces.

She's concerned and confused. And Ottawa isn't helping.

"A lot of politicians are speaking over our heads," says 23-year-old Shannon Enns, an Edmonton parking lot attendant. "They're not talking to us."

Enns was one of more than 5,000 people who attended a two-day inquiry into Canada's defence policy, called *The True North Strong And Free?*

Her disillusionment, confusion and mistrust of Ottawa found a strong echo here and, as conference organizer Mel Hurtig argued, an echo that may one day spell trouble for the Progressive Conservatives at the polls.

The Tories would like Canadians to understand that Canada's close defence ties to the U.S. — a country with which we share every value that counts — needn't erode our sovereignty or prevent us from speaking out for disarmament.

But that comforting message just isn't getting through, in part because it doesn't seem to be backed up by a sharply focused, easily understood set of ideas on what Canadian sovereignty, defence priorities and arms-control goals ought to be in a world dominated by U.S. President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative, the space-based missile-defence scheme popularly referred to as Star Wars.

People at the conference complained bitterly that they simply can't see a coherent game plan in Ottawa on three vital issues:

□ Enhancing Canada's sovereignty through a stronger military presence in the North and on Canada's coasts, without getting drawn into dangerous U.S. plans to erect a Star Wars shield around the continent;

□ Speaking out clearly in favor of specific arms-control proposals — such as banning cruise missiles — that they say a large cross-section of the public believes in even if it means offending Canada's allies; and

□ Carving out a more coherent role for the nation's overburdened armed forces, while giving them the personnel and equipment to do the job.

As John Lamb, head of the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, puts it, Ottawa has crafted broad policies on defence and arms control but has shrunk from making its voice heard on the "hardware issues," which most directly threaten arms control. Those issues include the cruise missile, U.S. Star Wars plans or the proposed MX or Midgetman missile systems.

These practical issues are all heatedly debated in the U.S., yet they're all but ignored by Ottawa even though they will affect Canadian security interests, Lamb says.

Growing problem

The government's cautious, uninspiring approach to these questions left people like Shannon Enns on their feet Saturday, wildly cheering a proposal that Canada pull out of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the North American Aerospace

Defence Command (NORAD) and go neutral, and dozing off when the discussion got technical.

Former diplomat Geoffrey Pearson was quick to draw attention to the growing problem of the "gap between what governments think and what a lot of people think" on the likelihood of nuclear war and on the best ways to avert it.

Frustrated by Ottawa's perceived failure to come up with policies behind which the country can rally, and to use the influence Canada supposedly has with the U.S. to advance Canada's security interests, the True North conference came up with an agenda of its own that embraces moderate and extreme ideas:

- ☐ Drop our limited support for the U.S. Star Wars program;
- ☐ Lean on the Americans to go along with the Soviet test moratorium;
- ☐ Stop cruise testing if the U.S. reneges on arms control deals;
- ☐ Press both superpowers to agree to limits on cruise missiles; and
- ☐ Consider turning Canada into a Finland, free of military alliances.

With the exception of this last proposal, many Canadians would go along with these ideas. For one thing, they have the advantage of being easily understood.

The True North conference offers evidence that Canada's nationalists and peace activists are in effect rushing in where the government has feared to tread:

They are doing their best to pump a fresh jolt of political energy into Canada's role as

a middle power vitally concerned about preventing a nuclear war.

Former University of Toronto chancellor George Ignatieff caught the sense of political disaffection and urgency at the meeting when he observed that "there can be no incineration without representation."

Popular scientist David Suzuki made a related point with characteristic zip:

"If intelligent beings came from outer space and saw a species arming itself to destroy itself and the planet, but they say they are making things safer, (these beings) would say: 'This is insane.'"

Many speakers at the conference acknowledged that the Mulroney government is not utterly bereft of ideas on sovereignty, defence and arms control.

External Affairs Minister Joe Clark has defended wisely and well the existing superpower agreements to limit nuclear weapons and existing restrictions on anti-missile defences.

And Defence Minister Perrin Beatty has recently been hinting that his white paper on defence needs — expected in March — will contain some far-sighted plans to focus future defence spending on air defences in the North, and on submarines and ships off Canada's coasts.

But, as the 5,000-plus turnout at the week-end conference suggests, the perception is growing among purple-haired Canadians — and the much larger Wallabies-and-cardigan set — that Ottawa isn't yet quite awake to the need for a jolt of political energy that will safeguard Canada's sovereignty and promote peace.

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CANADA: DEMONSTRATORS PROTEST CRUISE TESTS, OTHER POLICIES

Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL in English 13 Nov 86 p A4

[Text]

More than 50 demonstrators were carted away by police after they blocked the main entrance to Defence Department headquarters yesterday after a protest against cruise missile tests and a variety of other defence policies.

Police reported 59 arrests after the demonstration, during which protesters splashed the front of the building with what they said was their own blood — donated the night before and kept in plastic bags.

The demonstrators were expected to face a variety of minor charges, including causing a disturbance, obstructing traffic and "things like that," a police spokesman said. They were to be released after signing promises to appear in court.

The protesters, including groups from Toronto, Montreal, Kingston, Ont., and Ottawa, were organized by the Alliance for Non-Violent Action, which describes itself as a "coalition of social change activists."

They distributed a list of grievances that included the tests of U.S. cruise missiles in Western Canada, the NATO training flights in Labrador, testing of submarine weaponry at Nanoose Bay, B.C., planned training flights over Canada by U.S. strategic bombers and supposed plans for land-based Star Wars weapons in the North.

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